Escalating South China Sea Tensions Demand Urgent U.S. Response

A series of recent maritime provocations between China and the Philippines near Sabina Shoal, a disputed atoll within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), have exacerbated Indo-Pacific tensions. These incidents, coupled with others at the nearby Second Thomas Shoal, underscore China’s growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea and the urgent need for a more assertive U.S. response to deter future provocations.

The intensity and frequency of maritime confrontations between China and the Philippines have risen steadily since 2023. Most of these dangerous encounters have centered on Chinese attempts to disrupt rotation and resupply (RoRe) missions to a makeshift Philippine outpost on Second Thomas Shoal — which, like Sabina Shoal, is located in the Philippines’ EEZ but claimed by China. On at least three occasions in 2024, the China Coast Guard has employed a combination of aggressive tactics — including ramming, firing water cannons, and boarding Philippine vessels — to disrupt Philippine RoRe missions to Second Thomas.   

However, on August 31, a China Coast Guard vessel rammed the BRP Teresa Magbanua — Manila’s coast guard flagship — which has been stationed near Sabina Shoal since April. This attack occurred in the aftermath of a similar incident on August 19, in which Chinese Coast Guard ships rammed two Philippine Coast Guard vessels en route to Sabina, ultimately preventing them from completing their resupply missions.

China’s maritime provocations at Sabina Shoal come mere weeks after Beijing and Manila reportedly reached a late July agreement to allow the Philippines to conduct limited resupply missions to Second Thomas. Since then, China has not blocked any Second Thomas resupply missions, shifting all of its focus instead to escalating tensions at Sabina.

All told, Sabina Shoal holds symbolic and strategic value for China and the Philippines. For China, controlling Sabina would strengthen its broader claims over large swaths of the West Philippine Sea, better enabling Beijing to project power farther from China’s shores. Such moves risk undermining U.S. security guarantees to the Philippines, which obligate Washington to defend Manila in the event of an “armed attack” by an aggressor nation.

Meanwhile, Sabina serves as a critical staging point for Philippine RoRe missions to Second Thomas, as well as a potential fallback position should Philippine forces come under Chinese attack at the disputed reef. Beyond these operational concerns, Chinese control over Sabina would be viewed domestically as a significant blow to Philippine sovereignty, similar to the 2012 loss of Scarborough Shoal, when China effectively took control after an intense standoff with Manila.

Following China’s latest provocations at Sabina, Manila threatened to file a new United Nations case accusing Beijing of violating its sovereignty. This tactic mirrors Manila’s previous arbitration case against Beijing — initiated in 2012 and awarded in 2016 — which invalidated China’s territorial claims over much of the South China Sea and re-affirmed Philippine control over reefs and atolls within its internationally recognized EEZ.

For its part, the U.S. State Department urged Beijing to “desist from dangerous and destabilizing conduct,” and, in a first, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, stated the U.S. military was open to considering escorting Philippine ships conducting RoRe missions.

China’s growing aggressiveness at Sabina and Second Thomas demands a stronger U.S. response beyond mere rhetoric, which has thus far failed to alter Chinese behavior. Going forward, in response to Chinese aggression, Washington should conduct more frequent regional freedom of navigation operations and impose sanctions on Chinese companies and China Coast Guard entities involved in waging South China Sea aggression. Washington and Manila should also consider announcing the commencement of joint RoRe escort missions to both Sabina and Second Thomas, which could force China to reassess its aggressive posture.

Craig Singleton is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and senior director of FDD’s China Program, where Reece Breaux is an intern. For more analysis from Craig, Reece, and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on X @CraigMSIngleton. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.