How Venezuela’s Maduro became Washington’s most persistent hemispheric adversary

On November 13, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced Operation Southern Spear amid an increased American military presence off the coast of Venezuela. Hegseth stated that the military and surveillance campaign is intended to “[defend] our homeland, [remove] narco-terrorists from our hemisphere, and [secure] our homeland from the drugs that are killing our people.” The operation follows a series of kinetic strikes that the US military has conducted since early September on vessels it states are drug-trafficking speedboats launched from Venezuela.

The US has increasingly pressured the South American country and its contested ruler, President Nicolás Maduro, amid US President Donald Trump’s claim that Maduro’s “illegitimate” regime has “failed … to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” However, this conflict did not start on November 13 or with boat strikes that preceded Operation Southern Spear, nor was Trump the first US president to pressure Venezuela.

Relations between Venezuela and the US have been strained since the early 2000s, intensifying when the former regime of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez clashed with the administration of US President George W. Bush. This discord has stretched over multiple administrations, increasing once again after a brief lull during the Obama administration when Chávez died of cancer in 2013 and Nicolás Maduro replaced him as president.

In late 2014, the Obama administration began sanctioning dozens of Venezuelan officials over their connections to narcotics trafficking. Trump’s first term, however, marked a noticeable escalation in the US strategy towards Caracas. The president inherited a bipartisan consensus that Venezuela’s once-democratic institutions were being hollowed out by corruption, repression, ties to Iran and Russia, and state involvement in drug and human trafficking.

Since 2017, the Trump administration has applied significant pressure on Caracas, often in response to the actions of the Maduro regime. On February 13 of that year, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Venezuela’s then-Vice President Tareck El Aissami for drug trafficking under the Kingpin Act for “facilitating shipments of narcotics from Venezuela.”

In April 2017, Maduro cracked down on the National Assembly, Venezuela’s primary legislative body, which was controlled by his political opposition. He pressured the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (STJ), the country’s highest court, to issue rulings stripping the National Assembly of its legislative powers and transferring them to the court, which Maduro de facto controlled. In response, the US sanctioned eight members of the STJ. Following the May 2018 Venezuelan elections, the US, along with most of the democratic world, formally rejected Maduro’s reelection, with Trump calling it a “sham.”

Venezuela’s opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, agreed with the US assessment and invoked the Venezuelan Constitution to assume an interim presidency in January 2019 after declaring Maduro’s victory fraudulent. The US recognized Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela, with Trump pledging to use “the full weight of United States economic and diplomatic power to press for the restoration of Venezuelan democracy.” Within days of Trump’s announcement, around 50 worldwide governments recognized Guaidó’s presidency.

In line with Trump’s pledge, his administration began placing economic pressure on Venezuela’s crude oil industry, which has accounted for around 66% of the government’s budget in recent years. In January 2019, Washington froze about $7 billion in Venezuelan government funds in US banks and placed Guaidó-appointed directors in charge of Citgo, a US-based subsidiary of the Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). Subsequently, then-Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin placed sanctions on PDVSA itself.

On April 30, 2019, Guaidó launched “Operación Libertad,” a military uprising in Caracas that attempted to oust Maduro. However, Venezuela’s armed forces stayed loyal to the regime, and the attempt failed. Then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed Maduro had been ready to flee to Cuba before his Russian backers convinced him to stay, and then-National Security Advisor John Bolton accused Havana of propping up Maduro and threatened to impose a total US embargo.

Following the failed coup, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Maduro and 14 other Venezuelan officials on narcoterrorism charges in March 2020. The indictment placed a $15 million reward for Maduro’s arrest and alleged that he spearheaded a conspiracy with Colombian guerrillas to export cocaine to the US. The DOJ documented an “air bridge” through which cocaine traffickers exported 200-250 metric tons of cocaine per year from Venezuela to the US, representing approximately 30 million lethal doses.

In the face of sustained American pressure, Maduro aligned more closely with America’s strategic adversaries. For example, in early 2019, US officials tracked roughly 100 Russian soldiers deploying to Caracas to bolster Maduro’s security and communications. China continued its practice of selling advanced surveillance equipment to Venezuela’s security services. Iran and Venezuela signed a 20-year cooperation plan in 2022 that promised collaboration in oil, defense, petrochemicals, tourism, and culture. In addition, Cuban intelligence agents trained Venezuelan forces, including on repression techniques, in exchange for drastically subsidized oil.

Once the Biden administration took power in 2021, it granted limited reprieves to Maduro’s regime but largely maintained the US’s posture under the Trump administration. The US Treasury Department authorized Chevron to drill in Venezuela under strict conditions, but most US sanctions remained in place. After Maduro won another reelection bid that local and international observers deemed fraudulent in 2024, Washington sanctioned 21 senior Venezuelan officials on election rigging and protest suppression charges. Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other US allies imposed similar measures following Maduro’s inauguration. The Biden administration also placed visa bans on a “significant number” of Maduro-aligned officials while continuing to demand that Maduro step aside.

Trump’s second term marked another escalation in US strategy regarding Venezuela. In January 2025, the president issued Executive Order 14157, which ordered US officials to treat Western Hemisphere drug cartels “and other organizations” as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT). The administration clarified which organizations the executive order meant when, in February 2025, the US State Department designated the major Venezuelan crime syndicate Tren de Aragua as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Trump then invoked the 1798 Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to order all members of the gang on US soil to be detained and deported. By the middle of 2025, dozens of Venezuelan migrants accused of gang ties were expelled to neighboring countries under the authority of the AEA.

In his second term, Trump has also used energy policy as a pressure point in US policy toward Venezuela. In February 2025, the president revoked Chevron’s Venezuelan drilling license, ending the Biden-era exemption. However, the US soon reversed course when Maduro agreed to release 10 imprisoned Americans and receive dozens of Venezuelan deportees. The hallmark of Trump’s second-term Venezuela policy, however, has been the American military buildup in the southern Caribbean.

In August 2025, the US Navy deployed an amphibious ready group, which included the USS San Antonio, USS Iwo Jima, and USS Fort Lauderdale, and roughly 4,500 personnel, off the Venezuelan coast. US forces also refurbished a nearby naval base in Puerto Rico and began construction of facilities in St. Croix. By the end of that month, seven warships and a fast-attack nuclear submarine were stationed near Venezuela, the largest US military force in the region since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Hegseth told Marines aboard the Iwo Jima that the deployment was a “real-world exercise” meant to “end the poisoning of the American people.”

After these initial deployments, the US began conducting kinetic strikes on speedboats suspected of shipping cocaine. On September 2, a US strike targeted a speedboat carrying cocaine that was linked to Tren de Aragua, according to the Trump administration. The attack sank the vessel, killing all 11 people aboard. Additional strikes on Sept 15 and 19 and Oct 3, 14, 16, 17, and 21 targeted what the US claims were similar speedboats and even a semi-submersible “narco-submarine.” All of this activity preceded Hegseth’s official naming of the deployments and campaign “Operation Southern Spear.”

The launch point for many of the boats that the US military has targeted is the coastal Paria Peninsula, which is controlled by armed gangs and beset by poverty, hunger, and human trafficking. The US has flagged Venezuela as a worst offender in human trafficking due to the country’s allegedly pervasive forced labor and exploitation of migrants.

Venezuela has responded to the US buildup by mobilizing its forces, with Maduro announcing plans to enlist over four million militia members and fortify key oil facilities. Currently, both the US and Venezuela remain on high alert in the Caribbean.

Samuel Ben-Ur is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Krystal Bermudez is a communications manager at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.