FCC Introduces New Bans on Chinese-Produced Equipment Linked to Cyber Risks

Washington is seeking to push older Chinese technology out of the nation’s core networks.

On June 26, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) moved to bar the importation of all equipment and services produced by firms on the commission’s Covered List, a designation for foreign firms and equipment that pose a risk to U.S. national security. The updated rule closes a loophole that allowed firms to sell older models of their equipment that had previously been approved prior to their designation.

The FCC’s move offers a sweeping restriction on Chinese equipment that still poses key national security risks while safeguarding core American networks from adversarial intrusions.

Commission Ban Covers Import of Vulnerable Chinese Equipment

The commission’s action bans the import of virtually all equipment produced by firms added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier, including Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei, ZTE, and Hikvision and the Russian cybersecurity firm Kaspersky. While several of these firms were barred from importing new equipment in 2022, the new rules retroactively revoke their outstanding equipment authorizations, banning their products from entering the American market.

However, firms currently operating the newly banned equipment will not be required to replace it, despite the FCC noting the national security risks associated with its integration into U.S. networks in its decision. Moreover, the FCC did not revoke the preexisting equipment authorizations for products added to the Covered List within the past year, including surveillance and video devices produced by Chinese drone manufacturers DJI and Autel Robotics and all foreign-produced routers.

FCC Moves to Secure U.S. Telecommunications Infrastructure

The regulations follow a string of FCC actions to secure American networks from Chinese interference. The day prior to releasing its decision, the commission voted to require all operators of submarine cable terminal equipment — the components that connect undersea cables carrying most global internet traffic to U.S. networks — to obtain licenses, effectively preventing Chinese firms from owning or servicing such sites. The new rules also strengthen cybersecurity standards and third-party service agreements for submarine cable operators, aiming to prevent Chinese firms from illicitly gaining access to U.S. cable networks or sabotaging landing stations.

The FCC has also expanded beyond its traditional reach to target other Chinese emerging technologies that interact with U.S. networks. In December 2025, the FCC implemented a stringent ban on all foreign-produced drones in response to China’s efforts to undermine the American domestic market and the reported espionage and sabotage risks posed by DJI and Autel. The FCC further tightened its restrictions on Chinese technologies in March by banning all new foreign-produced routers, a decision that primarily affected Chinese router firm TP-Link, a company repeatedly linked to cyberattacks against American networks.

While intended to protect telecommunications infrastructure, these moves have also elevated the commission as a key national security agency, particularly as the Commerce Department has loosened export controls and reportedly paused a planned expansion of the Entity List to cover additional Chinese firms allegedly linked to the Chinese military.  

Commission Should Target Chinese Providers Seeking to Operate on Domestic Networks

The FCC’s ruling is an essential step to safeguard U.S. networks against Chinese intrusions, particularly as previously authorized equipment often maintained functionally similar vulnerabilities to banned newer models.

In seeking to further secure American critical infrastructure, the commission should prevent firms on the Covered List from being able to provide domestic telecommunications services under blanket Section 214 authority, which allows domestic carriers to provide services without a formal license, and bar American providers from interconnecting with them. These measures would block adversarial firms that pose a proven national security risk from accessing core U.S. networks that were previously compromised amid long-running Chinese cyberattacks.

Jack Burnham is a senior research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Jack and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.