8 Questions Facing the United Nations at UNGA 81

The United Nations was formed “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Yet more armed conflicts rage worldwide today than at any point since the world body’s formation at the end of World War II. 

As the high-level week at the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly begins, the United Nations is facing an estimated 130 conflicts around the globe alongside a funding crisis that places it on the cusp of “imminent financial collapse,” as the outgoing UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres put it. 

This year’s debates also take place in the shadow of the selection of a new UN Secretary General, expected before the end of the year. A clear frontrunner is still to emerge, with the eight current candidates actively lobbying member states for support while attempting to avoid the vetoes of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Here are eight key questions confronting the United Nations:

1. Can the UN assist in stabilizing Gaza?

Adopted in November 2025, UN Security Council Resolution 2803 provides the international framework for implementing President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan by authorizing the Board of Peace, an International Stabilization Force (ISF), a Palestinian technocratic administration, reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and — critically — the disarmament of Hamas and allied terrorist groups.

The question at UNGA 81 is how the wider UN system can help turn this framework into a functioning postwar order so that Gaza ceases to be a threat to Israel. There are several obvious mechanisms. The Security Council can use the six-month reporting requirement imposed by Resolution 2803 to maintain pressure for the implementation of disarmament, to be followed by a phased Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. UN humanitarian agencies can coordinate assistance with the Board of Peace while strengthening safeguards against diversion by armed groups. The World Bank and other international financial institutions can inject capital into the dedicated reconstruction trust fund envisioned in the resolution. 

The biggest unresolved issue is security. Resolution 2803 authorizes the ISF to help secure Gaza’s borders, protect humanitarian operations, train vetted Palestinian police, and facilitate the permanent decommissioning of weapons held by terrorist groups. Whether member states are prepared to contribute sufficient troops, equipment, money, and political backing to make that force effective will be crucial in determining whether the resolution succeeds.

2. Does UNRWA have a future?

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), dedicated solely to the descendants of the Arab refugees from Israel’s 1947-1949 War of Independence, received an important political boost when its mandate was renewed by the General Assembly in December 2025.

However, its financial and political position remains increasingly precarious. Washington has ended U.S. support, while several other countries, most recently Finland, have periodically suspended funding. UNRWA’s future is further jeopardized by Gaza’s move toward a new governing structure under the Board of Peace and a Palestinian technocratic administration. Stakeholders will have to decide whether to migrate the provision of education, health, and social services to other UN agencies and NGOs, or leave them in UNRWA’s hands.

Other ongoing points of tension include the relationship of UNRWA employees with Hamas — a febrile issue given the participation of some UNRWA employees in the October 7, 2023, Hamas atrocities in Israel — and the agency’s educational materials promoting ugly antisemitic tropes and the demonization of Israel. 

The issue of approximately six million Palestinians who have inherited refugee status —unlike the descendants of all other refugee populations — remains largely unaddressed. UN General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock hinted at an evolution in UN thinking when she told an UNRWA pledging conference in June 2025, “UNRWA was never meant to be permanent.” For its part, the Board of Peace has been unambiguously direct, declaring that, “UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza. We are turning the page on the complex of perpetual aid dependency and conflict. The people of Gaza deserve better.”

3. What will happen after the UN leaves Lebanon?

The mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), one of the UN’s oldest peacekeeping operations, expires on December 31, 2026, after which the mission is expected to begin an orderly withdrawal lasting up to one year.

UNIFIL’s departure will  leave Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces as not only the primary, but sole, actor responsible for establishing effective control in southern Lebanon and enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 —  particularly the requirement that no armed force other than the Lebanese state operate south of the Litani River as a prelude to the disarmament of all armed groups throughout the country. 

The transition raises a larger issue about Lebanon’s willingness to act upon its obligations. Hezbollah renewedthe conflict with Israel in March. Israel, in response, has taken to steps to dismantle and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure. What remains to be seen is whether LAF will act to consolidate these gains, as the U.S.-brokered June 26 Framework Agreement between Israel and Lebanon envisages, or whether Beirut’s demonstrable disinclination to confront Hezbollah will prevail — leaving the group with just enough breathing room to pursue regeneration.  

 4. Can Trump force a leaner, more accountable UN?

The Trump administration has already applied strong financial pressure on the UN system.

The administration’s proposed FY2026 budget sought to eliminate much of U.S. assessed and voluntary funding for international organizations, while it suspended or ended support for numerous UN bodies. In January, Trump ordered the United States to cease participation in or funding for 31 UN entities following a government-wide review of international organizations.

This pressure has coincided with Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s UN80 reform initiative. The UN has already cut 21 percent of secretariat positions in 2026, consolidated administrative services, moved positions from expensive locations to cheaper duty stations, and begun reviewing overlapping or outdated mandates. The UN estimates that its overall resource base has shrunk by $16 billion over the last two years. 

There are signs of a limited bargain emerging. In August, Washington said it planned to make a $725 million payment toward its outstanding UN obligations while emphasizing that further U.S. support depended on continued reform. U.S. officials pointed to nearly $1 billion in UN budget reductions as evidence that American pressure was producing results.

Additionally, the United States has injected more than $3 billion of funding into the UN’s humanitarian operations over the last year. A Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United Nations in December 2025 resulted in the United States making a $2 billion commitment to UN-managed humanitarian funds. In June, the State Department separately announced more than $1 billion for UNICEF and the World Food Programme. 

UNGA 81 will therefore test whether the United States can convert a funding crisis into lasting structural reform, rather than a truncated, cash-poor United Nations performing essentially the same functions with fewer resources.

5. Can the UN enforce renewed sanctions on Iran?

Iran’s nuclear program and the future of UN sanctions enforcement will be among the most important security issues surrounding High-Level Week from September 22-29.

The Security Council faced a contentious fight over whether to renew the panel of experts that monitors implementation of UN sanctions on Iran. The panel investigates sanctions violations and evasion and reports to the Council’s Iran sanctions committee. The United States and European governments argued that effective sanctions require an independent monitoring mechanism. On September 17, however, Russia and China vetoed a U.S.-drafted resolution extending its mandate, which expires on September 26

For Washington, the issue is particularly important because UN sanctions impose obligations on member states, which are responsible for enforcing them, and can impose costs that unilateral U.S. measures alone cannot replicate. Its relevance is additionally boosted by ongoing concerns over Iran’s nuclear compliance. The IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguard obligations in June 2025. On September 9, the board referred Tehran to the UN Security Council for the first time in 20 years.

6. Can Ukraine hold international support together?

Ukraine is now facing a more difficult diplomatic environment than in the early period of Russia’s 2022 invasion.

The beleaguered nation continues to command broad support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the coalition willing to endorse Kyiv’s preferred language has become more fragmented. A growing number of states in the Global South favor negotiations without embracing Ukraine’s conditions for a settlement, while the Trump administration is pursuing its own diplomacy with Moscow and pressing European allies to shoulder more of the burden. The country’s goal will be to preserve support for Ukraine’s borders, prevent war fatigue from deepening, and resist any settlement that legitimizes territorial conquest.

The UN General Assembly remains valuable to Kyiv precisely because Russia has no veto there. But maintaining a large diplomatic majority will be increasingly difficult as governments focus more heavily on ending the war as quickly as possible.

7. Can China use the UN to shield its partners and rewrite the rules?

China will arrive at UNGA 81 with an increasingly assertive agenda inside the UN system: weakening Western pressure on U.S. adversaries, constraining Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and building new institutions that reflect Beijing’s vision of global order.

China has repeatedly opposed or diluted Western efforts to increase pressure on its partners in the “axis of aggressors” at the United Nations, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea. For the United States, the concern is not simply that Beijing casts sympathetic votes, but that China and Russia can use their Security Council vetoes and procedural leverage to hollow out sanctions regimes and monitoring mechanisms.

Taiwan is another front. Beijing continues to press its claim that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758embodies the “one-China principle” that justifies excluding Taiwan from the UN system — an interpretation rejected by Washington and other governments. China has also made support for its position on Resolution 2758 a recurring feature of its diplomacy with candidates seeking to become the next UN secretary-general.

At the same time, Beijing is building institutions of its own. In July, China launched the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization in Shanghai with 29 founding members, presenting it as a new vehicle for global AI governance and a stronger voice for the Global South. Xi Jinping has explicitly linked the initiative to a broader Chinese vision for international governance, while Beijing is also promoting its Global Development, Security, Civilization, and Governance Initiatives.

8. Who is winning the race to replace Antonio Guterres?

The contest to succeed UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres as his term expires at the end of 2026 remains wide open, with Rebeca Grynspan of Costa Rica currently holding a narrow numerical advantage after the latest Security Council straw poll.

Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett of Guyana, Rafael Grossi of Argentina, Macky Sall of Senegal, Michelle Bachelet of Chile, María Fernanda Espinosa of Ecuador, Olara Otunnu of Uganda, and Ivonne A-Baki of Ecuador are all competing for support along with Grynspan. The decisive question remains whether any candidate can secure at least nine of the fifteen votes on the Security Council without encountering a veto from one of the five permanent members (the U.S., China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia). UNGA high-level week will therefore be a major lobbying opportunity.

China has been particularly active in cultivating candidates. Rodrigues-Birkett, Grynspan, Bachelet, Sall, and Espinosa all traveled to Beijing over the summer. Rodrigues-Birkett used her July visit to endorse UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, reaffirm the “one-China principle,” praise Xi Jinping’s four global initiatives, and back China’s proposed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization.

The next phase of the contest will become much clearer once differentiated or color-coded ballots reveal which candidates face opposition from permanent Security Council members. The U.S. is likely to closely scrutinize Rodrigues-Birkett due to her closely alignment with China and her false accusation that Israel carried out a “veritable genocide” in Gaza, while there is a growing probability that Russia will object to Grossi, who has been strongly criticized by the Kremlin in recent weeks over his alleged refusal to blame Kyiv for attacks around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in southeastern Ukraine.

Ben Cohen is a Research Fellow focusing on international organizations at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.