Riyadh has an obvious problem, but no obvious solution

Now, the Kingdom is in a war it tried to avoid, but still without a clear path to victory.

On October 10, the Iran-backed Yemeni terror group launched a deadly drone and missile attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport, killing at least 13 people and injuring more than 300. Operations at the airport are suspended until at least October 17, but the Houthis have continued launching daily attacks and warned international airlines to stay away from Saudi airspace and airports. They exempted the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from their warning despite targeting both in recent weeks.

This is exactly the kind of danger Riyadh has hoped to avoid. Saudi Arabia led an expensive seven-year air campaign in support of the Yemeni government after the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, sparking a civil war. Once the UN-brokered truce in 2022 brought peace, Riyadh sought political engagement because decisive victory remained elusive.

The Houthis began their recent escalation in mid-July after Riyadh, at the request of Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG), struck Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian plane from landing. Ostensibly, the plane was returning the Houthi delegation that attended slain Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral, but it also carried Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and weapons. The exchange of strikes between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia shattered the fragile 2022 truce and restarted the Yemeni civil war. Weeks later, the group began drone and missile attacks across Yemen but with a focus on the government-controlled southern Red Sea coast, including the key port city of Mocha, ahead of a ground advance.

In mid-September, the Houthis burst out of their territory and seized the entire Yemeni Red Sea coast. This move granted the group and its partners in Tehran control over the critical Bab al-Mandeb chokepoint. Iran, losing leverage in the Strait of Hormuz as the U.S. moved oil through the Persian Gulf to market, wanted to pressure a second waterway. Riyadh exported an average of over 4 million barrels of oil per day – roughly 4% of global supply – via the Red Sea, until the Houthis declared a maritime blockade of the Kingdom in July.

Yemen’s west coast forces collapsed in the face of the rapid Houthi advance, sparking concern about the capacity of the anti-Houthi coalition. Still, Yemen’s IRG launched a counteroffensive with Saudi support on October 5 pushing the Houthis back from the immediate vicinity of Bab al-Mandeb on the first day. Fighting continues along the west coast and in key territory inland of the Houthis’ recent gains.

The goal goes beyond reversing recent Houthi gains. The Saudi-led coalition spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, said the Kingdom will support Yemen until “the Terrorist Houthi Militia is eliminated.” It is less clear how Riyadh and Yemen’s IRG will accomplish what previous campaigns couldn’t.

There are important differences. Before January of 2026, Yemeni forces were backed by either Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh and its partners ultimately drove Abu Dhabi out of the country after the Emirates’ southern secessionist partners attempted to seize southern and eastern territory in late 2025. Since then, Saudi Arabia has consolidated its influence and moved to unite the various factions of Yemen’s anti-Houthi coalition under one chain of command. Historically, Yemeni forces have struggled to present a cohesive challenge to the Houthis because of conflicting loyalties, goals, and, in some instances, mutual animosity. Riyadh may not have made enough progress before the Houthis mounted their attack.

Furthermore, it’s unclear if Yemen and Riyadh will receive substantial international support. Washington has repeatedly rejected Saudi requests for American airstrikes on the Houthis. The UK is providing refuelling for defensive operations, and France has committed personnel and systems to defend critical energy infrastructure. Turkey and Pakistan, Riyadh’s partners in the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, have only offered limited support focused on Saudi self-defence. Defensive support is needed, but Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s IRG need support fighting the Houthis.

Tehran is doubling down on the Houthis. IRGC advisors supported the Houthis on the ground during their west coast advance. The July flight with arms and personnel was just the latest in Iran’s decade-plus history of arming the Houthis. As the Iranian conflict with the U.S. has become focused on energy and economics, the regime in Tehran won’t give up the Houthi leverage over the Red Sea easily.

The West has resisted military action against the Houthis. Interrupting Houthi smuggling routes, purchases of dual-use technology, and illicit finance channels can cut the group off from resources and resupply.

The Houthis are a threat far beyond Yemen’s borders. So long as they are on Saudi Arabia’s southern border the Kingdom and the region will face an era of instability.

Bridget Toomey, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focuses on Iranian proxies, specifically Iraqi militias and the Houthis.