Syria’s leader charms the world, crushes the Druze. Israel should be wary

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa has charmed world capitals with pragmatic diplomacy, from a White House visit to neutral dealings with Russia and Iran, but has used his global popularity to rule through centralization that has crushed Syrian minorities. Sharaa is now commendably reaching out to Israel. His outreach raises fears that he wants to leverage a possible thaw in relations with Jerusalem to weaken his country’s Druze, whose suspicions continued to build after the mysterious killing of one of their own, last week, and government stonewalling. Until Sharaa reaches a credible accommodation with the Druze, Israel is well-advised to remain wary of deeper ties with Damascus.

Since taking power in December 2024, Sharaa has built strong ties with regional capitals and Washington. He became the first Syrian leader in decades to visit the White House despite his past as an Al-Qaeda fighter against US troops in Iraq. Washington lifted broad sanctions that had long damaged the Syrian economy. 

Sharaa also turned the page with Russia, traveling to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin even as the West remained distant over Ukraine. Sharaa has kept his foreign policy focused on economic rebuilding rather than ideology.

With Iran, Sharaa has avoided direct confrontation despite old grievances from the civil war. He stays out of the wider US-Iran conflict and only intercepts Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah when they cross Syrian territory. He presents these actions as defense of Syrian neutrality. 

The same pragmatic tone appears toward Israel. Sharaa has authorized direct talks through his foreign minister and limited his demands to Israeli withdrawal to the 1974 line and an end to overflights and strikes. Israel has said its operations target Iranian proxies, not the new government, and has reduced such activity as Damascus has cracked down on those networks.

Sharaa’s diplomatic gains contrast sharply with his domestic record. He equates national unity with strict centralization and views decentralization as treason. This approach has created serious friction with Syria’s main minority communities. Alawites and Kurds suffered massacres, while the Kurds were forced to sign away most of their autonomy for limited self-rule. The Druze now face similar pressure to disarm and submit.

Sharaa’s centralization exceeds even the Assad dynasty’s methods. Hafez al-Assad kept firm control from Damascus but practiced pragmatic accommodation: once groups accepted his authority he generally left them alone on local matters. Sunni merchants expanded their businesses, and the Druze of Suwayda and eastern Arab tribes enjoyed autonomy. 

Bashar Assad failed to replicate his father’s savviness and abandoned this balance. He allowed relatives to seize businesses from Sunni merchants, provoked the Druze and tribes, lost influence in Lebanon in 2005, and triggered the 2011 revolution. He responded with brutality and relied on Russian and Iranian support until Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah contributed to his downfall.

Sharaa has reversed Bashar’s foreign alignments by courting nearly every major capital. Domestically he has copied Bashar’s heavy centralization, this time wrapped in Islamist ideology — instead of the Baath’s Arab nationalism — and accompanied by similar corruption among his brothers and associates. Most governments have overlooked these problems because of his diplomatic progress. Only Israel has objected, driven by its own Druze citizens who serve loyally in the Israeli military and maintain tribal ties to the Syrian Druze in Suwayda

When Sharaa’s forces moved against the Syrian Druze, Israel intervened with air support to help them hold defensive lines and struck Damascus warningly. Today Sharaa’s forces control 34 destroyed Druze villages and roughly 150,000 people remain displaced inside Suwayda province. 

Sharaa is unlikely to accept this situation indefinitely and will seek new ways to bring remaining autonomous areas under central control. This standoff has become the main obstacle to improved Damascus-Jerusalem relations despite Syria’s overtures. 

Israel fears Sharaa could use warmer ties as cover to finish subduing the Druze. But a workable solution exists. 

The Druze issue can be settled along the lines of the earlier Kurdish agreement. Such a settlement would remove the principal barrier to deeper Syrian-Israeli engagement and could open the path to a bilateral peace treaty. 

For the Druze to accept any deal they will need credible external security guarantees. The July 16 killing of Ma’moun Mukahhal, followed by the government’s seizure of the body, refusal of an autopsy, and shifting explanations of the cause of death, is only the latest incident reinforcing their distrust. Reports of ISIS activity in neighboring Daraa add to their vulnerability. 

The Druze will not rely on Sharaa’s assurances alone. Any viable arrangement will require American backing, ideally in a formal document similar to the one provided the Kurds. Once Israel is convinced that Sharaa is not using diplomatic outreach as a tool to undermine the Druze, Syria can advance on international legitimacy, regional stability, and domestic cohesion at the same time. 

Without addressing the Druze question through a US-guaranteed framework, Sharaa’s foreign-policy achievements will remain fragile, undermined by the centralizing pressures he applies inside Syria.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), a non-partisan organization focused on national security and foreign policy.