Donald Trump’s Tariffs Can Cripple Russia—If Done Right

The weapon that can do the most damage to Russia’s war machine isn’t a drone or a tank—it’s America’s economic leverage. That’s why President Donald Trump’s August 6 announcement of 50 percent tariffs on India—Russia’s second-largest crude oil customer—could mark a turning point in the campaign to constrain Russia. The policy’s success, however, depends on how decisively Washington follows through and how New Delhi responds.

Countries like India have helped sustain Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine by prioritizing short-term economic gain over strategic alignment with the United States and its allies in Europe. India’s imports of Russian fossil fuels have jumped from just 1 percent of its crude supply in 2021 to more than 40 percent today. Trade between the two countries now amounts to more than $5 billion per month, with most coming from the oil trade. 

Meanwhile, Indian state-owned firms continue purchasing Russian weapons, including S-400 air-defense systems. Reports suggest an Indian company may have even recently sent explosive compounds to Russia that the United States assesses are “critical for Russia’s war effort.”

Trump’s move to double the already significant 25 percent tariffs on Indian goods announced last week introduces even more meaningful economic consequences for New Delhi’s ongoing support of the Kremlin.

And the timing is smart. With global oil prices down roughly 40 percent since mid-2022, the financial upside of buying sanctions-laden Russian crude is shrinking. Meanwhile, nearly one-fifth of all Indian exports reach the United States. Aggressive tariffs on those goods could further incentivize a rapid reorientation of India’s energy basket away from Russian exports.

Signs are emerging that the pressure may be working. While some reports suggest India will not acquiesce to Trump’s demands, others detail how India’s state-owned oil refineries—which have been some of the largest single buyers of Russian oil—are already pausing their demand. Officials are reportedly directing these state-owned firms to identify alternative sources, though privately held Indian refineries do not appear to have received similar guidance yet.

Critics may argue that India, with its longstanding ties to Russia, cannot simply pivot and align with the United States against its ally. But that underestimates how unattractive Russia has become as a partner. Moscow is a global pariah, an increasingly junior partner to China, and a security ally with little left to offer as it remains mired in Ukraine. India has reason to reconsider the relationship on its own. The United States simply needs to accelerate India’s shift away from Russia with the right combination of carrots and sticks.

It worked in 2019, when the United States imposed sweeping sanctions on Iranian oil while offering India alternative supplies and deeper energy cooperation. Similar measures were taken in 2012 as well. The same model can work here. The United States should offer India a six-month waiver to give the country enough time to identify and transition to alternative suppliers. Washington should actively support this process, helping India to diversify its energy imports and reduce its dependence on Russia. It can be a model for how the United States works with countries that have spent far too long trying to play both sides of a global rivalry.

This sharper posture toward India also raises a necessary question: why isn’t China, which plays an even more significant and nefarious role in propping up Russia, facing similar penalties? Unlike India, China is not a partner of the United States. Yet, Beijing continues to purchase sanctioned Russian oil, enable trade in dual-use goods, and shield Russian financial transactions from scrutiny without facing the kind of Russia-based tariff escalation now directed at New Delhi. If the Trump administration wants to cut off Russia’s economic oxygen, it must show at least equal aggressiveness toward China, whose support for Moscow is deeper, more deliberate, and more dangerous.

Until then—and if done right—Trump’s tariffs against India could be the start of something far bigger. India, like the United States, imports more than it exports—a reality that has made both countries vulnerable to trade manipulation by surplus economies like China’s. 

India, therefore, stands to benefit from the accelerating push to diversify global supply chains and develop additional industrial capacity in countries beyond China, provided it makes meaningful reforms that align with US interests. If Indian prime minister Narendra Modi makes the right choice, Trump should follow through by making him a better deal than Putin ever could.

Ultimately, India’s growth alongside and in partnership with the United States hinges on New Delhi recognizing a hard truth: it cannot be a bridge between democracies and dictatorships forever.

Max Meizlish is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow him on X: @maxmeizlish. Angela Howard is a research analyst at FDD. Follow her on X: @angela__howard.