What can work in Lebanon can also work in Gaza.

*This article was originally published in Hebrew

If the Prime Minister agrees to end the war in Lebanon and withdraw the IDF under less-than favorable terms, why should he not agree to end the war in Gaza under even better terms in order to free the hostages?

The State of Israel, after recovering from the failure of October 7, has managed to achieve unprecedented operational results: the elimination of Hamas and Hizballah’s leadership and chain of command, the destruction of the infrastructure threatening communities near the border, severe damage to masses of terrorists and stockpiles of weapons, and demonstrating both defensive and offensive superiority against Iran. These cumulative results, after a year of fighting, are unprecedented in comparison to recent decades, and we can only regret that we had to experience the horrors of October 7 in order to do this.

But alongside this considerable progress, the Israeli government faces a number of issues and dilemmas that must be dealt with quickly. First and foremost, 101 hostages remain in Gaza, both alive and dead.  A political controversy over them rages, with many Israelis ready to forego the hostages’ return in exchange for continuing the war. It is clearly Hamas that rebuffed the previous offers and is to blame that no agreement has been reached so far. But if the Israeli government is determined to secure the hostages’ return, then it must find a solution. And the solution is within reach.

When the war in Gaza ends, “the day after the war” will begin. An operational and political response is needed to prevent the smuggling of weapons from Sinai to Gaza, as well as to manage civilian life in Gaza, establish public order, and to begin the reconstruction process. And of course, there is the war in Lebanon. From the terms under which Israel is apparently willing to end this war, it can be understood that the Prime Minister considers the extensive damage to Hizballah so far to be a satisfactory achievement. If, in light of the achievements that have been reached, the Prime Minister is ready to reach an agreement, he should be congratulated. But in order to return the residents to the North at the end of the war, it is necessary to return to them a sense of security, and that sense depends upon civilians’ trust that the operational achievement will be maintained over the long term and that Hizballah will not succeed in rebuilding its stockpile of missiles or its operational infrastructure along the border. Israel cannot rely upon Russia, Syria, or the deployment of the Lebanese army, UNIFIL, or any other foreign entity in south Lebanon. There must be a decision that the IDF can operate freely against any violation of the agreement by Hizballah. I believe and hope that the Prime Minister took care to obtain these understandings from both the outgoing and incoming President of the United States.

Those who agree to accept these terms in Lebanon cannot deny that, in every category described regarding ending the war in Lebanon, Israel’s position regarding the Gaza Strip is even stronger. The damage to Hamas in the Gaza Strip is significantly greater than the damage to Hizballah.  Hamas’ offensive capabilities and leadership have been crushed by the IDF and Shin Bet, and the main threat Hamas poses is to forces still present and operating in the Strip.

In addition, the ability to prevent the restoration of Hamas’ offensive capability is much more possible than preventing the strengthening of Hizballah in Lebanon. Instead of agreements with Russia and Syria, Israel can reach agreements on Gaza with the U.S., Egypt, and regional countries. Israel should have reached an agreement long ago with the U.S. and Egypt for building an underground barrier on the Gaza-Sinai border. Since the construction of the “Slurry Wall” on the Gaza-Israel border, not a single tunnel has been dug that crosses the border with Israel. This can also happen on the Sinai-Gaza border.  The Rafah border crossing also needs to be upgraded under close Israeli supervision and the IDF must maintain complete freedom of action against any violation of the agreement.  All of this will dramatically limit the arming of Hamas, with much greater confidence than that which the Israeli government is agreeing to regarding Hizballah in Lebanon.

Furthermore, while we cannot prevent Hizballah from continuing to rule in Lebanon, the Israeli government is already working behind the scenes to find solutions that will distance Hamas from managing civilian life in the Gaza Strip. The Prime Minister is energetically promoting this plan, although it is likely to run into political difficulties with the extremist elements in his government that are striving to implement military rule in the Gaza Strip and to rebuild Netzarim and Gush Katif. But these are not among the goals of the war, and the IDF cannot be instructed to remain in the Gaza Strip for the sake of such madness.

There remains the issue of releasing prisoners in exchange for the hostages, about which, according to media reports, there are understandings, including agreements regarding the possibility of expelling the senior officials out of the Gaza Strip. So why are they not reaching a deal? Hamas, which the Prime Minister correctly blames for not having agreed to a deal so far, is demanding an end to the war and the IDF’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The Prime Minister of Israel declared today that he is not ready to end the war in the Gaza Strip. But if the Prime Minister agrees to end the war in Lebanon and to withdraw the IDF on less-than favorable terms, why should he not agree to end the war in Gaza for even better terms in order to free the hostages? On this question, the Prime Minister of Israel must give an answer to the families and the public.

The time is running out. The hostages that are still alive are in danger of dying, and the Israeli public is waiting for all of them, alive and dead, to return home.

Dr. Eyal Hulata is Israel’s former National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council. He is currently a senior international fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).