March 1, 2026 | Policy Brief

Hezbollah Deliberates Over Attack on Israel as Further Strikes Hit Iranian Regime Targets

March 1, 2026 | Policy Brief

Hezbollah Deliberates Over Attack on Israel as Further Strikes Hit Iranian Regime Targets

Operation “Epic Fury” opened with a well-placed strike against Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s compound in Tehran, eliminating him and several other senior officials. Yet save for sharply worded, but ultimately noncommittal, condemnations, Hezbollah — once the crown jewel of Iran’s regional proxy array — is nowhere to be found. The group’s inaction so far does not suggest it is surrendering or abandoning the Tehran regime. Instead, Hezbollah is assessing the best avenue to serve the Islamic Republic.

To Intervene or Not To Intervene?

In a January 26 speech, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem suggested that Hezbollah could not remain neutral in the face of a threat to Khamenei, but he was explicitly noncommittal about intervening. “We will decide at the time how to act, to intervene or not, and with the specifics appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and the course of the battle,” he said. Hezbollah reaffirmed Qassem’s remarks after media quoted an unnamed Hezbollah official declaring an attack on Khamenei a “red line.”

Hezbollah’s Self-Preservation Serves Iran

For the past year, Hezbollah has been focused on regeneration impeded by only ongoing Israeli operations in Lebanon. This effort is motivated not solely by self-interest but also by the desire to carry on serving the Islamic Republic of Iran as a self-described vanguard in the “exportation of the Islamic revolution.” As Qassem implied during his speech, Hezbollah prioritizes the regime’s endurance over the person of Khamenei — whom they can bill as one of the righteous martyrs of the “Axis of Resistance” on the path to their divinely promised victory against the United States.

So long as an off-ramp permitting the regime’s survival exists, Hezbollah will remain inactive to preserve that window of opportunity. Intervention by the group, or any of Iran’s other proxies, will only extend the war and allow Israel and the United States to inflict additional damage upon the regime and its regional assets. This will leave Tehran with more raw material from which to rebuild its proxies the day after the war, should the regime survive.

A De Facto Referendum on Hezbollah’s Arsenal

To that end, Hezbollah will also take into consideration domestic factors impacting its own survival. Its main concern is not the stance of the Lebanese state, which so far has consisted of cosmetic actions and forceful statements warning Hezbollah not to attack Israel, but rather how intervention will affect the group’s standing among Lebanese Shiites. Hezbollah already miscalculated by joining Hamas’s war against Israel, subjecting Shiites to a highly destructive war for a cause not their own while they were still suffering from Lebanon’s 2019 economic collapse. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s ineffectiveness during that conflict very likely exposed the hollowness of its carefully cultivated image as a capable “resistance” organization — one of the main reasons driving Lebanese Shiite support for the group.

Hezbollah needs to demonstrably retain Shiite support to continue deterring the Lebanese state from seeking its disarmament. Since the November 2024 ceasefire took effect, Hezbollah has been eyeing Lebanon’s May 2026 parliamentary elections as a de facto referendum on its continued popularity. Subjecting its supporters to another avoidable war in as many years will undermine the group’s dual objectives of retaining its hold — alongside its partner Amal Movement — on the parliamentary seats reserved for the Shiite community and expanding its share of the popular vote.

Don’t Let Hezbollah Intervene on Its Own Terms

These factors leave Hezbollah constrained and vulnerable, creating an opportunity for the United States to shape the confrontation. Washington can press Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to proactively prove their worth as partners, not just by issuing terse statements against Hezbollah dragging Lebanon into a foreign war but also by exploiting this opportunity to constrain and disarm the group. Additionally, the United States can support a preemptive Israeli escalation against Hezbollah in Lebanon if the Israelis decide on this course of action.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. For more analysis from David and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow David on X @DavidADaoud. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.