Is Egypt Flying Apart at the Seams?

Egypt has seen an alarming rise in violence this past week between protesters and security forces — a stark illustration that the army has botched the country’s political transition. Since President Hosni Mubarak left power in February, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has refused to open Egypt’s political system, creating dangerous incentives for groups to resolve their differences in the streets instead of the halls of power.

The latest fighting has left at least 14 people dead and many more injured, and soldiers have reportedly stripped some female protesters bare in the streets. The violence began on Dec. 16, when protesters blocked the entrance to the prime minister’s office after the supreme council appointed the Mubarak-era apparatchik Kamal el-Ganzouri as the new head of government. Ganzouri was minister of planning and prime minister in the Mubarak era. He represents the regime that revolutionaries hoped to bring down.

The supreme council blames a “hidden hand” for sparking the violence, citing foreign infiltration and the remnants of Mubarak’s regime — apart from themselves, of course. Regardless of who’s responsible, the army has missed a chance to lay down a road map for Egypt’s political transition, unwisely attempting to monopolize the entire process instead of sharing power with civilians.

Before leaving office, Mubarak empowered the supreme council with both executive and legislative powers. At first, protesters and members of the opposition thought the council would collaborate with them, but as they’ve found, it has no such desire.

After six decades of military dictatorship, the army should have sought above all to oversee a peaceful transfer of power and an orderly return to the barracks. The first step would have been a unity government including all political factions, followed by work on a new democratic constitution. Then, the army could have enabled political groups to compete openly, leveling the playing field at last.

Finally, after the army had overseen the drafting and approval of a new constitution — one with broad public support — it would have held elections. This would have enabled newly formed secular and liberal parties to catch up with the well-established Islamists, who, despite oppression from the Mubarak regime, had managed to secure funding for years, and establish grassroots patronage networks through mosques and charities.

Instead, the supreme council pushed to hold legislative elections as soon as possible. Apart from the Islamists, who understandably saw a chance to maximize their gains, every last one of Egypt’s political factions opposed this plan. In March, the council rushed the country into a referendum while curfews were still in effect and post-revolution insecurity remained at the forefront of people’s minds.

The referendum was free but not fair. The army compelled Egyptians to choose between the uncertainty of the status quo or approving an imperfect political road map they hoped would stabilize the country. Seventy-seven percent of voters voted to hold legislative elections first and allow the winner to write the new constitution.

Overnight, Egypt’s secular forces rejected the country’s political process, creating a climate of pervasive uncertainty in which not even the Islamists can be confident of their futures. Secular modernists, Coptic Christians and other constituencies began to believe that protest, not dialogue, was the only way they could exert pressure on the army.

Days before legislative elections began on Nov. 28, modernists started a nationwide wave of protests, to which the army once again responded with a heavy hand. Yet elections went on, and Islamists seemed to be winning.

Once more, the voting was relatively free, but far from fair. The Islamists did not rig the elections, but they were the only people prepared for them. The supreme council took no serious measures to control campaign funding or the use of religious slogans, which are prohibited by law. Secular forces had little time to organize, and their funding was no match for that of the Islamists.

So far, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party has won about 40 percent of the vote, running on a fairly liberal platform that accepts a civil democratic state and equality among citizens regardless of gender and religion. Like most liberal parties, the brotherhood encourages a free market economy, preserving some elements of the existing welfare state. But the Salafist Al Nour party, which advances a religious fundamentalist vision, managed to secure approximately 25 percent through old-fashioned politicking, and handing out food in villages and poorer areas.

Despite the unfairness of the elections, Islamists have gained political legitimacy. Yet the ongoing violence has them worried about what they might inherit if and when they come to power.

Ten months after the revolution, Egyptians are mired in frustration. The supreme council is less and less popular, and everyone — election winners and losers alike — fears the future.

The drafting of the new constitution will afford the army another opportunity to make good, ensuring that minorities are heard and the majority does not become tyrannical. If the military elites are wise, they will referee Egypt’s political process, rather than dominating the whole game.

Khairi Abaza is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington and a former official of Egypt’s liberal Wafd party.