Rubio Instructs State Department To Actively Combat Adversarial Information Warfare

America is prepared to “take an assertive stance” against information warfare conducted by its adversaries, according to a leaked cable signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The New York Times was among several outlets reporting that current and former officials had confirmed the missive’s veracity. The cable directs U.S. embassies and consulates around the world to “take an assertive stance” against the “pernicious issue” of “anti-American propaganda” and covert foreign influence operations.

As they attempt to covertly influence Americans, Russia, China, and Iran are also seeking to sway international audiences to undermine U.S. interests abroad. U.S. embassies can play a unique role in countering these efforts by closely monitoring information circulating in their respective countries and leveraging their relationships with locals.

5 Goals for Information Campaigns

The State Department cable instructs its employees to focus on five goals: countering hostile narratives, expanding access to information, exposing adversarial behavior, amplifying pro-American local voices, and “telling America’s story.” It encourages diplomats to collaborate with local influencers, academics, and community leaders to advance counter-propaganda messaging. 

In addition, the cable calls on embassies and consulates to coordinate their work with military psychological operations (PSYOP). PSYOP personnel have supported various embassies for decades. For example, a PSYOP unit worked with U.S. Southern Command and the U.S. Embassy in Colombia to support counternarcotics operations in the 1990s.

Many of the priorities outlined in this cable are not new. For example, the State Department engaged with local influencers to counter ISIS propaganda. The leaked cable, however, serves as a meaningful reassurance that the United States plans to take on an increasingly active role in combating adversarial information warfare. These revelations should ease concerns that Washington has not been investing in countering adversarial efforts, as voiced by policymakers and researchers after Congress defunded the Global Engagement Center (GEC) — a State Department effort to counter adversarial information warfare in foreign countries.

Adversarial Information Warfare Can Damage U.S. Interests

The United States has paid significant costs for not successfully countering adversarial information warfare targeting overseas audiences. Russia’s successful influence campaign in Niger illustrates the stakes. Russian influence operations — partly by fueling anti-American sentiment — helped create the conditions for Niger to terminate its military agreement with Washington, ultimately contributing to the loss of a U.S. base that cost American taxpayers $280 million. After this expulsion, Iran also purchased 300 tons of concentrated uranium from Niger. 

Russia’s influence operations targeting Niger began at least as early as 2020 and then capitalized upon the coup in 2023. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry created a civil society group that passed out Russian flags at protests in Niger after the coup.

China also operates persistent influence campaigns seeking to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. For example, Beijing forged documents claiming that the United States created biological warfare labs in Taiwan to convince people in Taiwan that America is an unreliable partner, with that narrative reportedly emerging as a significant theme in Taiwan’s online and media environment. China has also leveraged influence operations seeking to undermine security cooperation between the United States and the Philippines.

Countering Information Warfare Overseas

The State Department, by leveraging its relationships with locals and country-specific expertise, can play a unique role in countering adversarial information warfare. It can elevate influencers who are aligned with American values — for example, by using official State Department social media channels to amplify content from aligned influencers — and proactively monitor information flowing through their respective countries’ online and media ecosystems. 

The efforts outlined in the leaked cable represent a positive step forward for the United States’ efforts to deny adversaries the advantages they seek through their information warfare efforts. However, U.S. messaging campaigns that are out of tune with local sentiment or perceived as manipulative can risk generating blowback. The State Department must counter adversarial information warfare in ways that strengthen, not squander, America’s credibility.

Max Lesser is a senior analyst on emerging threats at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ (FDD’s) Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI), where Kellie McSween is an intern. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on foreign policy and national security.