September 20, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post

Arab states watch Hezbollah deterrence weakened, Israeli deterrence restored

After losing it after October 7, now, Israel is returning to the impression that the region has had of the country for the past decades.
September 20, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post

Arab states watch Hezbollah deterrence weakened, Israeli deterrence restored

After losing it after October 7, now, Israel is returning to the impression that the region has had of the country for the past decades.

The region is watching Israel’s recent actions against Hezbollah. October 7 was a major setback for Israel in the region in terms of the impression that Israel was powerful and impregnable. The reputation of Israel’s intelligence services and army suffered on October 7 as IDF units were overrun and Israelis were kidnapped to Gaza in large numbers.

Now, Israel is returning to the impression that the region has had of the country for the past decades.

The infiltration of Hezbollah, the exploding pagers, and the elimination of Hezbollah commanders are all seen as signs of Israel’s impressive capabilities.

This is important in a region where strength is respected. Israel needs to appear strong, or countries will not respect it. Countries may otherwise think Israel is weak and consider working with Israel’s enemies or hedging their bets.

This matters. Iran is on the move in the region, seeking closer ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. China has pushed for Iran-Saudi ties to grow. Russia is working with Iran. NATO member Turkey is backing Hamas. US major non-NATO ally Qatar hosts Hamas.

Hezbollah is suffering setbacks

Now, Hezbollah is suffering setbacks. Many countries likely quietly applaud Israel’s actions. Saudi Arabia, for instance, played the key role in the Taif agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war.

Saudi Arabia has a crucial role in Lebanon and cares about groups that oppose Hezbollah. Syrian rebel groups also loathe Hezbollah for its role in supporting the Assad regime in Syria.

Countries and groups that oppose Iran also oppose Hezbollah. As such, they likely look with some pleasure on Israel’s actions during the week of September 15-September 20. This week may have been a game changer after a lot of slow progress Israel was making.

Now, Al-Ain media in the UAE is openly asking critical questions about what this week’s accomplishments mean.

The report mentions several possible options for what Israel’s strategy is now.

It could be “an attempt by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to pressure Nasrallah to stop Hezbollah’s attacks on northern Israel and to sever southern Lebanon’s connection to the front that has been raging in Gaza since last October.”

Indeed, Hezbollah has allowed Hamas to run the war in Gaza and dictate the tempo of the war in the region. Iran prodded Hezbollah to help take the pressure off Hamas and create a multi-front war. Hezbollah has vowed to keep up attacks as long as the war in Gaza continues. Gaza is thus the tail “wagging the dog.” Hezbollah, here, is the proverbial dog.

Al-Ain media also suggests that Israel is seeking to “provoke Nasrallah to push him to start the war, which would give [Israel] the legitimacy to ignite the northern front without political repercussions on the deeply divided domestic arena.”

If Hezbollah doesn’t respond with a major war, then “the image of deterrence that has been stable since 2006 will have been severely damaged, at the very least.”

This is a key point. While the 2006 war is seen in Israel as bringing quiet, it is seen by Hezbollah as deterring Israel.

For instance, Hezbollah built up an equation after 2006 where Israel was basically told not to carry out strikes in Lebanon, no matter the threat.

There were exceptions, and when they happened, Hezbollah would then claim it had a right to attack. This happened when there was a drone incident in Beirut in 2019.

Hezbollah retaliated, but it ended up hitting a vehicle with dummies in it. There were also incidents in 2015 and also Israel’s Operation Northern Shield, and throughout it all, Hezbollah built up capabilities and expanded into the Syrian side of the Golan during the Syrian civil war.

It also threatened Israel with drones. It then pressured Israel into the maritime deal in 2022 and set up a tent in a disputed area of Mount Dov or what Hezbollah calls the Sheba’a Farms.

Hezbollah increased its provocations between 2018 and 2023. This was all part of Hezbollah believing Israel was deterred. It thought it had the upper hand, and Israel was afraid of war.

When the regional media, such as Al-Ain, speak about Hezbollah losing its allure and losing its ability to deter Israel, this is important.

Hezbollah has suffered a lot in terms of losing its image in the region.

It acquired an image of power and almost invincibility. That has been shattered.

Israel suffered a defeat and setback in the regional perception of Israel’s capabilities on October 7. Now, Hezbollah has suffered a significant setback.

The reports that it lost more than two dozen fighters on September 17-18 and then lost another twenty on September 20 in the heart of the Dahiyeh in Beirut is a major setback for Hezbollah.

Now, it must decide how to react. Its regional image is also on the line, which matters to Iran and Hezbollah.

Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issues:

Issues:

Arab Politics Hezbollah Iran Iran Global Threat Network Israel Israel at War

Topics:

Topics:

Al Ain Bashar al-Assad Beirut Benjamin Netanyahu China Dahieh Egypt Gaza Strip Golan Heights Hamas Hassan Nasrallah Hezbollah Iran Israel Israel Defense Forces Lebanon Mount Dov NATO Operation Northern Shield Qatar Russia Saudi Arabia Shebaa Farms Syria Turkey United Arab Emirates