February 24, 2025 | Policy Brief
Risking Sanctions, South Africa Welcomes Nuclear Cooperation with Russia and Iran
February 24, 2025 | Policy Brief
Risking Sanctions, South Africa Welcomes Nuclear Cooperation with Russia and Iran
South Africa is on a collision course with President Donald Trump.
On February 17, Pretoria’s minister of mineral and petroleum resources, Gwede Mantashe, signaled his government’s openness to nuclear energy cooperation with two of America’s chief adversaries: Russia and Iran. “We can’t have a contract that says Iran or Russia must not bid, we can’t have that condition,” Mantashe said. “If they are the best in terms of the offer on the table, we’ll take any [country].”
Just days earlier, Mantashe threatened to “withhold” South Africa’s critical mineral resources from the United States — a direct response to Trump’s February 7 executive order halting all U.S. assistance to South Africa. Trump’s order highlights South Africa’s support for Iran and Hamas, as well as its lawfare against Israel, all of which reflect the increasingly anti-American policies of the ruling African National Congress (ANC).
Dealings with Iranian, Russian Nuclear Sector Carry Sanctions Risk
Iran’s entrance into the anti-Western BRICS framework — of which South Africa is an active participant — has strengthened ties between Pretoria and Tehran. Last September, on the sidelines of a BRICS energy summit, Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Ali-Abadi declared Iran’s readiness “to share these technical and specialized capacities with BRICS member countries, including South Africa.” It is not clear if this was a reference to nuclear technology, yet such dealings would run afoul of U.S. sanctions.
South Africa has also historically pursued nuclear cooperation with Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom). In September 2014, six months after the Kremlin carried out its illegal annexation of Crimea, South Africa signed an approximately $76 billion nuclear energy agreement with Russia. The deal, which faced public scrutiny over transparency concerns, was ultimately declared unlawful by South Africa’s High Court in 2017.
Since then, the United States has sanctioned nearly 70 Rosatom subsidiaries and related individuals, including its chief executive officer and management board. Any unauthorized dealings with Rosatom could expose South Africa to future U.S. sanctions.
Mantashe Dismisses U.S. Sanctions — Until They Kill a Russian Energy Deal
Mantashe has a checkered history of supporting Russian energy investments. In late 2023, South Africa’s national oil and gas company, PetroSA, controversially selected Russia’s Gazprombank to restart its Mossel Bay gas-to-liquids refinery despite the bank’s failure to demonstrate it could support the nearly quarter-billion-dollar deal. Moreover, the tender process raised suspicions after PetroSA disqualified 19 of the 20 companies that submitted bids, leaving Gazprombank as the only bidder. Despite PetroSA officials warning of the obvious sanctions risk, Mantashe boasted before parliament: “We cannot take a hostile position because the West feels so. We will work with them … I am not one of the people who is sensitive in working with Russia, and believes that working with them will translate to sanctions.” By November 2024, however, the United States sanctioned Gazprombank and its six foreign subsidiaries, including South Africa-based GPB Africa and Middle East Pty Ltd. Since then, Gazprombank reportedly failed to deliver the promised funding, but Mantashe also indicated on February 18 that U.S. sanctions were ultimately responsible for the deal falling through.
Washington Should Sanction ANC Officials, Restrict U.S. Nuclear Cooperation
South Africa continues to seek America’s assistance despite its governments pursuit of policies that harm U.S. interests. For the last decade, Washington and Pretoria have been negotiating a new nuclear cooperation agreement — known as a Section 123 Agreement — to facilitate nuclear material and technology transfers. Although the parties have reportedly concluded technical-level negotiations, legal processes remain incomplete, and a new agreement remains unsigned.
Absent a commitment from South Africa to forgo nuclear cooperation with Iran, Russia, and other U.S. adversaries, President Trump should halt the ratification of the Section 123 Agreement. The administration should also warn South African leaders that dealings with sanctioned Russian and Iranian nuclear entities will trigger sanctions on South African nuclear producers — and the officials enabling such transactions.
Max Meizlish is a senior research analyst for the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Alexander St. Leger is a research analyst. For more analysis from Max, Alexander, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow them on X @maxmeizlish and @AlexStLeger. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.