February 2, 2026 | Policy Brief
Trump Administration Scores Major Victory as Panama Supreme Court Rules Against Chinese Shipping Firm
February 2, 2026 | Policy Brief
Trump Administration Scores Major Victory as Panama Supreme Court Rules Against Chinese Shipping Firm
The Danish shipping behemoth Maersk is now temporarily managing two ports along the Panama Canal after the Panamanian Supreme Court annulled a Chinese company’s contracts on constitutional grounds.
The court’s January 29 decision to cancel the contracts with Chinese shipping magnate CK Hutchison marked an important victory for President Donald Trump’s bid to roll back Beijing’s dominance of the global maritime industry. Last year, Trump had declared that “China is operating the Panama Canal, and we didn’t give it to China, we gave it to Panama. And we’re taking it back.”
The shift has been nearly one year in the making. In March 2025, CK Hutchison announced the sale of its non-Chinese port portfolio to a consortium composed of the American asset management firm BlackRock and the European shipping powerhouse MSC.
Consequently, China moved to block the deal through an anti-trust review unless the Chinese state-owned company, COSCO Shipping, was assigned a major stake. BlackRock, MSC, and CK Hutchison all have significant business interests in China that could be at risk as a result.
Replacing the publicly listed, privately owned CK Hutchison — which itself was susceptible to coercion by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — with a Chinese state-owned enterprise that functions as an extension of the CCP, would amount to a major step backwards for American economic security, particularly with regard to the two Panamanian ports.
China’s Maritime Monopoly
The Chinese government presently has the maritime industry in a chokehold. China controls more than 100 overseas ports on every continent except Antarctica. It manufactures more than 95 percent of shipping containers and 70 percent of ship-to-shore cranes. This includes 80 percent of the cranes used in America — which lawmakers have highlighted as possible tools for Chinese surveillance. In addition, China possesses 69 times as many merchant vessels as does the U.S. and has 232 times the shipbuilding capacity.
In the Western Hemisphere, China now has a presence in 35 ports. The two Panama Canal ports are the most significant in strategic terms, as roughly 40 percent of all U.S. container traffic passes through waterway.
If China’s maritime dominance expands, the U.S. and its allies risk the same dependency they now face with critical minerals and rare earths; they risk being at Beijing’s mercy, begging access to Chinese-owned ports while lacking domestically built ships or containers.
After Panama: Next Steps
While addressing the risk to the Panama Canal was the top priority for the White House, China’s broader global position is also of concern, the remainder of the CK Hutchison portfolio includes vital ports that remain vulnerable to control by Chinese state-owned entities. It holds 41 international ports located in such critical areas as the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab-el Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea, as well as assets in Europe, Mexico, South Korea, and Australia. Developing a strategy to reduce Chinese control and block Chinese state ownership of those ports remains a critical national security concern.
China’s Maritime Bullying Must End
In the wake of the Panamanian Supreme Court’s decision, the Trump administration and the Panamanian government must now ensure that concessions for two Panama Canal ports are permanently entrusted to operators committed to protecting the Western Hemisphere from malign Chinese influence.
However, given that ports are just one aspect of China’s maritime monopoly, the United States and its allies should bolster investments in all industries vital to maritime transit. The U.S. and South Korea’s “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” partnership is a welcome first step. Similar deals should be created for the manufacturing of shipping containers, ship-to-shore cranes, and logistical systems.
Elaine Dezenski is senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Susan Soh is a research associate. For more analysis from Elaine, Susan, and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Elaine on X @ElaineDezenski. Follow Susan on X @SusanSoh827. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.