Saudi Nuclear Deal Raises Concern Over Diluted U.S. Nonproliferation Standards

In a notable loosening of decades of U.S. nonproliferation practice, the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia now being reviewed by Congress would open the door to uranium enrichment of just under 20 percent purity at a facility on Saudi soil.

The text sent to Congress last week has been declassified, but two associated side letters remain classified, according to a congressional source, presenting an obstacle to public scrutiny. Under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, Congress has 90 days of continuous session to block the accord.

The arrangement raises the risk that Russia and China will abandon their own restraint and offer enrichment and reprocessing to partners — capabilities that can produce reactor fuel or material for nuclear weapons — or trigger other states in the region to seek them.

Enrichment and Conversion Study

The 30-year accord authorizes transfers of reactors, equipment, fuel-cycle information, and safeguarded low-enriched uranium. It bars restricted data, prohibits retransfer without U.S. consent, and forbids military use. Riyadh may not reprocess spent fuel or alter sensitive nuclear material without prior U.S. approval.

A two-year “Joint Enrichment and Conversion Study” would examine U.S. transfers of conversion and enrichment technology, potentially permitting enrichment up to 5 percent purity on Saudi soil. A separate study would then consider production of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), enriched up to 20 percent and used in some advanced or small modular reactors. Enrichment to 3-5 percent purity represents most of the effort to produce 90 percent, or weapons-grade, uranium.

Reports suggested the administration would negotiate “black box” limits denying Saudi personnel access to enrichment technology, but the 123 agreement itself sets out no such terms. These would likely be negotiated separately, if at all.

Safeguards Gaps

The agreement can only take effect alongside a special bilateral safeguards arrangement enshrining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a monitoring role. Riyadh already accepts IAEA safeguards at declared sites. The special arrangement would add shorter-notice IAEA access to “covered sites” — those related to activities specified in the nuclear agreement — and disclosure of sensitive activities. This is intended to supplement the IAEA’s enhanced inspection regime, the Additional Protocol (AP), which Saudi Arabia has refused to adopt. But it would not authorize IAEA access to undeclared sites where covert work might be occurring, as would be the case under the AP.

Washington did not make the AP a condition, even though it has 123 agreements with 51 countries that have an AP in force and only two that do not.

Proliferation Concerns Inadequately Addressed

The State Department’s Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) notes Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s past remarks that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran did, then downplays the concern by citing later Saudi nonproliferation pledges. It never explains how Washington would constrain Iranian enrichment after authorizing it on the territory of one of Tehran’s chief rivals.

The NPAS also cites a rationale of drawing Saudi Arabia toward the U.S. nuclear sector rather than Chinese or Russian suppliers. Yet there is no public evidence that Beijing or Moscow offered Riyadh enrichment or conversion. If the United States abandons its longstanding opposition to spreading such technology, China and Russia may add similar incentives to their own offers. The assessment also fails to examine whether Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, or others in the region would seek enrichment or reprocessing in response.

Congress Should Oppose the Agreement

Congress should urge the president to withdraw the agreement and renegotiate it to bar conversion, enrichment, and reprocessing and to require the AP. If he refuses, lawmakers should oppose the accord.

Congressional sources say a joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced later this month. Both chambers would need simple majorities to pass it; overriding a presidential veto would require two-thirds of each house — a remote prospect.

Even so, Congress should take a stand against a deal that risks a new cascade of proliferation and work to reverse it if the agreement takes effect.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.