U.S. Intelligence Community Omits Key Russian Threat in Annual Assessment

Moscow’s favorite color in the Arctic is gray.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) Annual Threat Assessment correctly identifies Russia as the dominant Arctic threat and China as its growing partner. However, it overlooks the most dangerous dimension of regional competition: Russia’s sustained gray-zone operations — subversive activities below the threshold of armed conflict.

These activities include GPS interference, infrastructure targeting, influence operations, and incursions into allied Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) that systematically test and erode U.S. and NATO deterrence and operational readiness in the High North.

Overlooking Sub-Threshold Operations

Russia’s gray-zone campaign is a defining feature of Arctic competition.

Russian aircraft routinely probe the U.S. and Canada’s North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) by operating in allied ADIZs — international airspace located directly before sovereign airspace. In 2025, NORAD responded nine times to Russian aircraft near Alaska and two times already in 2026. Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness, recently noted that such activity “doesn’t even make the news anymore,” underscoring the normalization of Russian military operations near U.S. airspace.

Moscow also conducts military exercises in NATO countries’ EEZs, likely to probe monitoring and response capabilities. In some cases, Russian forces have simulated strikes against regional targets, such as a 2018 mock attack on a Norwegian radar facility.

Additionally, Russia interferes with GPS in the Arctic, disrupting military communications, civilian aviation, and emergency services. Allied officials have also linked Moscow to underwater cable disruptions, temporarily degrading coordination and surveillance capabilities. NATO suspects that Russian ships conducting seabed mapping research support the targeting of underwater infrastructure.

In cyberspace, Moscow deploys disinformation campaigns, including deepfakes — synthetically edited media designed to appear authentic — to amplify narratives that undermine NATO unity and promote pro-Kremlin messages. Moscow uses these operations to sow division, with other examples including operations targeting U.S. elections and European cohesion.

Focus on Conventional Threats

Russia “views the region as essential to its economic well-being and national security” and has built a network of Arctic bases and defenses accordingly, the ODNI assessment briefly explains. These defenses, however, pose direct threats to the U.S. homeland.

Russia maintains the largest icebreaker fleet — approximately 40 ships — compared to the United States’s 12, of which only three are polar icebreakers capable of sustained Arctic operations. While icebreakers can be used for peaceful missions like search and rescue, Moscow also deploys them to support military operations and is developing armed variants.

Meanwhile, Russia’s Northern Fleet anchors its Arctic force posture and contains a significant portion of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile and guided missile submarines. This provides the Kremlin with a second-strike capability — the ability to survive an initial nuclear attack and retaliate. Russia also fields an array of aircraft, air defense systems, and subsurface capabilities, including underwater drones. The assessment further notes China’s growing regional role, through joint patrols and interest in Russia’s Northern Sea Route.

Strengthening Allied Arctic Posture

Addressing conventional and gray-zone threats require enhanced allied coordination and greater investment in Arctic-specific capabilities.

Maintaining robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is essential for tracking Russian submarine activity through key geographic chokepoints. Washington should also push its allies to strengthen integrated air and missile defense systems, including closer coordination with NORAD, Canada, Greenland, and Denmark on initiatives such as the Golden Dome.

NATO allies must also expand their fleet of Arctic-capable platforms, including unmanned systems, ice-strengthened vessels, and additional polar icebreakers, to close surveillance gaps and sustain operations in extreme conditions. The Ice Pact between the United States, Canada, and Finland represents a positive step, but broader investment is needed to improve allied force posture in the region.

Finally, the United States and its allies should conduct offensive influence operations targeting Russia. Coordinated campaigns aimed at exploiting tensions in the Russia-China Arctic relationship could help blunt these efforts and impose strategic costs on Moscow.

Emmerson Overell is a project coordinator at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) for the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI). For more analysis from Emmerson and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.