FPV Drones Are the Logical Evolution of Hezbollah’s Warfighting Doctrine

Hezbollah’s new first-person view (FPV) drones provide the group with a maximum return on investment — earning their name from their cameras broadcasting footage of attacks until moment of impact.

FPVs are cheap, easy to acquire or produce locally, and virtually unstoppable when equipped with fiber-optic guidance — which allows the operator to control the drone through an ultra-thin, transparent, physical fiber-optic cable, rather than by radio, GPS, or wireless transmission. Hezbollah has relied heavily on FPVs during the most recent round of fighting with Israel. Operating at a range of 10-20 km, these drones are immune from electronic jamming and largely go undetected before striking their intended targets — all while their operator remains safely hidden from Israeli forces throughout the attack.  

Propaganda Is a Cornerstone of Hezbollah’s Military Doctrine

FPV drones help generate propaganda that Hezbollah deems as valuable as actual damage to Israeli forces. Hezbollah describes  its military media as another weapon in the group’s arsenal, intended to “memorializing the achievements of the resistance and waging psychological war against the enemy, with the camera as its pillar.” Especially if the targets are infantry, and the camera captures their facial expressions, then the footage can potentially carry massive psychological impact, allowing the group to manipulate its audience — whether they are friends or foes — into believing Hezbollah is winning the fight.

Hezbollah began refining this propaganda methodology during the 1985-2000 South Lebanon Conflict against Israel. It was then that the group learned that proper camera use could transform tactical pinpricks into strategic accomplishments. Then, as now, Hezbollah admittedly lacked the ability to directly defeat Israel. So, the group amplified the impact of its limited kinetic means with psychological warfare.  

To its supporters, through carefully editing and packaging operational footage, the group rewrote even tactical failures against the IDF into enduring victories for “the Resistance.” In Israel, meanwhile, “Lebanon fatigue” was growing  along with sensitivity to IDF casualties they increasingly believed were unnecessary. The group fed into this souring on the Lebanon campaign through a steady drumbeat of often visceral footage showing a persistent and disciplined Hezbollah wounding or killing demoralized IDF soldiers.  Over time, this created a groundswell of pressure on the Israeli government to prematurely end the fight against Hezbollah and withdraw from south Lebanon.

FPVs Allow Hezbollah To Exploit the Gaps in Israel’s Technology and War Strategy

Hezbollah has proven adept at exploiting, in its own words, Israel’s “gap of vulnerability to small, agile, and uncontainable threats” with relatively simple weapons.

This gap can be found in Israel’s strategy. When the IDF hunkered down in fortifications during the conflict in south Lebanon in the 1990s, Hezbollah used mobile bands of fighters to snipe at the IDF’s outposts with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Nearly thirty years later, Hezbollah is exploiting Israel’s current immobility in south Lebanon, the result of U.S.-brokered ceasefires with Beirut, to strike with impunity at gatherings of Israeli troops.

But the gap can also be technological. As Hezbollah also noted, its FPVs were created as a direct response to the Israel’s single-minded emphasis on developing electronic warfare systems effective against radio and GPS signals. But this came at the expense of overlooking the threat of relatively simple weapons, like drones operated by fiber optic cable.

Washington’s Direct Interest in Israel’s Fight Against Hezbollah’s UAVs

Washington stands to benefit from allowing Israel more operational flexibility in south Lebanon.

First, doing so will allow the Israelis to reclaim the advantage over Hezbollah, a U.S. adversary, transforming the FPV threat into a temporary nuisance until their production sites and operators are located.

As the Israelis confront FPVs in real time, they will also begin to hone the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to neutralize this threat. The resulting methods, lessons, and countermeasures can then be shared with the United States, which has its own and growing interest in countering the threat of small and cheap drones.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) focused on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at FDD focused on Syria and Iranian intervention in Arab affairs and the Levant. For more analysis from the authors, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow David on X @DavidADaoud. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.