Hezbollah’s Lebanese Allies Are Ready to Dump It

Speaker Nabih Berri and Druze chief Walid Jumblatt have so far sided with Hezbollah by denouncing the June 26 Trilateral Framework between Lebanon, Israel, and the U.S. Yet despite their rhetoric, neither has moved to unseat Lebanon’s government, citing concerns over sectarian tensions. The gap between their words and actions suggests both are hedging their bets, uncertain whether Hezbollah will survive its confrontation with Israel.

Berri and Jumblatt are among Lebanon’s most enduring political survivors, with nearly a century of public life between them. Their political choices have always tracked the prevailing balances of power in Lebanon. They backed Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) when it dominated parts of Lebanon, only to abandon him after Israel’s 1982 invasion. Afterward, the two aligned with Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus until the 2005 Cedar Revolution forced Syria out of Lebanon. They then seamlessly shifted their allegiance to Hezbollah.

Berri and Jumblatt’s political antennas must now be tuned to the existential crisis faced by Hezbollah. The militia is exhausted and outmatched by a determined Israel. Under Naim Qassem’s lackluster leadership, it no longer projects the strength that once defined its dominance in Lebanon. Jumblatt himself has noted that Iran dispatched senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives to prop up Hezbollah. 

The balance of power has shifted decisively against the group, opening a rare opportunity for the Lebanese state. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have recognized these vulnerabilities and are moving assertively to reassert state authority over security and decision-making. Berri and Jumblatt recognize the same shift but remain cautious. They prefer to let events unfold rather than risk a premature rupture that could backfire.

Hezbollah has never been in a weaker position. Israeli operations have devastated southern Lebanon, flattening more than sixty villages. Roughly nine percent of Lebanese territory—concentrated in Shia areas—remains under Israeli control. Hezbollah’s arsenal was designed to prevent such an outcome or impose unacceptable costs on any occupier. Instead, Iran’s decision to extend the ceasefire to Lebanon without demanding a full Israeli withdrawal has drained those weapons of strategic value and exposed their limits.

In this war, Lebanon’s Shia have endured the longest period of mass displacement in their modern history. Families now live in tents with no clear timeline for return. The only realistic path home runs through Hezbollah surrendering its arsenal. 

For years, Hezbollah’s weapons gave the Shia a sense of empowerment and political leverage against other Lebanese communities. Once politically unpopular, disarmament has gained traction as prolonged conflict exposed the failure of these weapons. The political costs of maintaining Hezbollah’s weapons have become unsustainable. Even Berri and Jumblatt now appear to be waiting for the party’s collapse, albeit quietly.

Hezbollah offers no fresh strategy, instead recycling old tactics. In the aftermath of the 2006 war, late Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted the group had nearly exhausted its ammunition in the final days, yet still bluffed Israel into believing it could continue fighting. Today, the militia relies on similar deception, reinforced by relentless propaganda and disinformation campaigns. It also places its hopes in Iran outmaneuvering the U.S.

Iran has turned the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz into leverage, securing relief from U.S. naval pressure in the Gulf and a ceasefire that extended to Lebanon. The maneuver bought time but produced no decisive shift in Lebanon’s balance of power, as Tehran prioritized its own direct interests. Hezbollah now awaits a broader U.S.-Iran settlement that could include concessions restoring its position in Lebanon. Berri and Jumblatt’s reluctance to fully embrace the Lebanese-Israeli agreement reflects fears that Washington could still prioritize a deal with Tehran over Lebanese sovereignty. 

With Hezbollah in terminal decline, the last thing Washington should do is extend the militia a lifeline in a bargain with Tehran. Prioritizing Gulf security concerns over Lebanon’s prosperity would be a major strategic miscalculation. Any such move would prolong Lebanon’s political paralysis and risk renewed cycles of conflict across the region. 

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a columnist focusing on Lebanon and broader Arab affairs.