Turkey and Pakistan Loop Qatar and Indonesia Into Burgeoning Defense Axis

The Mecca Pact gained a cousin on Wednesday when two of its signatories — Turkey and Pakistan — announced a new defense agreement with Qatar and Indonesia. The Badr Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed in Doha on October 21, aims to “facilitate cooperation and integration” between its four signatories in manufacturing, research and development, and technical training. The head of Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) said that the MOU, named after the full moon, “will contribute to transforming the complementary capabilities of Qatar, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Turkey into concrete projects.”

Unlike the Mecca Pact, which Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed in August 2026, the Badr MOU is not a mutual defense agreement. Instead, it builds on existing bilateral partnerships, expanding and providing a defense-industrial component to the emerging Mecca orbit. However, without any associated projects, investment commitments, or new production-sharing arrangements, it is unclear whether the Badr memorandum will become a substantive partnership or remain largely declaratory.

Badr Builds on Existing Defense-Industrial Partnerships

Qatar already operates Turkish drones, armored vehicles, and fast attack craft, and in 2018 established a joint venture (“BARQ”) with Turkish defense companies ASELSAN and SSTek. BARQ expanded in January 2026 “to cover high-technology areas and selected local production capabilities,” according to an ASELSAN press release.

Turkey has also cooperated with Pakistan on four Babur-class corvettes for the Pakistani navy through a 2018 technology transfer agreement and in 2019 signed a contract with Indonesia for the coproduction of 18 KAPLAN MT tanks. The first tranche of tanks was delivered to Indonesia in 2022. Three years later, Ankara selected Indonesia as the first customer for its fifth-generation KAAN fighter jet. The export agreement provides for technology transfer and the development of production and maintenance infrastructure inside Indonesia.

American Partners Are Building Parallel Networks

The Badr MOU is the latest example of American partners hedging their relationships with the United States by developing their own regional defense and economic frameworks. Pakistan and Qatar are Major Non-NATO Allies of the United States, granting them enhanced “military and economic privileges.” Qatar also received a U.S. security guarantee via executive order in September 2025. Indonesia, though not a treaty ally, is a longstanding U.S. security partner, and Turkey remains a NATO member. Still, the perception of waning U.S. security commitments and the parties’ longstanding outreach to American adversaries are encouraging them to diversify. Alongside Turkey’s regional ambitions, these dynamics are inspiring a web of new networks.

In June 2026, for example, Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed two memoranda of understanding to establish a rail line connecting the Gulf to Europe via Syria and Jordan. The design, reminiscent of the Ottoman-era Hejaz Railway, circumvents Israel and the United Arab Emirates, defying and potentially competing with the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) that Washington is championing. Even if these initiatives are slow to materialize, they show that American partners are increasingly willing to route around Washington, which could erode U.S. influence in the region.

Washington Should Monitor Badr and Clarify CAATSA Reach

Washington should monitor the Badr MOU for concrete outcomes, such as named coproduction programs, the establishment of a joint company, or the potential addition of new members, and ensure that associated efforts align with American interests in the region. Washington should monitor the Badr MOU for concrete outcomes, such as named coproduction programs, the establishment of a joint company, or the potential addition of new members, and ensure that associated efforts align with American interests in the region. Additionally, SSB, as Turkey’s leading defense procurement authority, will ostensibly be involved in Badr-related projects despite the fact that it remains under sanctions that bar U.S. export licenses and authorizations to the agency. The State and Commerce Departments should clarify how these sanctions apply to future Badr-related cooperation and review U.S.-origin components in jointly produced systems, including those marketed to third countries.

Natalie Ecanow is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Helin Unal is a research fellow at FDD. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Natalie on X @NatalieEcanow. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.