March 31, 2026 | Policy Brief
Renewed Threat From Houthis in Yemen As Iran War Reaches Decisive Stage
March 31, 2026 | Policy Brief
Renewed Threat From Houthis in Yemen As Iran War Reaches Decisive Stage
After a month on the sidelines, the Houthis have entered the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States and Israel on the side of their sponsors in Tehran.
On March 28, the Yemeni terror group claimed “a barrage of missiles” in support “of the Islamic Republic in Iran and the resistance fronts in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine.” The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the interception of one missile targeting the south of the country. The Houthis went on to launch a second attack later in the day with a cruise missile and drones. The IDF subsequently reported the following day that it had intercepted two Houthi drones near Eilat.
The absence of the Houthis during the opening stage of the war was particularly notable given how eagerly they joined with Hamas in the war in Gaza triggered by the October 7, 2023, atrocities. During two years of war in the coastal enclave, the Houthis launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel, along with commercial shipping and U.S. forces. They were also Iran’s most active ally during the Israeli and U.S. airstrikes against the regime’s nuclear and military installations in June 2025.
The Houthis have now chosen the lowest risk entrance into the present conflict. By targeting Israel, they are unlikely to provoke a response from the United States while simultaneously signaling to domestic constituencies, Iran and its proxy network, and the global community that they are still a threat.
Attacks on Israel Are Measured Escalation
A ceasefire has been in place between the United States and the Houthis since May 2025. Meanwhile, Houthi attacks against Israel and commercial shipping continued until the ceasefire in Gaza the following October. In response, Israel conducted attacks against the Houthi political leadership, their military chief of staff, and infrastructure.
While Israel is conducting substantial air campaigns against Hezbollah in Lebanon and key targets in Iran, a third front may not be prohibitive. During the 12-day war, Israel conducted airstrikes against the Houthis while also targeting Hezbollah and Iran. However, the operations against Hezbollah during that period were more limited than Israel’s current campaign.
Houthis Can Still Target Vital Trade Routes
If the Houthis choose to expand the conflict, they could target international shipping in the Red Sea or Gulf energy infrastructure. The Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Houthi maritime terrorism resulted in a 90 percent drop in container shipping through the Red Sea — which under normal conditions accounted for up to 15 percent of international maritime trade — during the first months of the war in Gaza.
Prior to Houthi attacks in 2023, the Red Sea carried approximately 12 percent of the global seaborne oil trade and 8 percent of the global liquefied natural gas trade. This route has only become more important as Saudi Arabia relies on its East-West Pipeline to export oil through the Red Sea instead of the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Republic has already targeted Yanbu, the Red Sea terminal for the cross-Saudi pipeline, which is also within range of Houthi weapons.
U.S. Should Revive Anti-Houthi Coalition
As the Arab countries are learning the hard way, no amount of appeasement or friendly relations can guarantee their protection from Iran and its proxies. The Saudi crown prince is reported to be encouraging President Donald Trump to finish the job in Iran. Egypt is also concerned given its reliance on Suez Canal revenues and its tourism industry, both of which are vulnerable to conflict in the Red Sea.
The United States now has an opportunity, along with its Gulf partners and Egypt, to reenergize the international coalition against the Houthis. Washington should encourage Saudi Arabia to resume leadership of such an effort, focused on a coordinated and expanded weapons interdiction effort and the enforcement of financial sanctions to further isolate the group.
Edmund Fitton-Brown is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Bridget Toomey is a research analyst. For more analysis from the authors, please subscribe HERE. Follow Edmund on X @EFittonBrown. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.