As the Shia Crescent Wanes, Aoun Stakes Lebanon’s Future on Washington

As Iran’s once-expanding “Shia Crescent” of influence across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen wanes, a new American-led regional order is emerging. Ahead of his first visit to the White House, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has clearly recognized this new reality.

“It is my duty to seize all opportunities that come to us with solutions,” Aoun said in a July 11 interview. “And today there is a golden opportunity called America that we must seize.”

The Lebanese president emphasized the importance of his upcoming meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, explaining that the face-to-face talks would allow him to lay out what Lebanon concretely needs to restore its sovereignty.

This Trump administration engagement with Lebanon is not charity. It reflects clear U.S. strategic interests in a region now more open to American influence than at any time since 1958. For years, Tehran’s so-called “Resistance Axis” appeared formidable. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack, however, triggered a powerful Israeli response that shattered Iran’s regional proxy network and opened a significant power vacuum. 

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, driven largely by Israeli military pressure, has created a rare opportunity for Washington and its allies to shape the future of the Levant. Iraq and Syria are already adapting to this new environment, prioritizing economic recovery over ideological confrontation.

Iraq has sought to distance itself from Iran to safeguard its oil revenues and avoid the reimposition of crippling international sanctions. Syria, under Ahmad al-Sharaa, has similarly sought to reduce external conflicts and instead focus on rebuilding its shattered economy.

Iraq and Syria signed an agreement in Washington on July 17 to revive and expand the defunct Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline, enabling Baghdad to export up to two million barrels per day while bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.

Likewise, Lebanon — under Aoun — stands out for placing economic interests at the center of its foreign policy. Unlike many Lebanese leaders since the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, Aoun has consistently framed political decisions in terms of their economic consequences.

He credited the June 26 Trilateral Framework with Israel and the U.S. for contributing to an improvement in Lebanon’s economic indicators. Aoun understands that sustained economic growth requires stability and that an armed Hezbollah engaged in perpetual conflict with Israel is fundamentally incompatible with prosperity. 

He has taken a long view of the problem, tracing it back to 1969 and the Cairo Agreement, which effectively ceded aspects of Lebanese sovereignty to Palestinian militias. “I am a son of the South and I have known the suffering since 1969,” Aoun said in his recent interview. “The people of the South have the right to [live in peace].”

Unlike many Lebanese politicians who treat Hezbollah’s disarmament as either impossible or merely a matter of slogans, Aoun approaches the issue with realism. He acknowledges that Israel’s security requirements differ from Lebanon’s. Even if Hezbollah surrendered the missiles and drones that threaten Israel, it would still retain large quantities of smaller weapons capable of intimidating Lebanese society and deterring investment.

This is why Aoun has emphasized dealing with Hezbollah’s weapons on multiple levels, with the final stretch ultimately becoming an internal Lebanese matter that will require time and a clear strategy rather than quick slogans.

“Disarming is a difficult process, especially since [Hezbollah’s weapons] are not present in specific barracks, but hidden everywhere,” Aoun said, stressing that the decades-old problems of militia arms cannot be solved by a few meetings.

The Lebanese president said that while he has repeatedly expressed his readiness for dialogue with Hezbollah, the pro-Iran militia has refused to engage with him. The reason, according to Aoun, is that Hezbollah’s decision-making ultimately lies with Iran, which refuses to relinquish power in Lebanon.

He has been clear-eyed about Lebanon’s relationship with Iran. While acknowledging Tehran’s regional importance, Aoun has insisted that “no one negotiates on our behalf,” rejecting Iran’s attempts to include Lebanon in its dealings with Washington.

Aoun’s decision to send Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa, a Christian, to attend the funeral of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was a deliberate signal that relations with Tehran should be conducted through official state channels, not through Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy.

Aoun has moved away from the emotional and ideological politics that have long dominated Lebanon. He sees foreign policy as a tool for economic recovery rather than a vehicle for posturing. At a time when governments across the region are prioritizing growth and stability after years of conflict, Lebanon’s president appears determined not to be left behind.

Whether he can translate this vision into concrete progress on Hezbollah’s weapons will largely determine whether Lebanon can join the new regional order forming across the Levant under U.S. leadership.

He has taken a long view of the problem, tracing it back to 1969 and the Cairo Agreement, which effectively ceded aspects of Lebanese sovereignty to Palestinian militias. “I am a son of the South and I have known the suffering since 1969,” Aoun said in his recent interview. “The people of the South have the right to [live in peace].”

Unlike many Lebanese politicians who treat Hezbollah’s disarmament as either impossible or merely a matter of slogans, Aoun approaches the issue with realism. He acknowledges that Israel’s security requirements differ from Lebanon’s. Even if Hezbollah surrendered the missiles and drones that threaten Israel, it would still retain large quantities of smaller weapons capable of intimidating Lebanese society and deterring investment.

This is why Aoun has emphasized dealing with Hezbollah’s weapons on multiple levels, with the final stretch ultimately becoming an internal Lebanese matter that will require time and a clear strategy rather than quick slogans.

“Disarming is a difficult process, especially since [Hezbollah’s weapons] are not present in specific barracks, but hidden everywhere,” Aoun said, stressing that the decades-old problems of militia arms cannot be solved by a few meetings.

The Lebanese president said that while he has repeatedly expressed his readiness for dialogue with Hezbollah, the pro-Iran militia has refused to engage with him. The reason, according to Aoun, is that Hezbollah’s decision-making ultimately lies with Iran, which refuses to relinquish power in Lebanon.

He has been clear-eyed about Lebanon’s relationship with Iran. While acknowledging Tehran’s regional importance, Aoun has insisted that “no one negotiates on our behalf,” rejecting Iran’s attempts to include Lebanon in its dealings with Washington.

Aoun’s decision to send Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa, a Christian, to attend the funeral of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was a deliberate signal that relations with Tehran should be conducted through official state channels, not through Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy.

Aoun has moved away from the emotional and ideological politics that have long dominated Lebanon. He sees foreign policy as a tool for economic recovery rather than a vehicle for posturing. At a time when governments across the region are prioritizing growth and stability after years of conflict, Lebanon’s president appears determined not to be left behind.

Whether he can translate this vision into concrete progress on Hezbollah’s weapons will largely determine whether Lebanon can join the new regional order forming across the Levant under U.S. leadership.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a columnist focusing on Lebanon and broader Arab affairs.