November 12, 2025 | Policy Brief
China Pauses Some Rare Earth Export Curbs While Retaining Levers of Control
November 12, 2025 | Policy Brief
China Pauses Some Rare Earth Export Curbs While Retaining Levers of Control
While China may have officially halted some hostile trade actions, Beijing isn’t laying down its most potent weapons. On November 9, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced a one-year delay in the implementation of certain rare earth export controls following a recent meeting between Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump in Busan, South Korea. The delay follows Washington’s promise to suspend the introduction of a new rule extending its own export controls to subsidiaries of sanctioned Chinese firms.
China’s decision to delay the new measures, rather than canceling them, showcases its desire to maintain its options in its relations with Washington.
Pause Extends To Recent Measures, Maintains Past Mineral Export Controls
MOFCOM paused components of the export control regime it introduced in December 2024, which banned the export of gallium, germanium, antimony, and other super-hard materials used in industrial production. Beijing also introduced a one-year delay on the start of new controls introduced in October 2025, which were intended to limit the export of all products with components that contain more than 0.1 percent rare earths from China, along with exports of processing equipment and heavy lanthanides.
However, Beijing has maintained the rare earth licensing system that went into effect on April 4, 2025, following the Trump administration’s “Liberation Day” tariffs. This system requires exporters to gain case-by-case permission to export seven rare earth elements and permanent magnet materials and effectively cuts off the flow of these materials to Western military manufacturers. These measures were intended to build on previous efforts to deny defense contractors access to rare earths.
Mapping China’s Rare Earth and Critical Minerals Export Controls
| Control Date | Key Materials Affected | Status |
| December 2024 | Gallium, germanium, antimony, other super-hard materials | Paused for 1 year |
| April 2025 | 7 rare earth elements and permanent magnets | Active (presumed denial of exports to U.S. defense firms) |
| October 2025 | Expanded section of rare earth elements plus processing technology and extraterritorial controls | Paused for 1 Year |
China Maintains a Strong Hold Over Rare Earth Supply Chains
China has spent three decades consolidating dominance over rare earth mining, processing, magnet production, and downstream component manufacturing. Chinese state-backed monopolies now control roughly 89 percent of global rare-earth refining and nearly every aspect of the high-performance rare-earth magnet supply chains, allowing Beijing to use its regulatory controls as de facto market chokepoints.
While China first began weaponizing its hold over rare earths in 2010 by halting rare earth shipments to Japan amid a maritime dispute, Beijing has rapidly expanded its bureaucratic capacity to enact more targeted controls. These measures include China’s 2021 Export Control Law and the devolution of export licensing authority to provincial commerce offices. Moreover, according to official job postings from October, China’s Bureau of Industrial Security and Export and Import Controls, the body responsible for enforcement, is planning to grow at its fastest pace since 2022.
During Enforcement Pause, Washington Should Pursue Ally-Shoring of Production
Washington should approach China’s promise to delay its export controls as a tactical pause that provides the Trump administration with an opening to cement ties with allies and partners rather than an enduring concession.
With Trump now back from a tour of the region, the administration should speed up ally-shoring deals with Australia, Japan, Canada, and new refining centers in Southeast Asia for processing rare earths and manufacturing permanent magnets. Congress should also act to provide funding for transitioning supply chains while enacting sensible permitting reform to speed up mine and refinery construction.
These efforts should also be coupled with the establishment of a more codified monitoring system for potential shortages, with the Commerce Department tracking license delays, approval trends, and shipping backlogs across agencies.
Jack Burnham is a research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Duncan Lazarow is an intern. For more analysis from Jack and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.