Reported U.S. Demands on Iran Fall Short of Eliminating Tehran’s Threat

During the latest round of indirect talks in Geneva, the United States reportedly presented Iran with demands that fall short of eliminating the Islamic Republic’s nuclear threat.

According to The Wall Street Journal, Washington called for the destruction of three key nuclear sites — Esfahan, Fordow, and Natanz — all previously struck by U.S. forces in June 2025. Tehran would also be required to transfer its remaining enriched uranium stockpiles to U.S. custody, including material believed to be stored in underground tunnels at Esfahan and Fordow. The proposal included a full ban on enrichment, minimal upfront sanctions relief, and an agreement with no sunset clause.

But critical gaps remain.

It is unclear whether the dismantlement demands extend to Esfahan’s tunnel complex, where Iran stored highly enriched uranium and was constructing a new enrichment facility. At Natanz, two enrichment plants were destroyed, yet there is no clarity on whether the deeply buried Pickaxe Mountain site — even more fortified than Fordow and where Iran could build another enrichment facility — must also be eliminated. Nor do the reported terms address Iran’s weaponization infrastructure. Despite Israeli strikes during the 12-Day War in June, satellite imagery shows reconstruction underway at SPND and at the Taleghan 2 facility inside the Parchin military complex where Tehran conducted weaponization activities. 

Most troubling, Washington is reportedly considering Tehran’s request for “token” enrichment — possibly as low as 1 to 1.5 percent, or up to 20 percent for the Tehran Research Reactor.

That would be a grave mistake.

Even 1 percent enrichment represents roughly half the technical effort required to reach weapons-grade uranium. Once enrichment infrastructure exists, escalation is a political decision, not a technical hurdle. Twenty percent enrichment — far above the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) 3.67 percent cap — dramatically shortens breakout time. It represents approximately 90 percent of the technical effort to achieve weapons-grade uranium. 

We have seen this mistake before. The 2013 Joint Plan of Action conceded “token enrichment” in exchange for limited sanctions relief and laid the groundwork for the fatally flawed 2015 JCPOA. Temporary concessions became permanent leverage for Tehran.

Allowing any enrichment today would repeat that error.

January 2029 matters. That’s the ultimate sunset to all deals when President Donald Trump leaves office. Iran could face a successor less willing to use force or leverage. Preserved enrichment capability would then give Tehran an open door to expand to unlimited enrichment and move to a bomb under reduced pressure.

Iran’s proposal would effectively allow the regime to restart capabilities destroyed by U.S. strikes, preserve breakout potential, avoid further military action, and wait out the clock.

A viable agreement requires full and permanent nuclear dismantlement: zero uranium enrichment, zero plutonium reprocessing, complete disclosure of past weapons work, destruction of centrifuge production infrastructure, and unrestricted inspections. It must also address terrorism, domestic repression, and Iran’s large and reconstituting missile program, including an intercontinental ballistic missile program it is building to target the American homeland. 

Anything less — especially a deal that leaves enrichment intact for the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism — is not a solution. It would be a failure for Trump who has been so successful to date in addressing the threat from Iran.

Mark Dubowitz is the CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of FDD’s Nonproliferation Program. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Mark and Andrea on X @mdubowitz and @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.