Erdoğan’s fourth term, brought to you courtesy of Turkey’s Kurds?

When Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ran for re-election in 2023, he told voters, it would be the last time. Under current provisions, Turkey’s President can only hold office for two five-year terms, but it now appears that Erdoğan will seek a (constitutionally prohibited) fourth term. To achieve this, he will need to find a way to change the constitution, but this can only happen if he succeeds in gaining the support of Turkey’s main pro-Kurdish party.

The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM, formerly HDP, Turkey’s is Turkey’s third-largest political party, and only DEM has the requisite number of seats in parliament (given the right incentives) to enable changes. (This is because following the most recent general elections, the party secured 57/600 seats in parliament).

Constitutionally, Erdoğan may be term-limited, but he has worked around this inconvenience before. He was originally elected president in 2014, and again 2018. He was re-elected for a third time in 2023 by relying on a technicality based on the argument that his 2014 election took place when Turkey was governed under the old parliamentary system. In 2017, Turkey transitioned from a parliamentary to a presidential system of rule that significantly increased the executive and legislative powers of the presidency. Thus, when Erdoğan announced his candidacy in 2023, he stated that his first term had actually begun in 2023, as the period between 2014–2018 did not count, as it was the old system.

Erdoğan is hopeful that he can entice DEM members by satisfying key political demands of the Kurdish movement. While wooing DEM, Erdoğan is stridently moving to beat down and delegitimize Turkey’s remaining political opposition, spearheaded by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) from fielding a credible presidential candidate that could successfully defeat him in a presidential election.

Turkey’s Kurdish political movement represents the most discriminated minority in the country. Kurds have experienced high levels of political oppression since the founding of Turkey in 1923, including political bans against Kurdish parties, removal and jailing of Kurdish parliamentarians and the denial of basic human rights to citizens of Kurdish origin, such as using their mother tongue. To think that DEM would now help play a vital role in helping Erdoğan consolidate power is ironic. Since 2015, Erdoğan has done much to damage DEM and the Kurdish movement. Numerous democratically elected Kurdish mayors, 58 to be exact, have been unlawfully removed from office and replaced by government-appointed trustees over their alleged ties to the Kurdish militants. This refers to the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which is designated a terrorist group by Turkey and the West.

In 2016, pro-Erdoğan courts arrested senior DEM party leaders, such as Selahattin Demirtaş on bogus charges of organizing protests in 2014 “in the country’s Kurdish-populated regions, known as the ‘Kobanî protests.’” He was sentenced in May 2024 to more than 40 years and an additional two-and-a-half-year sentence in July 2024.

What could Erdoğan possibly offer DEM?

The Kurds’ motivation to help Erdoğan would be based on self-interest and realpolitik. In late 2024, Erdoğan and his far-right nationalist coalition ally, Devlet Bahçeli, began negotiating with DEM’s leadership. This came as a surprise, mainly because Bahçeli, who leads the ultra-Turkish Nationalist Action Party (MHP), is historically anti-Kurdish and anti-minority rights. However, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development (AKP) and Bahçeli’s MHP lack the required number of seats to change the constitution.

Rumors coming from the secretive deliberations between the AKP/MHP and DEM suggest that Erdoğan is preparing to announce the release of Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan was the founder and previous leader of the PKK. He is an inspirational figurehead, and has been in a Turkish prison since his capture and conviction in 1999. Securing his release would be a big win for DEM, as he is widely regarded by Kurds internationally as being the Kurdish equivalent of Nelson Mandela. Erdoğan is also allegedly considering granting autonomy to Turkey’s Kurds. What this means in practice is unknown, but it would likely include measures such as legally protected cultural rights and perhaps territorial autonomy. Together, Öcalan’s release and cultural/administrative autonomy would be gains that would be hard to refuse/decline.

As negotiations continue , Turkey’s pro-Erdoğan judiciary is taking simultaneous steps to cripple the remaining political opposition. On January 21, law enforcement officials unexpectedly arrested and jailed Umit Özdağ, leader of the far-right Victory Party (ZP). Özdağ stands accused of insulting Erdoğan. Özdağ is not a major political actor threatening Erdoğan’s chances of re-election, but his arbitrary removal from the political field is intended to send a clear message: Erdoğan is willing to jail any political opponent at a time and day of his choosing. Such a message is particularly relevant to Ekrem İmamoğlu, the charismatic CHP mayor of Istanbul, a position which Erdoğan once held. At the 2023 presidential elections, many voters were hopeful that the CHP would nominate İmamoğlu to run against Erdoğan, which was denied by the party’s chairman at the time, Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu, who chose to run against Erdoğan himself and lost.

Erdoğan fears İmamoğlu because he is a popular national figure with widespread appeal. Erdoğan’s fears are not misplaced, as İmamoğlu has successfully defeated the AKP twice (2019 and 2024) when he ran for mayor. In 2023, polls suggested that if he were the CHP’s presidential candidate running against Erdoğan, he could have beaten him. Fear of İmamoğlu is likely the reason pro-Erdoğan prosecutors brought charges against him for insulting government officials. The court conviction has been sitting at the appeals court. If the conviction is upheld, İmamoğlu would be banned from politics. This was followed up by new charges against İmamoğlu on January 27 for insulting a government expert witness.

Turkey’s Kurds will play a pivotal role in helping to advance or curtail Turkey’s democratic trajectory. Given all they have suffered historically as a minority, the prospects that they could gain constitutional protections and the release of a political icon (in return for helping Erdoğan enact constitutional changes) may be once in a lifetime opportunities. It would also be a Faustian bargain. It would help consolidate Erdoğan’s authoritarian rampage that has undermined the fundamental rule of law in Turkey. DEM would be pursuing a narrow number of policy goals at the expense of advocating for democratic governance for all of Turkey’s citizens, most of whom would not condone Öcalan’s release from jail.

This would not be the first time the Kurdish political movement has made such a choice. During Turkey’s widespread anti-Erdoğan Gezi Park protests of 2013, Kurdish politicians refrained from criticizing Erdoğan and did not stand with the large swaths of protestors who demanded an end to Erdoğan’s authoritarian and corrupt governance practices. Instead, the Kurdish movement at the time was deep into negotiations with Erdoğan to see if a deal could be struck to release Öcalan and secure minority rights for Kurds in Turkey.

Erdoğan abandoned this deal in 2015, and there is no guarantee that he will not shortchange DEM again. It is unlikely that the Kurdish political movement will make the right call this time and stand tall with the country’s political opposition, and help end Erdoğan’s 20-plus years reign. From their standpoint, their decision to help Erdoğan could be justified. The political opposition, especially the CHP, has done nothing to stand up for the rights of Kurds.

The only argument for DEM taking a stand against Erdoğan is simple: it’s the right thing to do, for what does it matter if they gain cultural rights and the release of Öcalan if they continue to live under authoritarian rule? Once Erdoğan gets what he wants, it is important to remember that rights can be easily taken away, and so, too can, Öcalan’s freedom.

Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at FDD and an expert on Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy.