Egypt in Transition

Today Egyptians celebrate the first anniversary of the uprising that ended three decades of authoritarian rule under Hosni Mubarak. In its rocky aftermath, the army took control, but the transitional process it set up created major advantages for Islamist parties, which were the only ones ready to run in elections. Egypt’s transition hasn’t gone as smoothly as Tunisia’s, and as the country’s economic situation grows more dire, the army has sought to wash its hands of its executive responsibilities as soon as possible.

So the outcome of Egypt’s first free elections since 1950 came as little surprise: Islamists won a majority of seats, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party winning a plurality. The FJP ran on a highly egalitarian platform, promising respect for democratic processes, gender equality and equal rights for Christians and other minorities.

Yet for Egypt to regain stability, it needs more than entente among political parties. The new parliament and the army must get along with the police and intelligence agencies, which continue to play a vital role in the state, and have power enough to scuttle any political transition. These factions also need to adjust to the new reality of serving the state rather than the regime, and the new parliament must pay heed to their interests. They should maintain their autonomy to protect them from party politics as they become incorporated into the new government.

On Jan. 23, the new parliament convened to for a procedural session to elect the speaker. Mohamed Saad El-Katatni of the Islamist Freedom and Justice party was elected with 399 out of a total number of 508 MPs. Then, the parliament will the process of selecting the members of the national commission tasked with drafting the new constitution.

This transition will undoubtedly mark a shift in the United States’s relations with Egypt. Over the last three decades, Washington’s relations with Cairo were straightforward. Though the White House worked with several Egyptian state agencies, final decisions were easier to negotiate, as Mubarak — a steadfast U.S. ally — was the ultimate authority.

Today, advancing U.S. interests in Egypt requires persuading a plurality of decision makers, including the military, police and intelligence agencies, and a range of new parties in parliament.

Washington’s best bet is to maintain good relations with each of the country’s distinct power centers, and encourage them to reach peaceful compromises with one another. The United States’s ambassador in Cairo, Anne Patterson, served previously in Pakistan — where the military has an even greater role in internal politics — and she understands this well.

Egypt’s Islamists are well funded and organized and have been providing social services for years, so they were naturally the best positioned for early elections. Secular parties remain underfunded, and had a mere six months to catch up.

Though the Islamists won about two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the parties they constitute represent constituencies ranging from secular liberal to radical Salafist. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood’s party has vowed to work with political forces of all ideologies to build broad support for the new constitution.

And while most Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, have moved toward the center and run on a fairly liberal platform, most secular parties have also agreed to maintain elements of Islamic law in the constitution and the new legislation that follows.

These sorts of concessions are critical, as no single party or agency can control the country completely. Whether the majority coalition represents Islamist parties or an alliance between Islamists and secularists, any unhappy minority can sabotage the entire political process.

If Washington wants to maintain a durable relationship with Egypt, it must respect the democratic aspirations of the Egyptian people. Like Americans, Egyptians also demand liberty, respect for human rights and free elections.

With Mubarak out of power, there will inevitably be public disagreements between Cairo and Washington, and Egyptians could yet assert themselves in ways Americans don’t like. But while the White House no longer enjoys the convenience of dealing with only one leader, party or agency in Egypt, it can preserve its interests there as it encourages the nascent democratic government along.

It can work with every group that keeps the peace, and every party that respects democratic processes.

Abaza is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and a former official of Egypt’s secular liberal Wafd Party.