Syria Can Squeeze Hezbollah, But Caution Is Necessary

Syrian forces may be returning to Lebanon more than twenty years after Damascus withdrew its military from its smaller neighbor’s territory.

Reuters reported on March 17 that the United States had approved “the idea of Syrian cross-border operations against Hezbollah,” including a possible incursion into eastern Lebanon. Syria, however, remains hesitant to undertake such an initiative, while U.S. officials — including Ambassador Tom Barrack — have denied that such a plan is afoot.

That should be regarded as positive, since Syrian intervention to counter Hezbollah could backfire. Post-Assad Syria has a vital role to play in the campaign against Hezbollah, but it must be carefully calibrated to prevent Syria from launching large-scale military operations and cross-border offensives that result in civilian harm or sectarian optics that will reinforce Hezbollah’s “resistance” narrative.

Hezbollah’s Financial and Militant Arms Remain in Syria 

Despite the December 2024 overthrow of former dictator Bashar Al-Assad — a stalwart ally of both Hezbollah and its main sponsor, Iran — companies tied to Hezbollah financiers continue to operate with relative freedom within the Syrian economy. Constrained by limited oversight and capacity, the new authorities in Damascus have yet to crack down on these networks. Many of these firms were formed during the brutal civil war launched by Assad to preserve his regime, facilitating the smuggling of Iranian oil and gas, and laundering funds for Hezbollah. 

Hezbollah-linked fighting cells also remain active on the ground. In February, Syrian authorities arrested several operatives following three attacks in the Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus. These cells are found elsewhere in Syria and are often composed of former members of Iranian-backed militias allied with Syrian government forces during the Assad era. In September 2025, Damascus confirmed that one member of a Hezbollah cell “had received training in camps inside Lebanese territory and were [sic] planning to carry out operations inside Syrian territory.” 

Assad’s Downfall Didn’t Cut Off Hezbollah’s Syrian Weapons Corridor

Hezbollah and its Iranian patron thrive in states with weak central governments and national identities. Ethno-sectarian fragmentation and tensions in post-Assad Syria have prevented the country’s nascent leadership from consolidating control over the territory nominally under their control. The resulting fragmentation has served Tehran and its proxy well. For months, Lebanese and pan-Arab media outlets have reported on Iran’s continued use of Syrian territory as a conduit to smuggle arms and funds to Hezbollah. In September 2025, for example, Asharq Al-Awsat was among the outlets that reported Iran had maintained networks in Syria to pass funds to Hezbollah. 

These reports are partially corroborated by the dozens of instances in which Syrian authorities have foiled these smuggling attempts over the past year — including on March 17, when Syrian security forces seized a weapons shipment intended for Lebanon.

One may assume that more smuggling attempts are reaching their Lebanese destinations than are being interdicted. This is especially so since the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have showed little appetite to properly police their side of the Syrian-Lebanese border or clamp down on Hezbollah’s rearmament. Scant evidence exists that the LAF has seized any weapons shipments after they have crossed into Lebanon.

U.S. Should Confine Damascus to Defensive Actions

Despite their hostility to Hezbollah, Syria’s new authorities present a problem in the form of the jihadist pedigree of President Ahmad al-Sharaa, as well as many of his deputies and the fighting forces under his command. Their recorded abuses against ethnic and religious minorities over the past year call into question the wisdom of empowering Syria as a military force. 

This background would also allow Hezbollah to portray any Syrian incursion into Lebanon as a resurgence of the Sunni Islamists it has long alleged are proxies of Washington and Jerusalem, thereby rallying Lebanese Shiites to their cause. Instead, Washington can replicate its approach to the Lebanese Armed Forces by providing Damascus, under strict end-user agreements, with only defensive training and weaponry necessary to clear Hezbollah out of Syria.

David Daoud is senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) focused on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at FDD focused on Syria and Iranian intervention in Arab affairs and the Levant. For more analysis from the authors, please subscribe HERE. Follow David on X @DavidADaoud. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.