November 13, 2026 | The Free Press
Is This the Most Serious Scandal of the Trump Era?
If Jensen Huang’s mistress was channeling Nvidia’s chips to China—and the administration looked the other way—it will constitute a breathtaking breach of national security.
November 13, 2026 | The Free Press
Is This the Most Serious Scandal of the Trump Era?
If Jensen Huang’s mistress was channeling Nvidia’s chips to China—and the administration looked the other way—it will constitute a breathtaking breach of national security.
Jensen Huang may have resigned from the AI-chip behemoth he founded, but the investigation into what he knew and when he knew it—about his mistress Alice Huang, and about where her company was delivering Nvidia’s most advanced chips—that’s just beginning.
Congressional investigators will soon be asking whether Jensen Huang helped Alice Huang, an alleged Chinese spy, to circumvent U.S. export controls to supply powerful chips to China’s AI companies. Did he have access to—and pass on—U.S. classified information? As a member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Jensen Huang was eligible for a security clearance and may have been briefed on sensitive intelligence. And given Alice Huang’s alleged ties to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), was she then feeding information to the Chinese government?
We’ll return to Alice Huang and the MSS in a minute.
But first we mustn’t overlook the companion narrative that only adds to the scandal. That is a story of brazen regulatory capture: how Jensen Huang gained personal, persistent access to the president of the United States, the secretary of commerce, and other key officials—and how he used that access to advocate policies that have put America’s foremost adversary, the People’s Republic of China, within reach of becoming the dominant power in artificial intelligence.
“China is going to win the AI race,” Jensen Huang told the Financial Times last November. He blamed American “cynicism” about AI and contrasted it with Beijing’s lavish subsidies for the technology. Jensen Huang released a statement later the same day saying, “It’s vital America wins” the AI race.
You wouldn’t know it from his lobbying efforts.
For most of Donald Trump’s second term, Nvidia has thrown its weight around Washington to roll back or block regulations and legislation prohibiting China from gaining access to advanced chips and chipmaking equipment. The two men have become friends, so much so that prior to Jensen Huang’s resignation, Trump urged him to fight to retain his position. Some senior Trump administration officials have parroted Jensen Huang’s line that he should be allowed to sell China billions of dollars of advanced chips in order to disincentivize Beijing from making its own alternatives. This, even as Chinese engineers say accessing U.S. chips is key to their success in AI. Beijing, meanwhile, is investing hundreds of billions of dollars into making homegrown chips anyway.
By all appearances, Jensen Huang’s lobbying worked. Since President Trump’s return to office, an avalanche of American computing power has made its way to Chinese companies. It’s not just due to smuggling. The administration has approved sales to China as well as to countries such as Malaysia, where Chinese firms buy remote access to Nvidia chips in data centers to train their AI models. This third-country scheme may account for one-third of China’s total AI computing power by the end of 2027, according to a recent report by the Institute for Progress. The supply of these chips is zero sum: Each one that China uses is one that is unavailable to U.S. or allied companies and governments. So much for “America First.”
The U.S. Department of Commerce could reverse this trend with a few strokes of a pen. Instead, the department, led by Howard Lutnick, the former CEO of a major Wall Street firm, has slow-rolled, stymied, and undermined efforts by his own officials to constrain China’s access to chips, according to numerous people with direct knowledge of the department’s affairs. On Friday, The New York Times reported that “Mr. Trump’s close relationship with Mr. Huang has also made department officials wary of taking aggressive steps to rein in sales of Nvidia chips, out of concern about angering Mr. Lutnick or the White House.” Also on Friday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC that the Commerce Department had delayed putting necessary restrictions on Megaspeed, the company where Alice Huang was a top executive and was allegedly buying Nvidia chips for China’s use.
Congressional investigators will have questions for Lutnick too. Did he or his family benefit from the loopholes staying open? Did his old firm, Cantor Fitzgerald, benefit? Cantor’s public filings show it is a sales agent for Bitdeer, an Nvidia cloud partner that is expanding its data centers into Southeast Asia. Bitdeer is a spin-off of Bitmain, which has been the subject of a national security probe over fears its machines could be remotely controlled to disable the U.S. grid or for espionage. Rules designed to close these loopholes have been blocked by the Department of Commerce on multiple occasions, even after the president ordered them closed, according to recent reporting by Axios.
We spoke with three former Commerce officials who described being sidelined or pushed out of the department during Trump’s term after devising technology restrictions aimed at protecting U.S. national security. One said there was a perception in the department that Nvidia had a hand in at least some of the purges. Neither Nvidia nor the Department of Commerce responded to a request for comment. A spokeswoman for the Department of Commerce told The New York Times that claims that Nvidia “had put a chill on the department’s actions . . . ‘false and reckless.’ ”
On Monday, Bloomberg News reported that in 2025, Nvidia general counsel Tim Teter called Jeff Kessler, a Commerce undersecretary, to inquire about an ongoing investigation involving Nvidia. Kessler’s bureau was examining Alice Huang’s company, Singapore-based Megaspeed International, on suspicion it was illegally diverting Nvidia chips to Chinese companies. Teter wanted to know whether the Commerce investigation had been responsible for Alice Huang’s temporary detention by Singaporean authorities. After that call, Kessler’s staff “were muzzled in their ability to look into the company,” Bloomberg reported. The investigation was soon transferred to the Department of Justice “in an effort to avoid any potential compromise of the government’s investigation of Megaspeed,” according to The New York Times. Despite having spent months working on the case, the Commerce investigators’ work was shut down.
Members of Congress will be asking why Lutnick, who came into office two years ago pledging to tighten export controls, has since seemed to want to do the opposite. They are planning hearings to get answers from the man himself. A bipartisan coalition is also hoping to overcome years of effective lobbying by Nvidia and the White House against legislation that would tighten export controls. Several bills, including the MATCH Act (Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware), aim to resume the trajectory toward stricter export controls that was a hallmark of the Biden administration and of Trump during his first term.
And then there’s Alice Huang. Screenshots of her social media feed show she made little effort to hide her close association with Jensen Huang, leading observers to speculate that if she’s really a spy, she wasn’t very good at it. David Sacks, an adviser to Trump who members of Congress describe as a key opponent of new export controls, asserted in an X post yesterday that “the spy narrative is collapsing.” He cited a CNN report that administration officials aren’t confident about the nature of her relationship with China’s intelligence apparatus.
Some of the confusion may come down to semantics. “Spy” is an ambiguous term that could mean a trained officer of the MSS or an asset who used her relationship with Jensen Huang to get information she could pass on. But it could also mean she used the relationship to gain access to Nvidia’s most advanced chips, which could be used by China, via Megaspeed.
A second common area of misunderstanding has to do with espionage versus influence ops. China’s intelligence apparatus is particularly adept at the latter and devotes massively greater resources to that mission than Western intel agencies do. The tradecraft for influence ops often starts out the same as for espionage: spotting and assessing a good target, such as someone with access to sensitive information or clout with key decision-makers. But if the main goal is to influence the target, such as to get them to sell their controlled technologies or lobby a U.S. president, the tradecraft morphs. While assets involved in theft of state secrets, say, hope barely to be noticed, intel assets involved in influence ops often insinuate themselves deep into the work and private lives of their targets and hide—sometimes for years—in plain sight.
Take the case of Fang Fang (a.k.a. Christine Fang), the suspected spy who worked on political campaigns of U.S. congressmen and developed romances with local mayors over the course of several years. She appeared with Zelig-like regularity in photos and social media posts with her suspected targets.
But the most potent circumstantial evidence that Alice Huang was an asset may be this: The work she was alleged to be engaged in appears to be perfectly aligned with the recently stated priority of China’s top spymaster, MSS Minister Chen Yixin—winning the AI race.
Since the advent of Anthropic’s powerful Mythos AI model earlier this year, it has become clear that Xi Jinping has positioned Minister Chen at the forefront of China’s AI strategy. In April, Chen revealed for the first time that strategic competition over AI and other critical technologies has been elevated to one of the MSS’s core missions—on par with pure espionage and guarding the regime from subversion.
Chen, in an April essay, framed Xi Jinping’s command to “win the initiative in global technological competition” as the lodestar of AI policy. Writing in the Communist Party theoretical journal Qiushi, Chen describes a “struggle against blockades”—that is, a battle to demolish or circumvent foreign obstacles to China achieving technological dominance. The “blockades” are, in other words, American export controls.
Depending on what Congress finds, the Nvidia scandal could wind up being the supreme scandal of this administration. It isn’t about lining the president’s pockets or pardoning convicted felons. Rather, it is far more consequential, as it augurs the greatest consequences for U.S. technological preeminence and national security.
Matt Pottinger was deputy national security advisor from 2019 to 2021. He chairs the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and is CEO of research and advisory firm Garnaut Global LLC. Liza Tobin served as China director at the National Security Council from 2019 to 2021. She is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation.