Any Iranian Enrichment Gives Tehran a Path to Nuclear Weapons

Washington has restated its red lines on Iran. On May 7, President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance reiterated the administration’s demand that Iran peacefully dismantle its nuclear weapons program, including uranium enrichment as well as its plutonium reprocessing capabilities — key processes that make fuel for atomic arms — or face military action. The United States and Iran have held three rounds of talks in Oman aimed at reaching an agreement to limit Tehran’s nuclear activities, and a fourth round may occur this weekend.

Dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is the correct U.S. position since any remaining nuclear fuel production capability means Tehran can ramp up production to weapons grade at any time.

U.S. Demands for No Enrichment

Since taking office, Trump administration officials have repeatedly said they seek the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, including the regime’s ability to enrich. Tehran would be allowed to have a civilian nuclear program but one that only utilized imported enriched uranium fuel. “No one right now has a civil nuclear program, with their entire enrichment infrastructure, that could enrich to the 90 percent needed to get to missile material and a nuclear weapon,” Vance stated on May 7 at the Munich Security Conference.

Secretary of State and interim National Security Advisor Marco Rubio noted on May 1, “The level at which [Iran enriches] it is really not relevant per se because, really, if you have the ability to enrich at 3.67 percent, it only takes a few weeks to get to 20 percent and then 60 percent and then the 80 and 90 percent that you need for a weapon.” Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and UN Ambassador nominee Mike Waltz have also expressly demanded that Iran dismantle its uranium enrichment program.

Iran’s Enrichment Program Geared Toward Nuclear Weapons Production

As Vance noted, Iran’s enrichment program is geared toward producing weapons-grade uranium fuel for nuclear weapons. For example, Iran does not fuel any nuclear power reactors with its enrichment capability, instead importing fuel from Russia to operate its sole plant at Bushehr.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has underscored its concern about the nuclear weapons trajectory of Iran’s program, noting that Tehran is the only state without nuclear weapons that makes highly enriched uranium (HEU), or uranium enriched to 60 percent purity. Producing HEU represents 99 percent of the effort to make weapons-grade uranium, or uranium enriched to 90 percent. Iran currently has enough enriched uranium overall to fuel at least 17 nuclear weapons.

Moreover, Iran has been under investigation by the IAEA since 2002 for violations of its legal safeguards obligations and efforts to build nuclear weapons. As recently as February 2025, the IAEA reported that it was not “in a position to provide assurance” that Iran’s nuclear program is “exclusively peaceful.”

Notably, only five other non-nuclear weapon states enrich uranium: Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands. None of those programs produces HEU or is under IAEA investigation. Some 23 countries have peaceful nuclear energy programs but forgo enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, instead importing this proliferation-sensitive fuel.

Any Enrichment Means Iran Can Make Weapons-Grade Uranium

Even if Iran retained low-level enrichment — or enrichment to 3.67 percent purity — it could increase production to weapons grade at any time. The Institute for Science and International Security, for example, estimated on May 6 that Iran could make weapons-grade uranium within a month if it retained its current low-enriched uranium stock and more than 13,000 fast-enriching advanced centrifuges.

To block Iran’s path to a bomb, the Trump administration must hold firm on its dismantlement and no-enrichment demand, which must include the full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, in-place destruction, or export of Iran’s centrifuges and related infrastructure.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.