January 30, 2026 | Policy Brief
Third Time Lucky? Syrian Government and Kurdish-Led SDF Announce Latest Agreement
January 30, 2026 | Policy Brief
Third Time Lucky? Syrian Government and Kurdish-Led SDF Announce Latest Agreement
An escalation of conflict in northeastern Syria has been averted, at least for now. But questions persist over whether the disputes that sparked the recent offensive by Syrian government troops against areas held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will be resolved.
The Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced a revised agreement on January 30 to gradually integrate military and administrative structures. The deal would permit Syrian government forces to enter the cities of al-Hasakah and Qamishli, while allowing the SDF to retain four military brigades tasked with operating in Kurdish-majority areas.
The agreement is the third reached between the two sides since President Ahmed al-Sharaa took power, which highlights the fragility of the arrangement.
The latest iteration differs from the January 18 deal reached after the government’s rapid campaign to seize Arab-majority territories previously held by the SDF. That deal sought to integrate SDF fighters as individuals, requiring the group’s disarmament. By contrast, the current agreement allows the SDF to retain dedicated brigades. Nonetheless, it is the design of the integration mechanism that will be decisive in determining whether the agreement succeeds.
Integration Mechanism Addresses Core Concerns
Both the Syrian government and the SDF have harbored concerns over military integration. Al-Sharaa has rejected SDF demands for integration as a bloc, insisting that its fighters be absorbed into the army as individuals, despite allowing Turkish-backed militias to integrate as intact units.
Allowing the SDF to remain a unified force would threaten Sharaa’s already delicate position, risk the emergence of an autonomous armed bloc, and set a precedent for other minorities, including the Alawites and Druze, that the Syrian authorities would rather avoid. Meanwhile, the SDF’s demands reflect their fear of the government elements that massacred minority communities. As Murat Kayilian, a Kurdish official, put it, “The weapons of the SDF are a guarantee of safety for Syria’s communities and for preventing a repeat of what happened on the coast and in Suwayda.”
Under this latest agreement, some of the core concerns on both sides are partially addressed. The SDF retains a degree of security autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas. The Syrian government gains the authority to approve personnel assigned to the brigades dedicated to the SDF and to deploy them into parts of northeastern Syria, such as al-Hasakah and Qamishli, which were previously off-limits to Damascus.
Unresolved Disputes Persist
Despite the explicit mention of appointing a Kurd as governor of Hasakah, as well as the appointment of Kurdish officers within the Syrian army, the formal inclusion of Kurds in the political process will be the true test of this agreement’s success. Trust eroded quickly after the first integration deal was signed in March, when Sharaa excluded Kurdish representatives from the constitutional drafting process and omitted any reference to Kurdish rights or their role in government. Now, with Presidential Decree No. 13 granting Kurds linguistic and cultural rights, the burden falls on Sharaa to implement these provisions. He can either agree to give both the SDF and Kurdish leaders a meaningful role in politics or risk repeating the conflict that erupted last March when talks collapsed.
U.S. Must Press Damascus To Respect Kurdish Rights
The Trump administration has signaled its trust of Sharaa by lifting sanctions and promoting stability. However, concerns persist in Washington over how Damascus has handled the SDF, with lawmakers proposing legislation that could reimpose sanctions on Syria.
The U.S. priority should be to pressure both sides to implement the agreement, adhere to Sharaa’s decree recognizing Kurdish rights, and enshrine those rights in the constitution. At the same time, Washington should be prepared to use existing authorities, including Executive Order 13894, against any individual or entity that “threatens the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria.”
Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.