January 8, 2026 | Policy Brief

China and Pakistan Increase Cooperation, Bring Taliban Into the Fold

January 8, 2026 | Policy Brief

China and Pakistan Increase Cooperation, Bring Taliban Into the Fold

China and Pakistan are trying to bolster the Taliban’s global standing. Beijing and Islamabad released a joint statement on January 5 urging Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to curb attacks from affiliated terror groups, namely Tehreek e Pakistan (the Taliban’s Pakistan chapter, or TTP). This move serves two purposes: to prevent further terror attacks against Pakistan’s defense forces and Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure while laying the groundwork for the Taliban to gain international legitimacy.

The TTP Has Previously Attacked BRI Infrastructure in Pakistan

TTP attacks against joint Pakistani-Chinese BRI infrastructure have degraded Beijing’s flagship partnership in South Asia. In March 2021, a TTP-linked suicide bomber blew up a convoy transporting Chinese engineers to the Dasu hydropower project in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing five Chinese nationals and one Pakistani driver. TTP terrorists conducted a similar suicide attack in the Pakistani city of Bisham in 2024, killing five more Chinese engineers en route to the Dasu site.

In 2017, Pakistan created a 15,000-strong Special Security Division to protect Chinese nationals and projects. Nevertheless, Beijing has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the Pakistani security apparatus. Chinese officials have pressed Islamabad for stronger counterterrorism measures for years and have begun using BRI investments as leverage to pressure Islamabad toward this goal.

China’s flagship BRI program in Pakistan is called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Established in 2015, the CPEC has received roughly $60 billion from Beijing to date; but Chinese money has slowed since 2020 due, in part, to poor security conditions. In 2021, China and Pakistan launched CPEC 2.0, which initially moved away from large-scale, state-backed megaprojects to smaller, slower-moving investments that carry less risk.

China Does Not Seek Taliban Reform Beyond Afghan Stability

Following the collapse of the Afghan government in 2021, China has cautiously engaged with the Taliban while refusing to grant international recognition. Having previously invested in a range of oil and mining interests across the country, including a joint venture between the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co. and AfgChin Oil and Gas Ltd., Beijing remains economically linked with the Taliban, despite the kidnapping of several Chinese nationals by the group in August 2025.

Beijing has also tried to pressure the Taliban into cooperating with its genocidal campaign against the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority group residing along the Afghan-China border. Chinese authorities have repeatedly called upon the Taliban to deny Uyghur militants a haven within Afghanistan, a pledge that the Taliban have largely panned, though the terrorist group has reportedly relocated its Uyghur fighters away from the border region.

The U.S. Should Isolate the Taliban

Beijing has already signaled it is willing to integrate Taliban-controlled Afghanistan into CPEC 2.0. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his Pakistani and Afghani counterparts in May 2025 and declared Afghanistan would join the program. If Afghanistan joins CPEC, the Taliban would gain access to increased Chinese capital, cross-border infrastructure, and legitimacy through diplomatic collaboration.

To prevent this from happening, Washington should reinforce Afghanistan’s economic isolation through increased sanctions targeting Taliban-controlled institutions. Likewise, the Trump administration should designate the Taliban as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The United States should also consider sanctioning sectors of the Afghan economy if China decides to support industries through CPEC 2.0.

By taking these steps, Washington would raise the price of diplomatic normalization and help deter efforts to mainstream the Taliban on the global stage.

Jack Burnham is a senior research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Samuel Ben-Ur is a research analyst. For more analysis from Jack, Samuel, and FDD, please subscribeHERE. Follow Jack on X@JackBurnham802. Follow FDD on X@FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.