7 Fault Lines NATO Must Address in Ankara

As NATO leaders gather on July 7 to 8 in Ankara, the summit’s true test lies in unresolved faultlines over U.S. force posture cuts in Europe, host nation Turkey’s disruptive role within the alliance, Ukraine’s shifting battlefield momentum, and NATO’s readiness to defend the critical infrastructure that future conflicts will depend upon. Here’s what to watch:

1. U.S. force posture cuts in Europe have left NATO allies uncertain.

The Trump administration has already significantly reduced the U.S. military force posture in Europe, but how far the drawdown will go is not yet clear. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States had generally maintained at least four brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Europe: the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Germany, a rotational armored brigade in Poland, and a rotational infantry brigade in Romania. However, the administration ended the rotational brigade deployments to Romania  in October 2025. Subsequently, the administration has floated the withdrawals of the brigades in Germany and Poland. The administration also canceled the deployment of a U.S. Army long-range fires battalion, which was meant to provide valuable long-range strike capabilities as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi Domain Task Force (MDTF). The administration also reportedly plans to cut other critical American capabilities such as certain intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, anti-submarine warfare aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and strategic airlift capacity allowing for the rapid transport of troops across continents. Those reductions would directly contradict the administration’s stated strategy of shifting conventional burdens to local allies while providing Europe with “limited but critical support.”

2. Turkey’s Erdogan is both hosting NATO and undermining it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has won an important political victory just by hosting the NATO summit in Ankara. Erdogan is depicting Turkey as an indispensable ally, even though the Turkish government is providing ongoing support to terrorist groups such as Hamas, backing sectarian militias in Syria, assisting Russia to circumvent sanctions, and opposing the U.S.-Israeli military operation against the regime in Iran. One challenge at the summit will involve balancing awareness of Turkey’s disruptive activities, including its threats against Israel, its continued occupation of northern Cyprus, and its threats towards other NATO allies like Greece by making sovereignty claims on islands in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, increasing the potential for armed conflict. Erdogan’s goal is to achieve strategic autonomy while depicting Turkey as core to NATO’s mission, although Turkey’s military spending is currently 2.33 percent of its GDP, below that of other NATO allies including The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada. However, Erdogan will likely use the summit to showcase Turkey’s growing arms industry, which generated over $10 billion in 2025. Most pressingly, Erdogan will demand progress on Turkey’s reintegration into the U.S. F-35 fighter program after its 2019 removal following its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system.

3. NATO’s 5 percent pledge is facing its first real test.

NATO’s agreement to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035 is politically significant, but implementation will be the real test. This pledge is complicated by tensions within the alliance over the recent U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran. The new benchmark allocates 3.5 percent to core defense spending and 1.5 percent to defense-related investments such as infrastructure, cyber resilience, logistics, and industrial capacity. Spending targets, however, are easier to announce than to execute: many allies still lack procurement capacity, and Europe’s defense industry faces bottlenecks in missile production, munitions, shipbuilding, and air defense. Still, many allies have made significant progress, especially in Eastern Europe where some allies are meeting or exceeding spending goals. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has pledged that the Ankara summit will unveil billions of dollars in new defense contracts, but the real measure of success will be whether allies produce credible implementation roadmaps rather than more spending promises.

4. Ukraine war momentum is shifting, and Zelenskyy wants NATO to lock it in.

The war in Ukraine has reached an inflection point. Ukraine’s finances are now on a sustainable footing, its armed forces have stopped bleeding manpower, and it has reclaimed some battlefield momentum. Moscow’s theory of victory, that declining manning levels and dwindling international support would eventually break Ukraine’s army, now appears undermined. Russia’s prospects of even achieving even its minimal aim of seizing the rest of the Donbas region look increasingly bleak, and the Kremlin faces mounting political and economic pressure to end the war. The White House seems to recognize that Ukraine has more leverage than once assumed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to press allies in Ankara for long-term financial and military commitments, including proposals for NATO members to dedicate a fixed share of GDP to Ukraine’s defense industrial base. Russian President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, has shown little sign of moderating Russia’s objectives, raising the risk that any ceasefire would merely give Russia room to regroup and rearm. NATO also faces the longer-term challenge of assembling security architecture to deter renewed Russian aggression.

5. NATO’s Arctic Sentry strategy still lacks details needed to secure the northern flank.

NATO’s new Arctic Sentry initiative acknowledges that the alliance’s northern flank has become a central theater of strategic competition, but the initiative itself is entangled with the ongoing dispute between the U.S. and Denmark over Greenland. NATO launched Arctic Sentry in February to coordinate allied military activity across the High North in response to Russia’s expanding Arctic presence and a growing Chinese focus on the region. Key questions remain unaddressed, among them anti-submarine warfare assets, protection of undersea infrastructure, expanded maritime surveillance, and Russia’s military concentration on the Kola Peninsula, where Russia locates its Northern Fleet and the majority of its ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). European NATO members have pledged to strengthen Arctic security to reassure Washington, but doing so will require sustained investment in ice-capable vessels, surveillance systems, and additional infrastructure, while Denmark insists that Greenland’s sovereignty remains non-negotiable.

6. NATO’s cyber and AI pledges lack operational teeth.

NATO has made cyber resilience a formal alliance priority through initiatives such as the Cyber Defence Pledge, the Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, the Integrated Cyber Defence Centre, and regular multinational exercises including NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence’s (CCDCOE’s) Locked Shields and the recent JATEC AI-enabled hybrid warfare exercise. More fundamentally, the U.S. needs NATO partners that can maintain power grids, telecommunications, ports, railways, airports, satellite communications and digital networks operational in the face of sustained cyberattacks. Russian actions against Ukraine have demonstrated that cyber operations increasingly target the civilian systems that enable military operations. China has likewise demonstrated through campaigns such as Volt Typhoon that it seeks to preposition inside critical infrastructure to create disruption during a future crisis. If NATO members cannot maintain essential services or securely move forces and information during conflict, higher defense spending alone will not translate into greater military capability. Absent concrete operational guidance, common procurement standards, and expanded exercises being announced and endorsed at the Ankara Summit, cyber and AI risk will remain aspirational themes rather than integrated military capabilities despite a rare consensus across the alliance that such capabilities are a priority.

7. NATO’s collective defense has a blind spot: telecom security.

As NATO invests in new weapons and larger militaries, it has devoted comparatively little attention to the civilian telecommunications infrastructure on which modern military operations increasingly depend. Military mobility, logistics, ports, rail networks, energy grids, and command-and-control all rely heavily on commercial digital networks. That makes secure 5G infrastructure an increasingly important element of collective defense. NATO and European governments have long expressed concern over reliance on high-risk vendors such as Huawei and ZTE, while the European Union’s 5G toolbox encourages member states to reduce dependence on suppliers that could compromise critical infrastructure. Military planners are simultaneously exploring how commercial 5G networks could support future operations, making trusted vendors and network resilience even more important.

Ben Cohen is a senior analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington, D.C.-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.