Erdogan’s imagined ‘arms race’ in Cyprus

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his loyalists wasted no time last week blasting Nicosia’s purchase of Barak MX air defense systems, denouncing it as a dire threat to Turkey and its client regime in northern Cyprus. Ankara claims the deal constitutes a major destabilization risk on the island and in the region, and might even spark an arms race.

Erdogan’s outrage rings hollow. The world still remembers Turkey’s 2019 purchase of Russian S-400 missiles, which got Ankara booted from the F-35 fighter jet program. That decision crippled Turkey’s ability to modernize its air force with badly needed fifth-generation stealth fighters, triggered US sanctions, and tarnished its standing among NATO allies. For Ankara to now feign alarm over Cyprus-Israel defense cooperation is hypocrisy at its peak. In reality, Cyprus’ acquisition of Israeli air defense batteries strengthens Eastern Mediterranean security – a welcome counterweight to Turkey’s irredentist ambitions in the region. Cyprus-Israel cooperation is a positive development in Eastern Mediterranean security.

Cyprus’ installment of Barak MX systems on the island last week was the latest development in a longer-term security partnership between Nicosia and Jerusalem. As it happens, Cyprus and Israel have good cause for defense and regional security cooperation. 

In June 2024, during a wave of drone attacks in northern Israel, the late Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah threatened to target Cyprus if it granted Israel basing rights or joined a war on Lebanon. The threat was baseless. Cyprus has never shown hostility toward Lebanon and remains neutral even as Israel and NATO members strike the so-called Axis of Resistance. And Hezbollah, for all its bluster, has no mandate to speak for the Lebanese state or its people.

Since Nasrallah’s threats, Nicosia has greatly bolstered its air defense network with help from Israel, first importing Barak MX missiles in December of last year. These systems became fully operational in March 2025, while imports continued with the latest shipment this month. 

By and large, Cyprus’ decision to strengthen security ties with Israel is good for NATO and bad for NATO’s adversaries – particularly Russia. Moscow was previously Cyprus’ primary military supplier until several years ago, a relationship that proved troublesome for countering Russian interests in the Mediterranean. Russian S-300 missile sales to Cyprus in 1997 sparked an intense crisis on the island lasting two years, and even in 2015 Nicosia authorized Moscow to dock military vessels in Cypriot ports. Denying Russia such a position in the Eastern Mediterranean – especially given Moscow’s longtime support for the former Assad regime in Syria – is a major stabilizing factor.

Turkey has legitimate security concerns, but Israeli air defense systems in Cyprus do not constitute one of them. Erdogan’s antipathy towards both Cyprus and Israel should not cloud the fact that Nicosia has a right to update its defensive military capabilities, particularly in a way ridding the island of Russian arms. 

Moreover, Turkey’s highly militarized occupation of the island’s northern third for the past half-century demonstrates that Ankara is far more a military threat to Cyprus than vice versa. Even last month, Turkish media announced Ankara’s plans to double its force presence on the island to 100,000 soldiers. Seeming to have exhausted all other petty excuses for its military occupation, Turkey blamed Israel for destabilizing Cyprus before the most recent batch of Baraks even arrived.

If Israeli missiles in Cyprus seem like a “dangerous escalation,” consider this: Turkey wants to send 50,000 more troops to “defend” an occupation zone home to less than 400,000 people. It might be wise for the international community to stop tolerating this aggression before Turkish soldiers outnumber UN peacekeeping forces on the island a hundred to one, as Ankara’s new plan would suggest.

Ankara’s violations of Greek maritime sovereignty with naval exercises under the “Blue Homeland” further confirm that Erdogan’s dream isn’t a stable Mediterranean, it’s Ottomanism revamped. One need only look at a map of Turkey’s plan – fixed in part with its bedfellows in Libya – to understand the sultanistic appetite behind the doctrine. 

Add in the ongoing Turkish occupation of northern Syria – which Erdogan has refused to yield under the guise of supporting Syrian reconstruction and framing US partners as terrorists – and you’ve got a Turkish bid for empire.

US partners in the neighborhood have already made clear their refusal to buy into Turkish irredentism in several peaceful manners. The “3+1” diplomatic forum between Greece, Cyprus, Israel and the United States is taking shape as a reliable security guarantor. Members of Congress are already pushing legislation to establish military cooperation on maritime security and counterterrorism, two issues where Ankara is not only a failure but a disruptor.

Energy cooperation is also demonstrating that the region is just fine without Turkish meddling. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) – a coalition of eight states cooperating on the region’s offshore natural gas reserves – shows the promise of diplomacy without coercion in regional waters. Turkey, which is not a member on account of its poor conduct with several EMGF states, could benefit greatly should it commit to stop bullying its neighbors.

Israeli Baraks are offering Cyprus the chance to be done with Russian arms, and it shouldn’t stop there. The US arms embargo on Cyprus is over, and 3+1 defense procurement can ensure high-quality defense tech from the United States and Israel can keep the Mediterranean safe. In turn, the United States should facilitate a Greek-Cypriot joint transfer of Russian arms – including the Cypriot S-300s now held on Crete – to help Ukraine.

If NATO can take away one lesson from the past three years of Russia’s wanton crimes against Ukraine, it’s that irredentism is a threat to liberal democracy, no matter from whom. Washington can – and should – step in to back up loyal allies and put Erdogan’s Ottoman ambitions to rest. 

William Doran is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington DC, where Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and director of the Turkey program.