FDD and TeamT5 Reveal That ‘Smiao Network’ Chinese Recruiting Scheme Expands to Target Taiwan

Beijing is using the same online recruiting scheme to target both the United States and Taiwan. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) exposed a likely Chinese intelligence operation earlier this spring associated with the Chinese technology company Smiao Intelligence that used fake consulting companies to recruit laid-off federal workers. But further investigation by FDD and cybersecurity firm TeamT5 has uncovered a new wing of this operation targeting Taiwan. While FDD has no evidence that this operation, referred to here as the Smiao Network, had any success, China employed similar tactics — using online work platforms for targeting and geopolitical consulting for cover — to recruit an Army intelligence analyst to provide more than 92 sensitive military documents, according to an April 2025 Department of Justice press release.

Company’s Location, Phone Number, and Language Reveal the Ruse

TeamT5, building off FDD’s research, discovered another extension of the Smiao Network — a company known as Pine Intelligence — by searching a phone number that appeared on the website of RiverMerge Strategies, a fake geopolitical risk consulting firm in the Smiao Network. While FDD and TeamT5 have not observed Pine Intelligence advertising jobs on online platforms, the company’s connections to the Smiao Network indicate it is likely only a matter of time.

Pine Intelligence describes itself as “a premier geopolitical consulting firm based in Taiwan,” but the specific address it provides is nonexistent. As of a month ago, it listed the same 400 phone number — a prefix distinctive to semi-toll-free numbers used in mainland China — as RiverMerge Strategies. (See Figure 1.)

Pine Intelligence has webpages in English and Chinese — primarily using traditional Chinese characters common in Taiwan rather than the simplified Chinese characters used in mainland China. However, the website contains at least eight simplified characters interspersed throughout its copy (区, 欧, 断, 变, 东, 势, 库, and 系).

Additionally, the creators of the website appear to have mistakenly translated the simplified character 面 (“position” or “side”) to the traditional character 麵 (“noodles”). This typo often results from an error in simplified-to-traditional character conversion, as the simplified character 面 can mean both “noodles” as well as “position” or “side.” This linguistic residue suggests that whoever created the website likely used an automated tool to convert content from a simplified source to traditional Chinese.

Copyright Text and Common Behaviors Further Connect Company to Chinese Operation

Pine Intelligence’s website previously included the words “Copyright©2019-2020 Seametis[.]com.” (See Figure 1.) Importantly, seametis[.]com shares historically dedicated web-hosting servers — typically controlled by a single entity — with websites in the Smiao Network. These websites include subdomains of Smiao Intelligence’s main website and siss.org[.]cn, a website listed on the corporate records of Smiao Intelligence’s parent company.

Pine Intelligence also copied 80 percent of its source code from taiwanrisk[.]com, the website for an authentic business located in Australia that focuses on geopolitical risk. The Smiao Network often employs such cloning behavior. Pine Intelligence’s website even copies taiwanrisk[.]com’s favicon, a small image that represents a website in browser tabs or search engine results. Pine Intelligence also used Chengmail, a niche Chinese enterprise email service used by four other companies in the Smiao Network.

Washington and Taipei Should Expand Intel Sharing About Chinese Operations

The United States and Taiwan’s shared threats in cyberspace encompass not only critical infrastructure compromised by the People’s Republic of China but also Beijing’s attempts to recruit high-value professionals from both countries. The U.S. government reportedly has already begun intelligence sharing with Taiwan, and these efforts should continue. Increased participation from the private sector and non-profits can also play a vital role. Threat intelligence sharing initiatives have supported Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and both Taiwan and the United States would benefit from similar arrangements in advance of a possible hot war between Beijing and Taipei.

Max Lesser is a senior analyst on emerging threats at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at FDD. Chih-Yun Huang is a cyber threat intelligence analyst at TeamT5, where her research interests include Chinese influence operations and China-nexus APT activities. For more analysis from CCTI and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.