Israel-Iran War is a Double-Edged Sword for Putin’s Russia

What Does Putin Really Want in the Israel-Iran Conflict?

As President Donald Trump weighs whether to join Israel’s military operation against Iran, Russia hopes to broker a diplomatic off-ramp. While the conflict presents some opportunities for Russia, it also carries serious risks. But Moscow finds itself with few good options to shape US and Israeli decision-making.

In public statements and international fora, Russian diplomats have urged de-escalation, condemning the Israeli strikes and blaming the West for allegedly helping provoke the crisis (though they’ve carefully avoided critiquing Trump). This action was the bare minimum Tehran expected from Moscow.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, has ruled out military intervention. Covert arms supplies also appear unlikely and probably wouldn’t make much difference anyhow, at least in the immediate future. Compared to Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Putin has been more muted in his criticism of Israel.

He even chided Tehran for allegedly rejecting a previous Russian offer to help build out Iran’s air defenses.

Relations Between Russia and Iran

Despite recently signing a strategic partnership agreement, Russia and Iran have eschewed a commitment to mutual defense. Their relations have certainly deepened in recent years, but Russia has never gone “all in” on Iran, seeking to maintain ties with the Arab Gulf states and Israel. Russia’s “multi-vector” approach to the Middle East is part of the reason Moscow has declined or delayed certain arms transfers to Iran and its proxies over the years. On June 13, Putin phoned both the Iranian and Israeli leaders, offering to mediate talks toward a resolution ensuring both Iran’s right to civilian nuclear energy and Israel’s “unconditional security.”

Meanwhile, Russian experts and elites have confessed admiration—and more than a little envy—at the ruthless competence with which Israel decimated Iran’s military leadership and capabilities. To many in Moscow, the Israeli operation demonstrates the immutable reality that “might makes right,” as RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan put it.

Might Makes Right

Although the Kremlin has urged de-escalation, the conflict isn’t without benefits for Russia. It has buoyed oil prices—good news for Russia’s struggling economy and federal budget if the higher prices last. Russian market analysts predict that the increase will be temporary, although this could change as events on the ground unfold. If the crisis leads to increased Chinese demand for Russian energy, it could grant Moscow a touch more leverage in a relationship increasingly dominated by Beijing.

Furthermore, Moscow no doubt hopes the conflict will exacerbate transatlantic frictions and distract Western attention and resources from the war in Ukraine, Russia’s top priority. Earlier this week, the conflict prompted Trump to depart early from a G7 summit where his Ukrainian counterpart had hoped to push the American president for tougher sanctions on Russia. Even before Israel launched its operation, the Pentagon diverted to the Middle East fuzes for counter-drone rockets that had been intended for Ukraine. Kyiv’s supply of Patriot surface-to-air missiles, already insufficient, may get stretched even thinner.

Russia’s own war effort likely won’t suffer significantly. Moscow no longer depends on Tehran for supplies of the Shahed-136 drones it uses to bombard Ukraine, as Russia itself now produces modified versions of those drones—and in far greater numbers. Russia has received some artillery ammunition from Iran but in relatively small quantities. Tehran may now be unable or unwilling to send Moscow more close-range ballistic missiles. However, those it has provided haven’t even seen action—possibly because Iran hasn’t delivered the launchers. By contrast, Russian experts predict Iran will emerge from the conflict more desperate for Russian arms.

Finally, the Kremlin hopes that by playing the role of peace broker, it can bolster Russian influence both with Trump and in the region. In recent months, Moscow has repeatedly pointed to Iran as an area for potential cooperation with Washington—part of an effort to de-link US-Russia relations from Ukraine. After the Israeli strikes began, Putin wasted little time in calling Trump to offer help in mediating.

Yet Trump has sent mixed signals about his openness to Russian mediation, while Moscow acknowledges that Israel currently has no interest in talking. Russia has few good cards it can play to change that calculus. Even whether Iran, traditionally suspicious of Russian intentions, would accept Russian mediation isn’t a given.

Indeed, Russia has been largely relegated to a bystander to the Middle East war—even as the risks to its interests are growing.

As Israel has widened the scope of its strikes, the Kremlin has expressed alarm at hints that Jerusalem and Washington will seek regime change. Moscow understands that its replacement could be far less favorable, undermining Russia’s regional influence as well as economic projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor. This would only add to the blow dealt by the fall of Russia’s Syrian client Bashar al-Assad last December.

The Russians also worry that the “galloping escalation” between Iran, Israel, and potentially the United States could wind up destabilizing the broader region. Moscow fears that this instability could spill over into Russia’s neighbors in the Caucasus and Central Asia and potentially into Russia itself.

Moreover, Moscow is skeptical that Israel alone can destroy Iran’s nuclear program. Russian experts worry the conflict could lead Tehran to develop a nuclear weapon or at least a dirty bomb. Russia does not want to see a nuclear-armed Iran. However, it would also not welcome further unilateral US military intervention in the Middle East.

Russia fancies itself as deserving a seat at the table on matters of global import. The time may yet come when Russia can insert itself diplomatically to help broker an agreement. But with little leverage to shape events on the ground, Moscow, for now, can only watch and wait.

John Hardie serves as deputy director of FDD’s Russia Program.