Five Key Legal Questions About the June 2026 U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding

The analysis draws on my decade as an attorney in the State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, followed by two decades as a law professor teaching and writing about international law issues.  For three of those years in the State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, I served as the U.S. government’s lead attorney drafting and successfully negotiating five U.S.-Russia nuclear agreements over the course of fifteen trips to Moscow.

Parts of this legal analysis are informed by discussions with some of my fellow alumni of the Legal Adviser’s Office, and other international law experts.  But the responsibility for any errors it may contain is entirely mine.

International agreements signed by senior U.S. officials are typically written following particular templates (depending on the nature of the agreement) and using words carefully selected to convey specific legal meanings.  Because the MOU does not follow this pattern, this analysis is a work in progress.  I will be revising it for various reasons, including as the U.S. and Iran further clarify, through word and deed, what the MOU means to them.  

I. Is the MOU legally binding on the U.S. and Iran?

Short answer

The text of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on June 17, 2026 by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is ambiguous as to whether or not the MOU is legally binding on the U.S. and Iran. 

Deeper analysis  

U.S. law, including the Case-Zablocki Act and its implementing regulations, makes a clear conceptual distinction between “international agreements,” which are legally binding, and “non-binding instruments” which are “intended to have political or moral weight, but not intended to be legally binding.”

Legal analysts have thus far disagreed on whether the MOU is legally binding, variously describing it as not, or likely not, or maybe, legally binding.  I particularly recommend this analysis by Professor Duncan Hollis, who previously served as the State Department’s lead attorney for treaty affairs, is editor of The Oxford Guide to Treaties, and is one of the leading academic experts on treaty issues.  Describing the MOU as “poorly drafted,” Professor Hollis notes that it “contains elements of both” binding agreements and non-binding instruments, leaving its legal status “decidedly murky.”

The title “memorandum of understanding” is not itself determinative of whether a document, agreed upon by the U.S. and a foreign nation, is legally binding and thus formally constitutes an “international agreement” as defined by U.S. law.  The internal text of a U.S. document agreed with a foreign nation typically makes clear whether the document is intended to be binding or non-binding.  

However, as Professor Hollis notes, the MOU includes conflicting elements.  One MOU element mitigating in favor of it being non-binding is its lack of a set of administrative rules, typically included at the end of a binding international agreement, providing a dispute resolution mechanism and specifying when the agreement takes effect and how it can be amended or terminated.

On the other hand, the MOU uses numerous phrasings – including words like “undertake” and “agree” – which are typically suggestive of a legally binding commitment.  In addition, the MOU has been signed by the parties’ leaders, which is often associated with (but not determinative of) an agreement being legally binding.

Given the ambiguity of its text, whether the MOU is legally binding is, per U.S. law, “a matter of judgment based on all of the circumstances of the transaction.”  The State Department Legal Adviser is empowered by U.S. law to make that determination.  

One key criteria, under U.S. law, for an agreed document to be legally binding is that “[t]he parties must intend their undertaking to be legally binding, and not merely of political” effect.  Thus, if the MOU is said to be legally binding, by the relevant officials of both Iran and the U.S., then it is legally binding.  Professor Hollis suggests, and I agree, that the two parties “alleviate the confusion by jointly signaling their views on what kind of agreement” they have signed.

II. Does the MOU legally bind Israel?

Short answer

The MOU seems to imply, in its first sentence, that its commitments extend to Israel.  It states that the U.S. and Iran “and their allies in the current war, by signing this MOU, declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other . . . ”   As discussed in response to Question I above, it is unclear whether the MOU is legally binding even on the parties to it, namely the U.S. and Iran.  Even if the MOU is legally binding on the U.S. and Iran, it is not binding on Israel, which neither signed the MOU nor otherwise consented to be bound by the MOU.

Deeper analysis

As discussed in response to Question I above, the MOU is not clearly legally binding on the U.S. and Iran (whose presidents signed it).  But even if the MOU were binding on those signatory countries, none of the MOU, including its first sentence, would be legally binding on Israel.  An international agreement could only be legally binding on Israel if a) Israel signed or otherwise directly and explicitly adhered to the agreement, b) explicitly provided the U.S. with a kind of proxy authorizing it to sign for Israel, or c) a legally binding UN Security Council resolution imposed the agreement’s terms on Israel. Thus, an Israeli action which contradicts the MOU does not violate international law (or U.S. domestic law for that matter) simply because it contradicts the MOU.

III. Is the MOU subject to the requirements and restrictions set forth in the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act?

Short Answer

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA) imposes several requirements and restrictions on any “agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran.”  These include required submission to Congress by the President of the following within five calendar days of the agreement being reached: 1) both the agreement itself and “any additional materials related” to the agreement; 2) a “verification assessment report” by the Secretary of State; and 3) a certification by the President.  In addition, INARA specifies that during the 30-day period following a covered agreement’s transmittal to Congress, “the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran . . . or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to” the covered agreement.

The June 2026 U.S.-Iran MOU appears to fall clearly within INARA’s definition of an “agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran,” and thus be subject to INARA’s requirements and restrictions.  

The Administration is evidently not applying INARA’s requirements and restrictions to the MOU, apparently on the basis of an opinion from the Department of Justice that some or all of INARA’s requirements and restrictions somehow are not applicable to the MOU.  The White House and the Department of Justice have apparently not shared this surprising opinion, or its arguments, with either Congress or the public.

Deeper Analysis

The June 2026 U.S.-Iran MOU appears to fall clearly within INARA’s definition of an “agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran,” and thus be subject to INARA’s requirements and restrictions.  

INARA specifies that “[t]he term ‘agreement’ means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not…”  

The MOU is clearly “related to the nuclear program of Iran.”  Paragraph 8 includes a reaffirmation by Iran that “it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons,” along with an agreed framework for the U.S. and Iran to resolve the disposition of Iran’s stockpiled enriched material.  In Paragraph 9, Iran agrees to “maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program” pending a “final deal.”  

The MOU also clearly both “includes the United States” and “commits the United States to take action.”  Indeed, the MOU commits the U.S. to take several different actions.  One of the most salient examples is the U.S. commitment, in paragraph 4 of the MOU, that “Immediately upon the signing of this MOU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade . . .”  Another salient example is the U.S. commitment, in paragraph 10, that “The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MOU . . . the U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services….” 

INARA’s definition includes an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran “regardless of whether it is legally binding or not.” Thus, the lack of clarity as to whether the MOU is legally binding (which is discussed in the answer to Question I above) does not exclude the MOU from INARA’s coverage.

INARA was passed to strengthen Congress’ role in overseeing President Barack Obama’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).   However, INARA does not have a sunset date and is as applicable to President Donald Trump’s June 2026 MOU with Iran as it was to Obama’s JCPOA.

IV. Are the MOU’s commitments to lift sanctions on Iran, and the administration’s implementation of those commitments, consistent with U.S. law?

Short answer

Paragraph 10 of the MOU contains a U.S. commitment, to immediately waive sanctions on Iran, which is inconsistent with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA).  The Treasury Department’s issuance on June 22 of a license which implemented the MOU’s paragraph 10 by immediately pausing sanctions on Iranian petroleum appears to be a violation of INARA.  

INARA specifies that during the 30 day period following transmittal to Congress of any nuclear agreement with Iran, “the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran . . . or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement” covered by INARA.  The Trump Administration’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran was transmitted to Congress on June 18.  The license was issued four days later.  

As discussed in the answer to Question III above, the MOU appears to fall clearly within INARA’s definition of an “agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran,” and thus be subject to INARA’s requirements and restrictions.  

The Administration appears to be acting on the basis of an opinion provided to the White House by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice that some or all of INARA’s requirements do not apply to the MOU.  The White House and the Department of Justice have apparently not shared this surprising opinion, or its arguments, with either Congress or the public.

In addition, paragraph 7 of the MOU appears to exceed the president’s authority when it says, “The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including . . . all unilateral U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed upon schedule as part of the final deal.”

Deeper analysis

A. Treasury Appears to Have Violated INARA by Providing Iran with Petroleum Sanctions Relief Pursuant to the MOU

The Treasury Department’s issuance on June 22 of a license immediately pausing statutory sanctions on Iranian petroleum, pursuant to a commitment provided in the MOU, appears to violate INARA.  

Section 135(b)(3) of INARA specifies that during the 30-calendar day period following transmittal to Congress of an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, “the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement” covered by INARA.    

Paragraph 10 of the MOU states: “The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MOU, and until the termination of sanctions, the U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.”   The Treasury license issued on June 22 waives, suspends, or otherwise provides relief from, sanctions prohibiting transactions “ordinarily incident and necessary to the production, sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil, petrochemical products, or petroleum products of Iranian origin.”

Former top attorneys from both the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama administrations quickly warned that INARA prohibited such waivers for the first 30 days following the MOU’s transmittal to Congress. The MOU was transmitted to Congress on June 18.  

INARA was passed to strengthen Congress’ role in overseeing President Barack Obama’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The 30 day period was designed to provide Congress time to review the JCPOA, and potentially reject it, prior to implementation. 

INARA does not have a sunset date and appears to be as applicable to President Donald Trump’s MOU with Iran as it was to Obama’s JCPOA.

B. Paragraph 7 Undertaking to “Terminate” All U.S. Sanctions on Iran Exceeds President’s Authority

Paragraph 7 includes the following: “The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including . . . all unilateral U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed upon schedule as part of the final deal.”  This would on its face include U.S. sanctions targeting not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its sponsorship of state terrorism, support for proxy forces destabilizing the region, missile program, and human rights violations. 

The MOU addresses the nuclear program of Iran, and purports to pave the way for a “final Deal” resolving the nuclear dispute between the U.S. and Iran.  But the MOU contains no reference to, and does not appear to anticipate the “final Deal” in any way addressing, Iran’s missile program or human rights violations.

The MOU does reference, albeit indirectly, Iran’s sponsored terrorist and other proxy forces.  The MOU states that Iran and the U.S., “and their allies in the current war, by signing this MoU, declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon…” The MOU also states that “The final Deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon…” This formulation could, if broadly interpreted and sustainably and verifiably implemented, conceivably entail Iran halting its sponsorship of state terrorism and regional destabilization.  

To the extent the missile and human rights sanctions on Iran are Congressionally imposed (rather than created by a president pursuant to his International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorities), the president may (depending on whether the statutory requirements for a waiver are met) be able to waive the sanctions without Congressional action (after the INARA waiting period).  But in the absence of Iran actually halting its missile program and human rights abuses, the administration will likely find it impossible to terminate its missile and human right sanctions on Iran without Congressional action.  

Such Congressional action could include direct repeal of the sanctions statutes or, potentially, Senate consent to a treaty overriding the sanctions statutes.  Analysts would need to determine whether such a treaty could be self-executing or would need to be implemented by Congress statutorily (thus requiring legislative action by both chambers).  

V. Has the Administration fully complied with the INARA requirement that the agreement, “including all related materials and annexes,” be submitted to Congress, along with a “verification assessment report” and a “certification,” within five calendar days?

Short answer

The Administration submitted the three-page MOU to Congress on June 18, less than a day after President Trump signed it.  However, INARA requires the President to submit to Congress within five calendar days of the agreement being reached not only the agreement itself but also the following which the Administration has evidently not submitted: 1) “any additional materials related” to the agreement; 2) a “verification assessment report” by the Secretary of State; and 3) a certification by the President.  

Deeper analysis

INARA requires the President to submit to Congress within five days not only the agreement itself, which it submitted on June 18, but also the following which it has evidently not submitted:

A. “all related materials and annexes”

INARA, in its definitions section, makes clear that the requirement to submit all “additional materials related” to the MOU includes “annexes, appendixes, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future”  

Vice President J.D. Vance has said that the deal includes “gentlemen’s agreements” with Iran, some of them written and some oral. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff reportedly noted that a side letter exists in which Iran invites the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect its nuclear sites and uncover the locations of Tehran’s enriched uranium.  

Consistent with INARA, the Administration should have submitted all of this to Congress within five calendar days of June 17, the date on which the agreement was reached.  

With regard to the oral “gentlemen’s agreements” referenced by Vance, it is important to note that under both international law and U.S. law, international commitments can potentially be legally binding even if they are oral.  U.S. law requires that oral arrangements which might be legally binding be “reduced to writing by the agency that concluded the oral arrangement.”

B. A “verification and assessment report of the Secretary of State”

INARA requires that “[n]ot later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership. . . a verification assessment report of the Secretary of State. . . with respect to the agreement” assessing:

1. “the extent to which the Secretary will be able to verify that Iran is complying with its obligations and commitments under the agreement”
2. “the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement with respect to Iran’s nuclear program to ensure Iran’s activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose. . .”
3. “the capacity and capability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the agreement, including whether the International Atomic Energy Agency will have sufficient access to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert nuclear-related activities. . .”

The first two sentences of the MOU’s paragraph 8 contains important commitments and assurances regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The first sentence states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.”  The second sentence states:  “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpile enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon . . . with the minimum methodology to be down blending on-site, under the supervision of the IAEA.”  

The required “verification assessment report” would be expected to address whether the MOU provides, or the IAEA otherwise has, sufficient access to Iran to verify Iran’s implementation of these assurances and commitments.

However, the MOU does not in fact contain any “safeguards” or “other control mechanisms” or other verification elements, let alone a “verification regime,” relating to these assurances (other than the vague reference to IAEA supervision of the down blending).  It would be important for Congress to see how frankly this gap is addressed by the verification and assessment report.

C. A “certification” by the President

INARA requires that “[n]ot later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership . . . a certification” that “the President determines the agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the common defense and security, provides an adequate framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran’s nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose.”

The President has yet to make such a certification.  

Such a certification could be difficult to make.  Critics would contend that the MOU does not provide an “adequate framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear activities permitted thereunder” will not be used to further Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  A “certification” would therefore presumably assert that the MOU is a stepping stone to a final agreement which will meet the specified criteria.

 Orde Kittrie is a senior fellow at FDD and law professor at Arizona State University’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.  He previously served as the U.S. State Department’s lead attorney for nuclear affairs.