November 20, 2026 | Real Clear World

Turkey Is Turning Lebanon into Another Front in Its Rivalry with Israel

November 20, 2026 | Real Clear World

Turkey Is Turning Lebanon into Another Front in Its Rivalry with Israel

Turkish flags fluttered above the streets of Tripoli as crowds welcomed Bilal Erdogan, the son of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Near the city’s Ottoman-era landmarks, a banner bearing the images of father and son proclaimed that Tripoli would light up for the visit. Lebanon’s Islamic Group, a Muslim Brotherhood organization designated by Washington as a terrorist organization in January, hailed the visitor as the “good son of a good father.” Despite holding no government position, Bilal Erdogan met President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. On November 12, Lebanon’s Parliament approved a military cooperation agreement with Turkey worth approximately $3 million over five years. 

Speaking in Tripoli, Bilal called for regional unity against Israeli military operations in Gaza, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and Syria, warning Israel that it “would not dare continue if the region’s peoples stood united.” His remarks reflect Ankara’s ambitions in Lebanon that could give it leverage against Israel while complicating the U.S.-led trilateral framework to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

Turkey’s efforts to expand its influence in Lebanon are nothing new. Turkish aid organizations have poured assistance into Turkmen villages in northern Lebanon. At the same time, Ankara developed close ties with the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which established an office in Turkey to deepen its political and organizational relationships there.

Erdogan made Ankara’s regional ambitions clear in June when he declared that Turkey’s security does not begin in southern Turkey but in “Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut.” Turkey has already established a military presence in Syria and developed close political and security ties with the government in Damascus, including through military training and assistance. Ankara is building relationships in the political, security and humanitarian spheres that could complicate the U.S.-led effort to disarm Hezbollah and normalize relations between Israel and Lebanon.

During Prime Minister Salam’s July visit to Turkey, the two governments discussed Turkish investments and rebuilding infrastructure. In September, Salam and Erdogan revisited Turkish assistance for southern Lebanon, including housing for displaced residents. Lebanon desperately needs reconstruction, but under the trilateral framework, that reconstruction rests on progress in dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. What Turkey is offering is an alternative to the American-led process by aiding in reconstruction without explicitly requiring the removal of Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

The implementation of the trilateral framework has largely stalled because of Beirut’s reluctance to disarm Hezbollah. Instead, Lebanese leaders have pressed Israel to withdraw and end its military operations, arguing that disarmament cannot be done forcibly and requires a domestic political dialogue with Hezbollah. Israel, on the other hand, insists that withdrawal can only be tied to verifiable progress on disarmament. This gap has created an opening for Ankara, whose diplomatic position overlaps with Beirut’s preference for a gradual Lebanese process rather than an Israeli military intervention. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has opposed an Israeli-imposed military solution to Hezbollah’s arsenal, arguing that the Lebanese government cannot disarm the group unilaterally and requires a domestic political arrangement.

In July, the Lebanese newspaper Annahar reported that figures close to Erdogan were uncomfortable with the American framework because eliminating Hezbollah could leave Israel with greater freedom to pressure Lebanon and Syria. Turkish academic Mohammad Hussein Marjan told the newspaper that Ankara did not want Lebanon drawn into Israel’s orbit.

Lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel would reduce a longstanding source of conflict in the region. However, Ankara views the conflict between Beirut and Jerusalem as an opportunity to continue exerting pressure on Israel. Turkey prefers a stalled process, with Hezbollah retaining some independent military capabilities. In that scenario, Turkey could position itself as an intermediary between Beirut and Washington while using its relationship in Lebanon to shape a favorable security environment.

Turkey has provided the Lebanese Army with training, technical cooperation, and equipment. It has also proposed equipping the planned southern Model Regiment, which would be committed to expanding state authority south of the Litani River, where Hezbollah’s military infrastructure remains. Erdogan has also said Turkey’s interested in participating in security initiatives, including deploying Turkish troops after the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon withdraws in 2027. A growing Turkish Lebanese security relationship would give Turkey influence over the Lebanese institutions responsible for implementing the disarmament process.

Turkey has also maintained contacts with Hezbollah. In December 2025, Lebanese outlet Al-Modon reported Turkish involvement in proposed assurances between Hezbollah and Syria. In June, Hezbollah parliamentarian Ali Fayyad told the pro-Iranian outlet Al Mayadeen that Hezbollah delegations had visited Turkey and received assurances against Syrian action. He also claimed Turkish support for Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon. On October 1, Reuters reported, citing six sources, that Syrian government officials and Hezbollah representatives had participated in secret talks in Turkey during September, arranged through Turkish security and intelligence channels. The talks reportedly addressed mutual security concerns.

These domestic ties give Turkey influence in Lebanon, but its standing outside Lebanon is what makes it especially useful to Beirut. Turkey is a NATO member with a substantial military and defense industry and access to Washington. Erdogan also has a personal relationship with President Donald Trump. For Beirut, Turkish intervention with Trump could create room to resist pressure to implement the trilateral framework coercively without formally repudiating its commitments. Ankara could press Washington to prioritize Israeli withdrawal and de-escalation while leaving Hezbollah’s disarmament to a Lebanese political process whose pace and enforceability Beirut controls.  

Washington should reject any alternative arrangements that do not include enforceable progress toward dismantling Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Washington should also oppose any Turkish military deployment in southern Lebanon that could undermine independent verification of disarmament or establish a competing security arrangement. More importantly, Washington must prevent Ankara from using its growing influence in Lebanon to preserve or protect Hezbollah as a counterweight or pressure point on Israel. By helping preserve the political and security arrangements that allow Hezbollah to retain its weapons, Ankara could turn Lebanon into another arena of its regional competition with Israel, at the expense of a lasting peace agreement.

Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), in Washington, D.C., where Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and director of the Turkey program.