Domestic Politics May Impede Vietnam’s Growing Relationship With the U.S.

Vietnam is performing a balancing act, but it’s unclear how long it can keep the plates spinning.

On March 16, Vietnam held its first ever “3+3” summit with China, a meeting that featured both countries’ ministers of public security, defense, and foreign affairs. Following their discussions, Vietnamese General Secretary To Lam independently met with the Chinese delegation. The contacts are part of a string of high-level interactions between Beijing and Hanoi since October, when Lam interacted with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of a North Korean military parade.

The meeting, which follows a month after Lam’s first meeting with President Donald Trump, showcases Washington’s loose grip on Hanoi as domestic political tensions threaten to pull Vietnam further away from the United States.

Hanoi’s Strategic Dialogue With Beijing Follows Diplomatic Outreach to Washington

According to Chinese state media, the meeting focused on “safeguarding political security,” a euphemism for tightening control over civil society. The meeting also focused on “advancing defense and law enforcement cooperation,” a reference to prosecuting cross-border trafficking operations that often entrap Vietnamese citizens in Chinese-linked scam call centers and managing occasional flare-ups of the countries’ contested maritime claims. The meeting also expanded on previous trade and supply chain integration agreements signed by Hanoi and Beijing in April 2025, a now more salient point of cooperation after U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer launched a new trade investigation targeting both countries on March 11.

The unprecedented meeting follows Lam’s first summit with Trump in February while Lam attended a meeting of the Board of Peace. In a read-out posted by Vietnamese state media, Trump allegedly promised to remove Vietnam from several export control lists, including those that had previously blocked Hanoi from acquiring dual-use technologies such as aerospace components and semiconductors. The president also pledged to deepen scientific and technical cooperation with Hanoi.

Vietnam Looks To Balance Against Potential U.S. Withdrawal

The “3+3” meeting highlights Lam’s efforts to balance between internal hardliners and his efforts to grow closer to the United States as a major source of economic growth. While Lam has aimed to promote growth via restructuring the bureaucracy and easing control over the private sector, his leadership has also faced pressure from both the Ministry of State Security — his main power base — and the country’s politically powerful military to strengthen state control over civil society. This pressure has partially prompted Lam to reestablish ties with Hanoi’s historic allies, including conducting Vietnam’s first state visit to North Korea in nearly two decades in October and attending Russia’s Victory Day parade in May, which featured Vietnamese soldiers marching in a foreign military parade for the first time.

Hanoi also has deepening concerns over its relationship with Washington. While Vietnam gained access to some American technologies and signed a preliminary trade deal in October to lower American tariffs, the United States has yet to finalize its promised sale of fighter and transport aircraft to Hanoi following Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s visit in November. While seeking to secure potential arms deals from emerging regional exporters such as South Korea, Vietnam also remains under scrutiny from Washington for potentially violating U.S. sanctions due to its alleged illicit purchases of Russian military aircraft over the past three years.

Washington Should Prioritize Conditional Outreach

While the meeting between China and Vietnamese officials may not ultimately lead to greater cooperation between regional rivals — Vietnam has surged construction of artificial islands in both countries’ disputed waters — Lam’s domestic political signals to his base may complicate Hanoi’s efforts to achieve more stable relations with the United States.

In response, the United States should prioritize conditions-based outreach to gradually cement ties with Hanoi. This effort should include the possibility of reimposing export controls and sanctioning Vietnamese firms involved in procuring Russian weapons, while continuing to push forward on weapons sales and tariff reductions as key pillars in strengthening Vietnam’s role as an aligned regional economic and security hub.  

Jack Burnham is a senior research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Jack and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.