Russia Accuses Serbia of Betrayal

On Thursday, May 29, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) accused Serbia of “an attempt to stab Russia in the back.” It blamed Serbia’s defense companies of supplying weapons to Ukraine and stated that they “have one obvious purpose: to kill and maim Russian servicemen and civilians.” The SVR emphasized that the arms sales are conducted via a “simple scheme using fake end-user certificates and intermediary countries” to act as “a cover for anti-Russian actions.” Oddly, the day after  the SVR’s statement, there was an explosion at the defense company Krušik, in Serbia, which was mentioned in the statement. 

This SVR news may be shocking to some, but for those who have been closely following Serbia-Russia relations for years, it comes as no surprise. According to a leaked classified Pentagon document in 2023, Serbia committed to send Ukraine “lethal aid or had supplied it already.” Serbia’s then Minister of Defense denied this statement: “Serbia did not, nor will it be selling weapons to the Ukrainian nor the Russian side, nor to countries surrounding that conflict.” Then, in 2024, the Financial Times reported that Serbia had exported 800 million euros worth of ammunition to Ukraine through third parties since February 2022.

The SVR report raises an important question: why did Russia choose to publish this statement now? Is it possible that the SVR remained unaware of these widely circulated reports until years after their publication? Unlikely. Rather, it seems that the statement is a stern warning to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić – Moscow is becoming increasingly tired of his balancing act, which sees him cultivating ties with Moscow, Beijing, and Brussels at the same time.

His refusal to choose a side is visible across many of his decisions of the past three years. Although Vučić has refused to join Western sanctions on Russia, Serbia has previously condemned Moscow’s actions in the United Nations, and Vučić often contends that Serbia is on the path to EU ascension. Some may thus conclude that Serbia is aligning with the West, but this ignores the facts on the ground. Serbia, for example, still serves as a sanctions evasion haven for Moscow, relies on Russia’s gas, and has close security relations with the Kremlin.

Furthermore, Belgrade may have supported Ukraine in the UN, but it’s only symbolic. The logic behind Vučić’s decision is simple: In Serbia’s view, its territorial integrity was illegally violated by Kosovo’s unilateral 2008 declaration of independence, and so supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the UN provides an easy parallel that serves Belgrade’s narrative of ownership. Since resolutions did not require signatories to impose sanctions, Serbia’s vote represented a low-stakes opportunity to give itself a slight boost in the eyes of Western leaders without truly jeopardizing Belgrade’s relations with Moscow.

Vučić’s ultimate goal is to remain in power, and he will play all sides toward that end.

For Serbia, sending weapons to Ukraine is not an ideologically driven decision. Defense companies simply offer lucrative business opportunities. Similarly, Vučić only keeps the door open to EU accession to access EU funds. He has no interest in aligning Serbia with the EU’s strict rules about corruption, rule of law, and democratic governance. His ultimate goal is to remain in power, and he will play all sides toward that end, maintaining close ties with Russia and China while getting economic benefits from the EU. 

However, unlike the West, Russia does not tolerate betrayal, and Vučić’s self-serving duplicity does not bode well for Moscow’s plans. Putin does not care about rightful ownership of territory in the Balkans; he simply needs chaos to reign in the region. This is because instability and conflict provide an opening to expose the EU and NATO as paper tigers in the region, incapable of addressing the myriad pressure points he is placing on the continent. They also allow him to position himself as a peacemaker, an important bargaining chip with the West. Therefore, as the SVR’s statement shows, he has little patience for Vučić’s maneuvering. 

In chastising Vučić, the SVR drew on the shared Slavic origins that tie together Russian and Serbian nationalism – a key pillar of Vučić’s efforts to stay in power. The statement accused “Serbian defense contractors and their patrons” of profiting “from the blood of their brother Slavic peoples” and forgetting “who their real friends are and who their foes are” and offered historical examples of Russian support for Serbian independence despite Western meddling. “Throughout all these historical stages,” it offered, “the bonds of brotherhood and shared faith remained unbreakable for Russians in their relations with Serbs.” The implicit threat is as clear as the call to ordinary Serbians: if Belgrade doesn’t fall in line, much of the legitimacy underpinning the government’s nationalist platform might find itself undermined by the Kremlin.

And Vučić is feeling the heat. As a response to the SVR statement, Serbia’s President announced that he has recently discussed the issue of the arm exports to Ukraine with Putin and that Serbia has “formed a working group, together with Russian partners, to establish the facts.”

Although Russia has been trying to portray itself as a protector of its “Slavic Brother,” the SVR’s statement is far from the truth. The West should use information operations to target the far-right audience in Serbia who still believe in friendship between Moscow and Belgrade.

They should remind the Serbs that Russia had previously joined the NATO-led peacekeeping mission to Kosovo, but it abandoned it in 2003. The West should emphasize to Serbian nationalists: “Where was Russia in 1999 to protect its Slavic brothers from NATO?” When Yugoslavia requested military support from Moscow, Russia sent incomplete S300s that were not even possible to use. It should remind them that in May 1992 Russia voted for a UN Security Council resolution introducing sanctions against Yugoslavia. Reportedly, Moscow also armed Croatia during the wars in the 1990s and, in 1999, it was Moscow’s “nyet” that prevented Yugoslavia from joining the Slavic Union between Russia and Belarus.

Putin’s anger over Serbia’s weapons sales is pure theater. Russia has betrayed its “Slavic brother” far more egregiously and repeatedly. It’s time to remind both Moscow and Belgrade exactly who the real fair-weather friend has been.

Dr. Ivana Stradner serves as a research fellow with the Barish Center for Media Integrity at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.