New Greenland Agreement Adds Sites, Not Strategy. NATO and NORAD Must Now Connect the Arctic.

Greenland is warming to the idea of an increased American military presence on the enormous Island, removing a source of transatlantic friction and bolstering NATO defenses.

On September 22, the United States, Denmark, and Greenland signed a security agreement authorizing two additional U.S. military sites — there is currently a single base at Pituffik — while preserving Danish sovereignty and Greenlandic self-determination. The accord does not remake Arctic defense: the 1951 agreement already granted Washington broad operating and transit rights. But the new locations and support for stronger NATO engagement could reinforce Greenland’s role linking NORAD’s defense of North America with NATO’s defense of the European Arctic and North Atlantic.

That link is increasingly urgent. Russian submarines can pass through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap toward vital Atlantic reinforcement routes, while bombers and Kola Peninsula-based ballistic-missile submarines can threaten North America through Arctic approaches. Growing Sino-Russian regional cooperation adds to NATO’s challenge.

More U.S. Access, More NATO Responsibility

The 1951 agreement allows U.S. aircraft, troops, vehicles, and official vessels to move between military sites within Greenland by air, land, and sea, including its territorial waters. The deal also permits U.S. aircraft to land anywhere on the island. The new accord preserves those rights; explicitly covers undersea access; authorizes defense areas at Narsarsuaq in southern Greenland and Mestersvig on its eastern coast; and permits expanded activity at Pituffik. The accord also allows for future additional sites by mutual agreement and commits Denmark and Greenland to accelerated review processes of proposed unmanned installations. Expanded access also supports the proposed Golden Dome missile-defense system. The agreement, which awaits Danish and Greenlandic parliamentary approval, has no end date.

Because Copenhagen and Nuuk are highly unlikely to approve a Russian or Chinese base, the prohibition on non-NATO installations is largely symbolic. More consequential are limits on investments from states that are neither NATO members nor partners, nor EU members. The deal restricts investments from those states to protect against adversarial access, control or influence over sensitive sectors like critical infrastructure and resource extraction.

The text also calls for a greater NATO role in Arctic defense planning, military presence, exercises, and joint intelligence capabilities.

Greenland Bridges European and North American Defenses

Pituffik enables missile warnings and defenses, space surveillance, and satellite command and control. Farther south, Greenland forms the GIUK Gap’s western edge, making it important for tracking Russian submarines and protecting the sea lanes needed to reinforce Europe. Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig could support U.S. and allied logistics, surveillance, training, and operations across these missions.

That potential was visible days before the signing, when NORAD’s Operation Arctic Vanguard moved U.S. F-16s from Alaska, through Canada, to Greenland with Canadian, Danish, and additional NATO support.

Arctic Sentry is a NATO initiative that coordinates allied activities across the region, while Nordic Bridge seeks to align planning among NORAD, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. European Command, and NATO. Neither effort has publicly detailed how the agreement will support enhanced allied integration.

Turn Arctic Coordination Into Integration

NATO should remain the organizing framework for European Arctic defense, with Nordic allies leading regionally, while NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM continue coordinating U.S.-Canadian defense of North America. Arctic Sentry and Nordic Bridge should align these efforts with U.S. Navy and NATO anti-submarine operations, Denmark’s growing capabilities, and allied surveillance, logistics, and reinforcement plans.

Arctic Vanguard provides a foundation for broader allied training. NORAD and NORTHCOM should expand NATO participation, with NORTHCOM and NATO adding land and maritime exercises that build toward integrated air, land, and sea operations. The new U.S. locations in Greenland could support this training.

Denmark’s commitment to strengthening its space capabilities is also a positive development. Copenhagen should prioritize space-based sensors optimized for high-latitude coverage, resilient satellite communications, and imagery-sharing systems. NATO should integrate Denmark’s satellite-imagery data into Task Force X Arctic’s planned multidomain awareness network and move successful systems from its 2027 demonstration into persistent operations, following the model of Task Force X Baltic.

Pooling resources is essential in the Arctic, where infrastructure and operations are costly and no ally can possess every capability. The Greenland agreement updates U.S. access and adds operating locations. NATO-NORAD integration will determine whether those provisions produce a stronger allied Arctic defense.

Emmerson Overell is a project coordinator at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where she researches threats to U.S. and allied security in the Arctic, space, and cyberspace. For more analysis from Emmerson and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.