The Mecca Pact Won’t Deter Yemen’s Houthis

Less than two months after its signing, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia activated the Mecca Pact for the first time.

On October 5, during an emergency meeting held in Riyadh, the three countries agreed “to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defense commitments and to take the necessary measures to provide the agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment in the kingdom.”

The decision followed the launch of a counteroffensive by the Yemeni government’s forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, against the Iran-backed Houthis. The offensive aims to retake strategic territory along Yemen’s western coast that the Houthis seized in recent weeks, including areas overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The pact’s activation is significant at a time when the Houthis have targeted Mecca and Medina, Islam’s two holiest cities. The more important test, however, is how far Pakistan and Turkey are willing to go and whether they will stick to defensive measures, especially given the political and strategic constraints that may limit how directly they are prepared to confront the Houthis and, by extension, Iran.

Strategic and Political Constraints for Turkey and Pakistan

A lack of domestic support and a desire to avoid antagonizing Iran are both likely to prevent Turkey and Pakistan from joining the Saudi offensive in Yemen, although defense support is likely forthcoming. Pakistan already provides such support in Saudi Arabia, while Turkey signaled that it will deploy only “defensive and technical” capabilities like air-defense systems. Turkey’s requirement for parliamentary approval to deploy troops abroad would, for the moment, likely constrain its ability to send substantial manpower. Other constraints include Ankara’s reluctance to antagonize Iran, with which it maintains close ties. Turkey has also provided a permissive environment for sanctions evasion and financing networks linked to Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah and Hamas.

Similar constraints apply to Pakistan. Islamabad rejected joining the Saudi-led war effort in Yemen in 2015 after its parliament opposed the deployment. Pakistan also shares a volatile border with Iran, has increasingly positioned itself as a key mediator for Tehran in its conflict with Washington, and must contend with domestic sectarian considerations. These include a large Shiite population that could be mobilized politically in response to Pakistani participation in an offensive war against an Iran-backed group.

Turkey and Pakistan Prioritize Defensive Measures

The deployment of defensive measures alone under the Mecca Pact is unlikely to deter the Houthis from continuing their attacks on Saudi Arabia. Since the pact was announced on August 7, the Houthis have launched multiple waves of projectiles targeting Riyadh, as well as civilian airports and military installations.

Since the pact’s activation, Houthi commentary has largely focused on the expectation that Pakistan and Turkey will not directly join the war; Houthi officials had previously dismissed the agreement at the time of its signing as a “cosmetic” alliance.

On the ground, this means that neither the longstanding presence of Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia nor the deployment of Turkish defensive capabilities has so far deterred the Houthis. Nor has activating a collective defense mechanism altered Houthi behavior. If anything, the Houthis may be inclined to intensify their attacks if they interpret Saudi Arabia’s reliance on outside assistance as a sign of vulnerability, particularly because they understand that neither Turkey nor Pakistan is prepared to join the war offensively against them.

Washington Should Use Turkish and Pakistani Defensive Operations To Align Them With U.S. Interests

President Donald Trump welcomed the Mecca Pact as an example of greater burden-sharing in the region. While Turkey and Pakistan may share Washington’s interest in protecting Saudi Arabia from Iranian and Houthi missile and drone attacks, both countries have continued to hedge in their relationship with Tehran, providing Iran with economic and diplomatic support. Washington should therefore make clear that a larger Turkish and Pakistani role in Gulf security cannot be limited to contributing defensive capabilities. It should also entail alignment with the United States on containing networks that enable Iran and its proxies to threaten the region. For Ankara and Islamabad, that means more consistently enforcing U.S. sanctions and restricting Iran’s access to their financial networks.

Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.