Tehran’s Negotiators Are Not a Counterweight to the IRGC

Whatever separates Tehran’s senior leadership, a strategy of escalation to extract concessions from Washington unites them.

President Donald Trump confirmed on August 17 that his administration has been in direct contact with Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), after Washington questioned whether Tehran’s official negotiators actually represented the guards’s position. That day, an IRGC spokesperson described Iran’s Foreign Ministry and IRGC as separate functions within the same system, while Vahidi had privately told the Trump administration in May that he fully supported the negotiators.

Washington is right about where ultimate authority lies in the Islamist regime. But that does not put Iran’s political leaders heading the talks, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, at odds with the IRGC. They may still want to negotiate, but only through the guards’s playbook of escalation to impose costs and extract more concessions. This alignment gives Washington little reason to ease its economic pressure in hopes of empowering a more pragmatic negotiating camp.

Tehran’s Political Leadership and the IRGC Are Aligned on Escalation

On July 8, two days after Iran violated the June Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by striking vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, Ghalibaf threatened that the chokehold would reopen only under “Iranian arrangements.” When Washington demanded that Tehran renounce the attacks, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian instead expressed support for the IRGC’s aggression, claiming that the regime had “acted responsibly.” On July 13, two days after the guards declared the strait “closed,” Araghchi stated Iran would remain “the guardian of the Strait” forever. On July 15, Ghalibaf asserted that Iran’s armed forces and negotiators were working from the same strategy on Hormuz.

Internal Rivalries Among Hardliners Are About Power, Not Ideology

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s latest government reshuffle filled key national security posts with figures from networks closest to him, including Vahidi, new Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, and Basij Commander Hossein Taeb. What set them apart was proximity to Mojtaba, not policy toward Washington. Rezaei had already aligned himself closely with the new supreme leader, becoming his military adviser in March, opposing the April ceasefire, threatening an escalatory response to Washington, and later shielding Mojtaba from blame for the failed MOU by arguing that Mojtaba had favored a different course. Taeb is another longtime Mojtaba ally, dating back to their service in the same Iran-Iraq War battalion and years of collaboration in internal politics.

Economic Pressure Maximizes U.S. Leverage

During the initial blockade of Iranian ports from April to June, CENTCOM disrupted more than 150 vessels, while Iran’s crude oil exports fell to zero in May. Since the blockade resumed on July 14, CENTCOM has interdicted roughly 70 more vessels. Washington has also issued eight sanctions packages since July targeting the regime’s shadow fleet, weapons procurement, cryptocurrency networks, and Strait of Hormuz extortion schemes.

July inflation averaged 66 percent annually and reached 87.9 percent year over year, while food prices climbed more than 134 percent. The rial sank to a record 1.95 million per dollar in July and was still trading near 1.88 million in early August. Regime officials are treating the economy as a national security threat after past hardship fueled nationwide unrest and could do so again.

Maximum Pressure Needs a Domestic Contingency

The blockade and sanctions have already constricted the regime’s cash flow. Washington should therefore be reluctant to bargain them away, making its refusal to revive an already moribund MOU the right call. Whether sustained pressure ultimately forces Tehran to compromise remains uncertain. But if economic deterioration again pushes Iran toward nationwide unrest, Washington should be ready to pair maximum pressure with a contingency plan for that moment by preserving protesters’ internet access and helping them withstand a regime armed and prepared for another crackdown.

Janatan Sayeh is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on Iranian domestic affairs and the Islamic Republic’s regional malign influence. For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. Follow Janatan on X @JanatanSayeh. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.