8 UN Failures in Yemen

The United Nations has been active in Yemen for a decade, yet the country remains one of the poorest places on Earth. The country is at war with itself and home to the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who kidnap aid workers, regularly attack shipping through the Red Sea, and launch missiles at Israel. From the negotiating table to field operations, the UN’s efforts have been plagued by blunders, missteps, and a lack of foresight to the detriment of the Yemeni people and their regional neighbors.

1. A crucial UN-brokered agreement favored the Houthis over Yemen’s government.

The 2018 UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government (IRG) halted an offensive by Yemeni forces and their partners to uproot the Houthis. As Yemeni forces advanced up the Houthi-controlled west coast, members of the international community, including the United Nations and the United States, pushed the IRG and aligned forces to agree to a ceasefire to avert a humanitarian crisis. This inherently flawed deal ultimately empowered the Iran-backed Houthis. The resulting UN-brokered agreement, which included an immediate ceasefire in the governorate of Hodeidah, cemented the Houthis’ hold on this strategic region. Hodeidah is home to the strategic ports of Hodeidah, Ras Isa, and al-Salif, control of which has enriched the Houthis, facilitated weapons smuggling, and provided access to the Red Sea. Control of Yemen’s west coast has also enabled nearly two years of Houthi terrorism against international shipping.

2. The UN fails to enforce the arms embargo on the Houthis.

The UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) began operations in 2016 at the request of Yemen’s IRG to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which placed an arms embargo on the Houthis and their affiliates. One inherent flaw in UNVIM is the mechanism’s reliance on voluntary submission for inspection as it does not have the authority or ability to interdict ships. According to the United Kingdom, there was a surge in vessels circumventing UNVIM and delivering uninspected cargo to Houthi-controlled ports in 2024. UNVIM, ill-equipped to fulfil its mission from the outset, has also been plagued by funding concerns. Meanwhile, Iran has been helping to develop the Houthis’ arsenal, which can be seen both in the systems deployed and those intercepted by efforts outside of UNVIM.

3. The UN enables Houthi control of Hodeidah port.

Enforcement of the Stockholm Agreement has been one-sided, especially as it relates to the port of Hodeidah. The UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) was established to oversee implementation of the Hodeidah Agreement, a key part of the Stockholm Agreement. Under the agreement, the port would be overseen by a third party, and its revenue would go to public-sector salaries in Hodeidah and across Yemen. In reality, the Houthis have retained control on the ground, prevented external oversight, and pocketed port profits. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen documented roughly $4 billion in customs revenue from fuel imports over a two-year period. That does not include other imports and various illicit fees, and the UN panel noted “that a significant portion of this amount was diverted towards military purposes.” Public sector salaries frequently go unpaid. Despite the Houthis’ noncompliance and exploitation, the international community — particularly through the UN Development Programme — has financed repairs and improvements on Houthi-controlled ports.

4. UN funding supports the malign activities of both the Houthis and Russia.

The UN has unintentionally bankrolled both Russian sanctions evasion and Houthi energy imports in waters controlled by the Iran-backed terror group. The Yemen, a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), was purchased in 2023 by the United Nations to store more than a million barrels of oil that had been onboard The Safer, a floating storage and offloading vessel. The Safer was in dire condition and at risk of sinking, spilling its cargo into the Red Sea, and causing an environmental disaster. The VLCC Yemen was acquired by the UN for $55 million in donor funds — including from the United States — and it costs $450,000 per month to maintain it.

Both ships are permanently located off the Houthi-controlled coast of Hodeidah, giving the group control over them, despite “ownership” by the IRG. The Houthis have used The Yemen to import and store sanctioned Russian oil.

5. The UN decision to headquarter in Houthi-controlled territory advantages the Houthis.

The UN has long resisted calls to relocate its headquarters from the Houthi-controlled capital of Sanaa to the IRG’s interim capital in Aden. Moving to Aden would help counter the Houthis’ exploitation of aid and humanitarian organizations and better protect UN staff members. Following the Houthis’ mass abduction of UN personnel in August, the UN was forced to relocate the office of its resident coordinator from Sanaa to Aden. Secretary General António Guterres announced several other offices would follow suit, in a change that came too late to protect the dozens of already detained individuals.

The United Nations continues to use Hodeidah as the primary port of entry for aid for all of Yemen, with 80 percent of humanitarian assistance entering Houthi-controlled ports. Houthi fees at the port of Hodeidah and the diversion of incoming aid and resources funds the group’s terrorism. While the UN, under donor pressure, has pushed back on some of the most egregious Houthi demands, continued reliance on Houthi ports enables exploitation. The UN has refused to seriously consider offers from the IRG to receive aid in southern ports for distribution across Yemen, despite the danger the Houthis pose to UN personnel and resources.

6. The UN fails its own kidnapped and vulnerable personnel.

The Houthis held 23 of 52, or 44 percent, of globally detained UN staff per the UN’s statement on the International Day of Solidarity with Detained and Missing Staff Members on March 25, 2025. The Houthis’ kidnapping of 22 UN workers at the end of August then catapulted the Houthi total to more than 40 detained UN workers. The detained employees are mainly Yemeni personnel who do not receive the same attention as foreign workers. A Jordanian national kidnapped during the August abductions, for example, was released after only days compared to the extended periods local staff spend in illegal Houthi detention.

The United Nations has not taken strong action to pressure the Houthis to return its people. Instead, the international body relies on weak statements, some of which fail to name the Houthis as the perpetrators of these crimes.

7. The UN chooses not to stand up to Houthi bullying and aid exploitation.

The Houthis seek to profit, either politically or financially, from humanitarian assistance at every possible opportunity. The Houthis have stolen a third of the nearly $30 billion in aid the United Nations and humanitarian groups have pumped into Yemen in the past decade, according to Yemen’s IRG. The Houthis aim to control all aspects of aid delivery in their territory, from managing lists of aid recipients to approving local partners for the UN and other humanitarian organizations. This enables the Iran-backed terror group to funnel the aid to itself and ensure work related to aid distribution goes to Houthi loyalists. The UN rarely pushes back against Houthi exploitation to avoid losing what access it has to the country. Experts, though, have questioned whether the access the Houthis allow is worth the price of enabling the Houthis and endangering UN personnel. Furthermore, in measuring humanitarian impact, the UN overvalues aid delivery to its general location instead of delivery to individuals in need.

8. The UN-led political process in Yemen legitimizes the Houthis.

The UN emphasizes the need for a political solution to the conflict in the country. That effort is led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen Hans Grundberg. Grundberg shuttles between meetings with Houthi leaders — along with their Iranian partners — in Muscat, and those with the legitimate Yemeni leadership in Riyadh and Aden, as facts on the ground dictate. The UN must deal with the Houthis. They control roughly three-quarters of Yemen’s population. However, the UN has limited capacity or will to pressure the Houthis and a poor track record of dealmaking in Yemen. Diplomatic engagement has made minimal progress and serves to legitimize the Houthis. Furthermore, the UN’s aversion to and condemnation of military action against the Houthis will only prolong the group’s hold on Sanaa.

Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where she focuses on Iranian proxies, specifically Iraqi militias and the Houthis. For more analysis from Bridget and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.