‘We Don’t Care What Others Say’: Turkey Won’t Withdraw Its Troops From Syria

Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler could not have been blunter.

“We have no agenda for withdrawing or leaving those areas,” Guler told the Turkish daily Hurriyet when asked whether Turkey might withdraw its armed forces from Syria, following the latest agreement between the government in Damascus and the Kurdish-led, U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as well as from Iraq. “The decision to withdraw from those areas will be made by the Republic of Turkey. We don’t care what others say.”

At the end of January, the latest offensive by government forces in northeastern Syria culminated in an agreement that would absorb the SDF into the Syrian army as four distinct brigades. Guler, however, did not rule out the possibility that the conflict with the SDF might resume. “Right now, a resurgence of terrorism is not visible. But that doesn’t mean it won’t happen,” he said, signaling that Ankara views the SDF’s residual organizational structure and continued possession of weapons as sufficient justification for Turkey to retain its military posture in Syria.

SDF-Damascus Government Agreement Hasn’t Allayed Turkish Suspicions

Since their first agreement was signed in March 2025, both Damascus and the SDF have harbored deep reservations about military integration. Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa initially rejected SDF demands to integrate as a unified bloc, insisting instead that its fighters be absorbed into the Syrian army as individuals. Turkey, Sharaa’s closest ally, shared this concern and repeatedly signaled that it would not tolerate the SDF retaining its weapons or continuing to exist as a military force.

Despite those objection, under the most recent agreement last month, the SDF secured a degree of security autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas. This allowed it, at least on paper, to retain its weapons and integrate into the Syrian army as distinct SDF brigades. While Turkey has publicly indicated openness to the latest agreement, the persistence of Kurdish units along the Turkish-Syrian border appears to be a core driver of Ankara’s continued military presence. A full division composed of SDF fighters, even if nominally under the Syrian army’s command, could lead to a future confrontation with Turkey.

To date, no binding implementation framework has been put in place, leaving the agreement vulnerable to delay or collapse. The apprehensiveness expressed by Guler could resurface and serve as Ankara’s justification for retaining its armed forces in the territory of its southern neighbor.

Israeli Concerns Escalating

Ankara’s determination to maintain a permanent military presence in Syria is likely to heighten Israeli concerns regarding Turkish expansionism in the region. Since the overthrow of former dictator Bashar al-Assad, Israeli worries that Ankara will use its military presence in Syria as a launchpad for its broader hegemonic ambitions have only grown. Israel is also wary that under Sharaa, a former jihadist, Syria will emerge as a client state of Turkey that is hostile to Israel and its security interests. That may well explain why the Israel Defense Forces  targeted the T4 airbase in Palmyra, which Turkey had intended to serve as a base for its F-16 fighter jets, during airstrikes in April 2025 .

U.S. Must Retain Military Presence in Syria

It is incumbent on Washington not to draw down its military footprint in Syria, as a continued American presence dampens the potential for escalation between Turkey and Israel. The United States must also make it crystal clear to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that a permanent occupation of Syria by the Turkish military would be an unwelcome outcome.

A permanent Turkish military presence is also likely to be perceived by Syrian Kurds as a threat that could revive armed conflict with Ankara directly, thereby bolstering the risk of destabilization in post-Assad Syria.

Ahmad Sharawi is as senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on Middle East affairs, specifically the Levant, Iraq, and Iranian intervention in Arab affairs, as well as U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at FDD. For more analysis from Ahmad, Sinan, and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ahmad and Sinan on X @AhmadA_Sharawi and @SinanCiddi. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.