December 24, 2021 | Foreign Podicy

Chinese Communism 101: Beijing’s Campus Strategy

December 24, 2021 Foreign Podicy

Chinese Communism 101: Beijing’s Campus Strategy

About

In recent years, it’s become apparent that the People’s Republic of China intends to eat America’s lunch. No one is more responsible for revealing that than Matthew Pottinger, a former journalist who went on to earn an honest living serving in the U.S. Marines, and, in the previous administration, as Deputy National Security Advisor. He’s currently a distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution and he chairs FDD’s China Program.

China’s rulers have an impressively comprehensive strategy for achieving dominance in Asia sooner, and globally later. One important component has now been revealed by FDD Adjunct Fellow Craig Singleton who previously spent more than a decade serving in a series of sensitive diplomatic national security roles with the U.S. government. He has published a new report on the “modern-day Trojan Horses” that have gained entry into America’s universities – supporting the military-industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China.

Matt Pottinger and Craig Singleton join FDD Foreign Podicy host Cliff May for a wide-ranging discussion.

Mentioned in the episode

The Middle Kingdom Meets Higher Education

December 9, 2021 | Craig Singleton

How U.S. Universities Support China’s Military-Industrial Complex

Read More

All Over the Map

November 15, 2021 | Emily de La Bruyère,  Nathan Picarsic

The Chinese Communist Party’s Subnational Interests in the United States

Read More

FAQ: The Middle Kingdom Meets Higher Education

December 9, 2021 | Craig Singleton

How U.S. Universities Support China’s Military-Industrial Complex

Read More

New FDD Study Identifies 28 American Universities and Schools That Maintain Research Partnerships with Chinese Institutions That Power Beijing’s Defense Establishment

December 9, 2021 |

“The Middle Kingdom Meets Higher Education” details linkages to China’s intelligence apparatus, nuclear weapons sector, and cyberespionage platforms 

Read More

More from Craig

Beijing Eyes New Military Bases Across the Indo-Pacific

July 7, 2021 | Craig Singleton

Tanzania, Cambodia, and the UAE are on China’s wish list—and now Kiribati, within striking distance of Hawaii.

Read More

Universities Maintain Ties to Malign Chinese Entities Following Confucius Institute Closures

August 2, 2021 | Craig Singleton

Read More

U.S. Trade Representative Outlines Roadmap for China Trade Policy, But Provides Few Details

October 18, 2021 | Zane Zovak,  Craig Singleton

Read More

Xi Takes a Page From Mao’s Red Playbook

September 27, 2021 | Craig Singleton

Like Mao’s consolidation of power, in the coming year Xi will also further intertwine foreign and domestic crises, even at the risk of potentially serious flair ups with Washington over Taiwan.

Read More

The WHO’s Fraudulent Procurement of Chinese PPE Holds Important Lessons for U.S.

July 7, 2021 | Craig Singleton,  Gabriel Epstein

Read More

Projects

  1. Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance, Eds. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018). (https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/00_diamond-schell_fullreport_2ndprinting_web-compressed.pdf)
  2. Emily de La Bruyère and Nathan Picarsic, “Defusing Military-Civil Fusion,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 27, 2021. (https://thefdd.wpengine.com/analysis/2021/05/26/defusing-military-civil-fusion)
  3. Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic and Alexander Bowe, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation,” October 7, 2020. (https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/Overseas_Chinese_Students_and_Scholars_in_Chinas_Drive_for_Innovation.pdf)
  4. See Appendix I.
  5. Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List; Removal of Person from the Entity List Based on Removal Request; and Implementation of Entity List Annual Review Changes, U.S. Department of Commerce, 77 Federal Register 58006, September 19, 2012, pages 58006–58020. (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/09/19/2012-22952/addition-of-certain-persons-to-the-entity-list-removal-of-person-from-the-entity-list-based-on)
  6. Rachelle Peterson, “Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education,” National Association of Scholars, April 6, 2017. (https://www.nas.org/reports/outsourced-to-china)
  7. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on December 3, 2020,” December 3, 2020. (https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1837636.shtml)
  8. “China theft of technology is biggest law enforcement threat to US, FBI says,” Reuters, February 6, 2020. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/06/china-technology-theft-fbi-biggest-threat)
  9. Eric Rosenbaum, “1 in 5 corporations say China has stolen their IP within the last year: CNBC CFO survey,” CNBC, March 1, 2019. (https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/1-in-5-companies-say-china-stole-their-ip-within-the-last-year-cnbc.html)
  10. “厦门大学和华为签署战略合作协议 [Xiamen University and Huawei sign a strategic cooperation agreement],” Zhongguancun Online (China), April 7, 2016. (Archived version available at: https://archive.fo/PW7mi)
  11. Criminal Complaint, United States vs. Mao, 4:19-mj-00647 (N.D. Tex. filed August 14, 2019). (https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16067493/1/united-states-v-mao)
  12. “Bo Mao,” LinkedIn, accessed November 23, 2021. (https://www.linkedin.com/in/bo-mao-07412545)
  13. Troy Fedderson, “Budget shifts include Confucius Institute closure,” Nebraska Today, September 4, 2020. (https://news.unl.edu/newsrooms/today/article/budget-shifts-include-confucius-institute-closure)
  14. “Current International Agreements,” University of Nebraska-Lincoln, April 2020. (https://globalnebraska.unl.edu/current-international-agreements)
  15. Xi’an Jiaotong University, Press Release, “西安交通大学获批国防科工局与教育部共建高校 [Xi’an Jiaotong University was approved by the National Defense Science and Technology Bureau and the Ministry of Education to build a university],” July 31, 2018. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20181002203241/http://news.xjtu.edu.cn/info/1004/97388.htm)
  16. Xi’an Jiaotong University, Press Release, “学校召开保密教育暨保密资格审查认证培训会议 [The school held a confidential education and confidential qualification review and certification training meeting],” October 13, 2006. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20191111061115/http://xhnet.xjtu.edu.cn/info/1002/78503.htm)
  17. Xi’an Jiaotong University, Press Release, “西安交通大学获批国防科工局与教育部共建高校 [Xi’an Jiaotong University was approved by the National Defense Science and Technology Bureau and the Ministry of Education to build a university],” July 31, 2018. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20181002203241/http://news.xjtu.edu.cn/info/1004/97388.htm)
  18. “能源与动力工程学院(核科学与技术学院)[School of Energy and Power Engineering (School of Nuclear Science and Technology)],” Xi’an Jiaotong University, May 6, 2019. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20191111091823/http://www.xjtu.edu.cn/xynr.jsp?urltype=tree.TreeTempUrl&wbtreeid=1029)
  19. Xi’an Jiaotong University, Press Release, “西安交大与解放军航天工程大学签署合作协议 [Xi’an Jiaotong University and PLA Aerospace Engineering University signed a cooperation agreement],” April 20, 2019. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20191111231428/http:/news.xjtu.edu.cn/info/1002/111642.htm); Xi’an Jiaotong University, Press Release, “第二届军民融合发展高科技成果展览 [The 2nd Military-civilian Integration and Development of High-tech Achievements Exhibition],” April 20, 2019. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20161117021547/http://news.xjtu.edu.cn/info/1033/70938.htm)
  20. Kate O’Keeffe and Aruna Viswanatha, “U.S. Files Criminal Charges Against Chinese Professor Linked to Huawei,” The Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2019. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-files-criminal-charges-against-chinese-professor-linked-to-huawei-11568048700)
  21. Criminal Complaint, United States vs. Mao, 4:19-mj-00647 (N.D. Tex. filed August 14, 2019). (https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16067493/1/united-states-v-mao)
  22. Kate O’Keeffe and Aruna Viswanatha, “U.S. Files Criminal Charges Against Chinese Professor Linked to Huawei,” The Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2019. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-files-criminal-charges-against-chinese-professor-linked-to-huawei-11568048700)
  23. Christopher Burgess, “Huawei Steals More U.S. Technology – Aided by U.S. University,” ClearanceJobs, September 10, 2019. (https://news.clearancejobs.com/2019/09/10/huawei-steals-more-u-s-technology-aided-by-u-s-university)
  24. Kate O’Keeffe, “Huawei Executive Accused by U.S. Startup of Involvement in Trade-Secrets Theft,” The Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2019. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-executive-is-accused-of-involvement-in-trade-secrets-theft-u-s-startup-said-in-court-filings-11558550468)
  25. Jane Wester, “Planned Guilty Plea Will Allow Chinese Professor Linked to Huawei to Return to China,” New York Law Journal, November 12, 2020. (https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/11/12/planned-guilty-plea-will-allow-chinese-professor-linked-to-huawei-to-return-to-china)
  26. Jonathan Stempel, “Chinese professor, despite no remorse, to return home after guilty plea in Huawei theft case,” Reuters, December 14, 2020.(https://www.reuters.com/article/huawei-tech-usa-idCNL1N2IU0Y2)
  27. “The partner institutions of Xi’an Jiaotong University,” Xi’an Jiaotong University, March 22, 2017. (http://international.xjtu.edu.cn/info/1049/4481.htm)
  28. There are 131 R1 research institutes and 135 R2 research institutes in the United States, classified as engaging in “very high research activity” and “high research activity,” respectively.
  29. “The Party Speaks for You,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 9, 2020. (https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you)
  30. PRC President Xi Jinping, “习近 平:使留学人员回国有用武之地 留在国外有报国之门 [Let the overseas students return to the country to use their abilities, and stay abroad to serve the country],” Speech at the 100th Anniversary Celebration of the European and American Alumni Association, October 21, 2013. (https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/shizheng/2013-10/21/content_17049078.htm)
  31. Kingsley Edney, “Soft Power and the Chinese Propaganda System,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2012, Volume 21, Issue 78, pages 899–914. (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2012.701031)
  32. Liu Qing, “12th Confucius Institute Conference Held: Confucius Institutes around the World Contribute to the Building of a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” China Radio International (China), December 18, 2017. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20200221190629/http://english.hanban.org:80/article/2017-12/18/content_711665.htm); Liu Yandong, “Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the 10th Confucius Institute Conference: Cater for New Demand and Push for Integration, Contributing to the World Cultural Communication,” Xinhua News Agency (China), December 10, 2015. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20151222083735/http://english.hanban.org:80/article/2015-12/10/content_626734.htm)
  33. Zhuang Pinghui, “China’s Confucius Institutes rebrand after overseas propaganda rows,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 4, 2020. (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3091837/chinas-confucius-institutes-rebrand-after-overseas-propaganda)
  34. Ethan Epstein, “How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms,” Politico, January 16, 2018. (https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327); Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Can 1 Million American Students Learn Mandarin?” Foreign Policy, September 25, 2015. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/25/china-usobamas-one-million-students-chinese-language-mandarin); Jon Marcus, “West’s Universities Reconsider China-Funded Confucius Institutes,” Time Higher Education, April 4, 2013. (https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/wests-universities-reconsider-china-funded-confucius-institutes/2002870.article)
  35. Ryan Fedusiak, “Putting Money in the Party’s Mouth: How China Mobilizes Funding for United Front Work,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, September 16, 2020, Volume 20, Issue 16. (https://jamestown.org/program/putting-money-in-the-partys-mouth-how-china-mobilizes-funding-for-united-front-work)
  36. Marshall Sahlins, Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware (Chicago: Paradigm Prickly Press, 2015), page 4. (https://www.worldcat.org/title/confucius-institutes-academic-malware/oclc/890621325)
  37. Rachelle Peterson, “Outsourced to China,” National Association of Scholars, August 6, 2017. (https://www.nas.org/reports/outsourced-to-china/full-report)
  38. Cody Goldberg, “Open Gates: Technology Transfer from Chinese Universities to the Defense Industry Through Joint Ventures,” C4ADS, June 2021. (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/60d9d5837ca3d8345a0d42c5/1624888707802/Open+Gates_Final.pdf); Audrey Fritz, “At the Nexus of Military-Civil Fusion and Technological Innovation in China,” The Diplomat, July 14, 2021. (https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/at-the-nexus-of-military-civil-fusion-and-technological-innovation-in-china)
  39. Joint-degree programs allow students to spend part of their university career abroad at a “host” institution and their remaining years at a “home” institution. Upon graduation, joint-degree students receive a single degree endorsed by both institutions, while dual-degree students receive a degree from each school.
  40. Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Students and Researchers From the People’s Republic of China, Executive Office of the President, 85 Federal Register 34353, June 4, 2020, pages 34353–34355. (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/04/2020-12217/suspension-of-entry-as-nonimmigrants-of-certain-students-and-researchers-from-the-peoples-republic)
  41. Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic and Alexander Bowe, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation,” October 7, 2020. (https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/Overseas_Chinese_Students_and_Scholars_in_Chinas_Drive_for_Innovation.pdf)
  42. PRC President Xi Jinping, “习近 平:使留学人员回国有用武之地 留在国外有报国之门 [Let the overseas students return to the country to use their abilities, and stay abroad to serve the country],” Speech at the 100th Anniversary Celebration of the European and American Alumni Association, October 21, 2013. (https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/shizheng/2013-10/21/content_17049078.htm)
  43. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Report, “China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System,” February 27, 2019, page 42. (https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Report%20China’s%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf)
  44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but Institute Operations Vary,” February 2019, pages 11–12. (https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-278.pdf)
  45. See Appendix II.
  46. U.S. Department of Education, Office of General Counsel, “Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965,” October 2020. (https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional-compliance-section-117.pdf)
  47. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Report, “China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System,” February 27, 2019. (https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Report%20China’s%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf)
  48. U.S. Department of Education, Office of General Counsel, “Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965,” October 2020, page 3. (https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional-compliance-section-117.pdf)
  49. For a full list of CI closures, see Appendix III.
  50. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries,” Pew Research Center, October 6, 2020. (https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries)
  51. U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division, “Information about the Department of Justice’s China Initiative and a Compilation of China-related Prosecutions Since 2018,” June 14, 2021. (https://www.justice.gov/nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related)
  52. The Thousand Talents Program is sometimes referred to as China’s Overseas High-Level Talent Recruitment Program (海外高层次人才引进计划). U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Report, “Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans,” November 18, 2019, page 1. (https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf)
  53. U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division, “Information about the Department of Justice’s China Initiative and a Compilation of China-related Prosecutions Since 2018,” June 14, 2021. (https://www.justice.gov/nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related)
  54. FBI Director Christopher Wray, “Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigations,” Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 13, 2019. (https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/07/23/2019/oversight-of-the-federal-bureau-of-investigation)
  55. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “SEVIS by the Numbers: Annual Report on International Student Trends 2020,” March 22, 2021. (https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/sevisBTN2020.pdf)
  56. Office of U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, Press Release, “Rubio Warns of Beijing’s Growing Influence, Urges Florida Schools to Terminate Confucius Institute Agreements,” February 5, 2018. (https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/rubio-warns-of-beijing-s-growing-influence-urges-florida-schools-to-terminate-confucius-institute-agreements)
  57. Office of U.S. Congressman Michael McCaul, Press Release “McCaul, Cuellar Send Letters to Texas Universities Hosting Confucius Institutes,” April 5, 2018. (https://mccaul.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/mccaul-cuellar-send-letter-to-texas-universities-hosting-confucius)
  58. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636. (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-115publ232/html/PLAW-115publ232.htm)
  59. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but Institute Operations Vary,” February 2019. (https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-278.pdf)
  60. See Appendix IV.
  61. U.S. Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, “National Industrial Security Program,” accessed November 23, 2021. (https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/ctp/nisp)
  62. PRC Chinese Ministry of Education, “教育部 财政部 国家发展改革委印发 《关于高等学校加快“双一流”建设的 指导意见》的通知 [Notice of the National Development and Reform Commission of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance on Printing and Distributing the ‘Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of “Double First Class” in Higher Education’],” April 27, 2018. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20191115032608/https:/yz.chsi.com.cn/kyzx/jybzc/201808/20180827/1716774413.html)
  63. “2018中国双一流大学排行榜,87所跻身全国百强 [2018 list of China’s double first-class universities, 87 universities in the top 100 nationally],” People’s Daily (China), December 27, 2017. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20191115031725/http:/edu.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1227/c9320-29732098.html)
  64. PRC National Administration of State Secrets Protection, “做好军民融合背景下的高校保密工作 [Doing university secrecy work in the context of military–civil fusion],” February 27, 2018. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20191031002801/http:/www.gjbmj.gov.cn/n1/2018/0227/c409091-29837375.html)
  65. PRC State Council, “State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense,” October 6, 2014. (http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/06/content_281474992893468.htm)
  66. Alex Joske, “The China Defense Universities Tracker,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 25, 2019. (https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker)
  67. “李玮, ‘国防科技奖学金申请面面观 [A full survey of applying for the National Defence Science and Technology Scholarship],” China Postgraduates, 2017, Volume 3, pages 53–56. (http://www.tzsti.com:85/Qikan/Article/Detail?id=40476666)
  68. Lobsang Tenchoe, “UMass Boston, the 23th US Academic Institution to sever ties with Confucius Institute,” The Tibet Express (India), January 17, 2019. (https://tibetexpress.net/9672/umass-boston-the-13th-us-academic-institution-to-sever-ties-with-confucius-institute); Revisions to the Unverified List, U.S. Department of Commerce, 84 Federal Register 14608, April 11, 2019, pages 14611–14614. (https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/federal-register-notices/federal-register-2019/2386-84-fr-14608/file)
  69. The University of Massachusetts Boston established its Center for U.S.-China Educational Leadership in partnership with Renmin University. This happened before Renmin’s subsequent removal from the UVL in October 2020. “Center for U.S. China Educational Leadership,” University of Massachusetts Boston Institute for International and Comparative Education, accessed November 23, 2021. (https://www.umb.edu/iice/center_for_u.s._china_educational_leadership); Revisions to the Unverified List, U.S. Department of Commerce, 85 Federal Register 64014, October 9, 2020, pages 64014–64019. (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/09/2020-20012/revisions-to-the-unverified-list-uvl)
  70. Those universities were the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, the University of Michigan, The University of Texas at San Antonio, North Carolina State University, and Miami University of Ohio.
  71. University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Press Release, “Confucius Institute Programs to Transition as part of strategic planning effort,” July 1, 2020. (https://inside.uncc.edu/news-features/2020-07-01/confucius-institute-programs-transition-part-strategic-planning-effort)
  72. Debing Su, “U-M to end agreement with Confucius Institute next year,” Michigan News, December 10, 2018. (https://record.umich.edu/articles/u-m-end-agreement-confucius-institute-next-year)
  73. University of Texas at San Antonio, Press Release, “Chinese arts and language programming to be fully integrated into East Asia Institute,” February 28, 2019. (https://provost.utsa.edu/news/2019/02/story/2019-02-28-east-asia-institute.html)
  74. North Carolina State University, Press Release, “NC State will restructure Asia programming in 2019,” November 8, 2018. (https://news.ncsu.edu/2018/11/nc-state-will-restructure-asia-programming-in-2019)
  75. See Appendix V.
  76. Stony Brook University, Press Release, “Stony Brook Recognized for Academic Excellence By 3 Top-Tier Publications,” October 25, 2016. (https://news.stonybrook.edu/newsroom/press-release/general/20169-10-25-stony-brook-university-rankings); “The Confucius Institute,” Stony Brook University, 2021. (https://www.stonybrook.edu/confucius). Stony Brook University’s CI closure announcement did not disclose the names of the 40 Chinese universities.
  77. Pace University, Press Release, “New Global Asia Institute Launched,” December 14, 2019. (https://dyson.pace.edu//centers/global-asia-institute/welcome/confucius-institute-closure-GAI-announcement)
  78. “Confucius Institute at Pace University Celebrates Anniversary,” China Daily (China), May 16, 2015. (https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-05/16/content_29359123.htm); Pace University, Press Release, “New Global Asia Institute Launched,” December 14, 2019. (https://dyson.pace.edu//centers/global-asia-institute/welcome/confucius-institute-closure-GAI-announcement)
  79. “Factsheet: Global Asia Institute,” Pace University, accessed November 23, 2021. (http://media.pace.edu/Dyson/factsheets/current/GlobalAsiaInstitute.pdf)
  80. Jack Freifelder, “Chinese Culture Inspires Student Essays,” China Daily (China), December 2, 2014. (http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-12/02/content_19010163.htm)
  81. Pace University, Press Release, “Confucius Institute at Pace University Celebrates Mid-Autumn Festival and Confucius’s Birthday,” October 2, 2012. (https://pressroom.blogs.pace.edu/2012/10/02/news-release-confucius-institute-at-pace-university-celebrates-mid-autumn-festival-and-confuciuss-birthday)
  82. Katherine Kane, Anna H. Bartsch, and Ansel Lurio, “Media Reports on Asia,” Pace University, accessed November 23, 2021. (https://dyson.pace.edu/centers/global-asia-institute/research); “About me,” Lurio Editing Services, accessed November 23, 2021. (https://awl2011.wixsite.com/website/about-me)
  83. See Appendix VI.
  84. See Appendix VII.
  85. See Appendix VIII.
  86. The U.S. host universities are Medgar Evers College, SUNY Global Center, Baruch College, The University of Toledo, Michigan State University, and Southern Utah University.
  87. The U.S. host universities were Texas Southern University, the University of Southern Maine, Portland State University, Georgia State University, the University of Wisconsin-Platteville, Central Connecticut State University, and Binghamton University.
  88. “Texas Southern University Confucius Institute Contract,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, February 12, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/494324296/Texas-Southern-University-Confucius-Institute-Contract)
  89. Central Connecticut State University, Baruch College, the University of Southern Maine, the University of Wisconsin-Platteville; The University of Toledo; and Binghamton University.
  90. “Exclusive: U.S. Universities ‘Must’ Accept CCP’s ‘Assessment’ on ‘Teaching Quality’ at Confucius Institutes,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, May 25, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/509294739/EXCLUSIVE-US-universities-must-accept-CCP-s-assessment-on-teaching-quality-at-Confucius-Institutes#fullscreen&from_embed)
  91. The U.S. host universities are Central Connecticut State University, Portland State University, Baruch College, University of Southern Maine, Southern Utah University, University of Wisconsin-Platteville, and Binghamton University.
  92. “Texas Southern University Confucius Institute Contract,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, February 12, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/494324296/Texas-Southern-University-Confucius-Institute-Contract)
  93. See Appendix VI.
  94. “Exclusive: U.S. Universities ‘Must’ Accept CCP’s ‘Assessment’ on ‘Teaching Quality’ at Confucius Institutes,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, May 25, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/509294739/EXCLUSIVE-US-universities-must-accept-CCP-s-assessment-on-teaching-quality-at-Confucius-Institutes#fullscreen&from_embed)
  95. “Texas Southern University Confucius Institute Contract,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, February 12, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/494324296/Texas-Southern-University-Confucius-Institute-Contract)
  96. “Exclusive: U.S. Universities ‘Must’ Accept CCP’s ‘Assessment’ on ‘Teaching Quality’ at Confucius Institutes,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, May 25, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/509294739/EXCLUSIVE-US-universities-must-accept-CCP-s-assessment-on-teaching-quality-at-Confucius-Institutes#fullscreen&from_embed)
  97. Ibid.
  98. “Contract Reveals Medgar Evers College Accepted $23,000 in Teaching Materials” from CCP for Confucius Institute,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, June 22, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/512736600/Contract-reveals-Medgar-Evers-College-accepted-23-000-in-teaching-materials-from-CCP-for-Confucius-Institute)
  99. “Exclusive: U.S. Universities ‘Must’ Accept CCP’s ‘Assessment’ on ‘Teaching Quality’ at Confucius Institutes,” Uploaded by Campus Reform, Scribd, May 25, 2021. (https://www.scribd.com/document/509294739/EXCLUSIVE-US-universities-must-accept-CCP-s-assessment-on-teaching-quality-at-Confucius-Institutes#fullscreen&from_embed)
  100. Mckenna Dallmeyer and Adam Sabes, “Texas Southern University once involved in contract giving China broad control of its Confucius Institute,” Campus Reform, February 19, 2021. (https://www.campusreform.org/article?id=16818)
  101. U.S. Department of Education, Office of General Counsel, “Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965,” October 2020. (https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional-compliance-section-117.pdf)
  102. Daniel Currell, “Foreign Money in U.S. Universities Parts I-VI,” George Mason University National Security Institute, June 30, 2021. (https://thescif.org/part-i-foreign-money-in-u-s-universities-44ba92856a0f)
  103. All information regarding donations from Hanban and its affiliates can be found on the U.S. Department of Education’s “College Foreign Gift and Contract Report” and “Federal Student Aid Foreign Gift and Contract Report” pages. U.S. Department of Education, “College Foreign Gift and Contract Report,” accessed November 23, 2021. (https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts); U.S. Department of Education, “Federal Student Aid Foreign Gift and Contract Report,” accessed November 23, 2021. (https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/foreign-gifts)
  104. The Foreign Language and Area Studies program provides funding to U.S. graduate and undergraduate students studying the languages and cultures of specific foreign countries. The National Resource Center Title VI programs provide grants to establish, strengthen, and operate language and area or international studies centers that will be national resources for teaching any modern foreign language.
  105. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, §1260H, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388. (https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6395)
  106. Jerry Dunleavy, “China on Campus: Confucius Institutes Collapse Nationwide,” Washington Examiner, May 4, 2021. (https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/confucius-institutes-collapse-us-campuses); Sarah Grimmer, “MSU’s Confucius Institute is closing, it’s part of a national trend with local effects,” Fox47 News, November 11, 2021. (https://www.fox47news.com/news/state/msus-confucius-institute-is-closing-its-part-of-a-national-trend-with-local-effects); Katie McKellar, “Utah lawmaker wants to close Confucius institutes in Utah, citing espionage concerns,” Deseret News, February 11, 2021. (https://www.deseret.com/utah/2021/2/11/22277159/resolution-to-close-confucius-institutes-advances-legislature-china-chinese-communist-espionage)
  107. See Appendix VIII.
  108. Alex Joske, “The China Defense Universities Tracker,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 25, 2019. (https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker)
  109. Joshua Eisenman and Michael Sobolik, “U.S. Institutions Must Get Smarter About Chinese Communist Party Money,” Foreign Policy, August 31, 2021. (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/31/chinese-communist-party-money-us-institutions)
  110. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, §1260H, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388. (https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6395)
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  133. Military geologists are used for terrain analysis, engineering, and the identification of resources. The peacetime application of military geology includes the building of infrastructure, typically during local emergencies or international peacekeeping deployments.
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  210. Ibid.
  211. “北京高压科学研究中心高压化学研究组博士后招聘启事 [Postdoctoral Recruitment Notice for the High Pressure Chemistry Research Group of Beijing High Pressure Scientific Research Center],” University of Science and Technology Beijing, October 14, 2020. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20190926230827/http://job.ustb.edu.cn/front/zpxx.jspa?tid=697); State Key Laboratory of Superhard Materials at Jilin University, Press Release, “吉林大学召开国家重点研发项目“高压下多尺度小量子复合体系的量子效应及其调控”项目实施方案论证暨启动会 [Jilin University held a national key research and development project ‘Quantum effect and regulation of multi-scale small quantum composite system under high pressure’ project implementation plan demonstration and kick-off meeting],” September 25, 2018. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20190926231156/http://nlshm-lab.jlu.edu.cn/info/1061/1731.htm)
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  213. Michael Tobin, “UO closes its Confucius Institute,” Daily Emerald, April 30, 2019. (https://www.dailyemerald.com/news/uo-closes-its-confucius-institute/article_f0f50ed4-6ae5-11e9-8732-632967bb2f6a.html); “Exchange Partners,” University of Oregon, accessed November 23, 2021. (https://international.uoregon.edu/partners)
  214. Leslie E. Wong, San Francisco State University, Press Release, “San Francisco State University to close Confucius Institute,” May 2, 2019. (https://news.sfsu.edu/announcements/san-francisco-state-university-close-confucius-institute); “Exchange Programs and Partner Universities,” San Francisco State University, accessed November 23, 2021. (https://oip.sfsu.edu/partner/exchangepartners)
  215. Minzhi focuses on globalization and free trade, the U.S.-China balance of power, and global economic rules. Its founder, Chen Mingjian, described its purpose in 2017: “The United Front is the new force of non-governmental diplomacy. Think tanks are an important form of expression in the process of the United Front’s globalization. The establishment of think tanks in China needs to have think tank platforms to communicate with the RAND Corporation, the Hoover Institution, and the Brookings Institution.” “陈明键:“全球化大统战”的纵横家 [Chen Mingjian: A Strategist of the ‘Global United Front’],” International Student Magazine (China), March 13, 2017.
  216. “美国对华态度全景 – 州长篇 [A Panoramic View of U.S. Attitudes Toward China-Governor’s Article],” Minzhi International Research Institute and Center of Globalization Studies, June 22, 2019. This report was the first in a larger series called “Overview of U.S. Attitudes toward China.” For more information on Minzhi and Tsinghua, see the appendix.
  217. Ibid. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo cited the Minzhi-Tsinghua report at the 2020 U.S. National Governors Association’s winter meeting. Anna Gronewold, “Pompeo to governors: China is watching you,” Politico, February 8, 2020. (https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/08/mike-pompeo-governors-china-112539)
  218. For full lists, see the appendix.
  219. To an extent, this may be a function of mirror-imaging the Chinese system: Chinese provinces play a core economic role; the People’s Republic of China assumes that U.S. states do as well. Moreover, in China, political leaders follow a direct path from subnational-level to national-level posts.
  220. Jane Perlez, “Xi Jinping’s U.S. Visit,” The New York Times, September 25, 2015. (https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/xi-jinping-visit)
  221. “习近平在中美省州长论坛上的讲话 [Speech by Xi Jinping at the China-U.S. Provincial Governors Forum],” Xinhua News Agency (China), September 23, 2019.
  222. “Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the China-U.S. Governors Forum,” China Daily (China), September 24, 2015. (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/2015-09/24/content_21966923.htm). Xi acknowledged in his speech that this was not a new approach. During a visit to the United States in 2012, he and then-Vice President Joe Biden attended a meeting of seven Chinese and six American governors in Los Angeles. In attendance were the governors of California, Vermont, Montana, Illinois, Hawaii, and the Northern Mariana Islands. PRC Embassy in the United States of America, Press Release, “Xi Jinping and Joe Biden Jointly Meet the Governors of Chinese Provinces and American States,” February 18, 2012. Xi also met with delegates to the second China-U.S. Governors Forum in Beijing in 2013. “Xi meets 2nd China-US governors’ forum attendees,” China.org.cn (China), April 15, 2013. (http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-04/15/content_28549659.htm)
  223. “Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the China-U.S. Governors Forum,” China Daily (China), September 24, 2015. (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/2015-09/24/content_21966923.htm)
  224. Ibid.
  225. Ibid.
  226. California Office of the Governor, Press Release, “Governor Brown to Co-Chair U.S.-China Governors Forum, Meet with President Xi of the People’s Republic of China on Tuesday in Seattle,” September 18, 2015. (https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2015/09/18/news19114/index.html)
  227. William Petroski, “Branstad talks with Chinese leader; soybean deals eyed,” Des Moines Register, September 23, 2015. (https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2015/09/23/branstad-talks-chinese-leader-soybean-deals-eyed/72687488); “Iowa, Chinese commercial delegation to sign purchasing contract Thursday,” Iowa Gazette, September 23, 2015. (https://wcfcourier.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/iowa-chinese-commercial-delegation-to-sign-purchasing-contract-thursday/article_09c103a4-6ed5-53de-a979-80c4ad146bd9.html)
  228. William Petroski, “Branstad talks with Chinese leader; Soybean deals eyed,” Des Moines Register, September 23, 2015. (https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2015/09/23/branstad-talks-chinese-leader-soybean-deals-eyed/72687488)
  229. Ibid.
  230. Anthony Kuhn, “How the U.S. Ambassador To China May Have Xi Jinping’s Ear,” NPR, February 18, 2018. (https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/02/18/586371119/how-the-u-s-ambassador-to-china-may-have-xi-jinpings-ear); James Lynch, “Xi still an ‘old friend,’ but Branstad worried by China’s authoritarian drift,” The Gazette, October 26, 2020. (https://www.thegazette.com/government-politics/xi-still-an-old-friend-but-branstad-worried-by-chinas-authoritarian-drift)
  231. Jane Perlez, “Xi Jinping’s U.S. Visit,” The New York Times, September 25, 2015. (https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/xi-jinping-visit); “Dinner Honoring President Xi Jinping,” U.S.-China Business Council, accessed October 26, 2021. (https://www.uschina.org/events/dinner-honoring-president-xi-jinping)
  232. Washington Office of the Governor, Press Release, “President Xi visit helped showcase Washington state as “world-class center of innovation,’” September 25, 2015. (https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/president-xi-visit-helped-showcase-washington-state-%E2%80%9Cworld-class-center-innovation)
  233. Dominic Gates, “Boeing chief defends China 737 center, unveils 300 jet orders,” Seattle Times, September 23, 2015. (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-agrees-to-open-737-center-in-china-inks-300-new-jet-orders)
  234. Boeing, Press Release, “Boeing Hosts China President Xi Jinping, Announces Airplane Sales, Expanded Collaboration with China’s Aviation Industry,” September 23, 2015. (https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2015-09-23-Boeing-Hosts-China-President-Xi-Jinping-Announces-Airplane-Sales-Expanded-Collaboration-with-Chinas-Aviation-Industry)
  235. U.S. Department of Defense, “Qualifying Entities Prepared in Response to Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261),” June 12, 2020.
    (https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/28/2002486659/-1/-1/1/LINK_2_1237_TRANCHE_1_QUALIFIYING_ENTITIES.PDF)
  236. The phrase “sister cities” refers to agreements between cities — or boroughs, towns, prefectures, regions, et cetera — designed to promote cultural and commercial ties.
  237. Nectar Gan and Cedric Sam, “Xi Jinping’s US visit: itinerary, issues, and delegation,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 30, 2015. (https://multimedia.scmp.com/xi-jinping-us-visit)
  238. Washington Office of the Governor, Press Release, “President Xi visit helped showcase Washington state as “world-class center of innovation,’” September 25, 2015. (https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/president-xi-visit-helped-showcase-washington-state-%E2%80%9Cworld-class-center-innovation%E2%80%9D)
  239. Jia Zhongzheng, “中美经贸关系新变化及中国对策 [New Changes in Sino-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations and China’s Countermeasures],” International Trade (China), 2017.
  240. Li Junqiang and Zang Zhenrui, “基础设施建设是中美合作的关键点 [Infrastructure Construction Is a Key Point of Sino-US Cooperation],” Motherland (China), 2017. In addition to serving as president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), Wang’s other titles include honorable vice chairman of the China Association for International Economic Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce, and vice chairman of the Western Returned Scholars Association under the UFWD. In the cited interview, his comments are recorded alongside those of Miao Lu and Tang Beijie, CCG’s co-founder and deputy secretary-general, respectively.
  241. Liu Danning, “美国加州杰瑞·布朗时期对华外交研究(2011-2018)[Research on the Diplomacy of California during the Jerry Brown Period (2011-2018)],” Jiangsu Provincial Party School of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the CCP, June 2020. This friendship was evident, for example, in “groundbreaking” cooperation between California and China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and China’s National Development and Reform Commission, among others, as well as in “the first Sino-U.S. joint working group on trade and investment cooperation between provinces and states.”
  242. “通讯:逆风前行——美地方政府积极寻求对华合作 [Correspondence: Going Against the Wind: U.S. Local Governments Actively Seek Cooperation with China],” Xinhua News Agency (China), August 19, 2019.
  243. Ibid.
  244. Ibid.
  245. See: Alexander Bowe, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States,” August 24, 2018. (https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-overseas-united-front-work-background-and-implications-united-states)
  246. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, “Designation of the National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification (NACPU) as a Foreign Mission of the PRC,” October 28, 2020. (https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-national-association-for-chinas-peaceful-unification-nacpu-as-a-foreign-mission-of-the-prc/index.html)
  247. For additional discussion of the Central UFWD, regional UFWDs, and the network of entities to which they are connected, see: Ryan Fedasiuk, “Putting Money in the Party’s Mouth: How China Mobilizes Funding for United Front Work,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, September 16, 2020, Volume 20, Issue 16. (https://jamestown.org/program/putting-money-in-the-partys-mouth-how-china-mobilizes-funding-for-united-front-work)
  248. Ibid.
  249. See: Alex Joske, “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Affairs Work,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, May 9, 2019, Volume 19, Issue 9. (https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work)
  250. John Dotson, “CPAFFC and the United Front Strategy: ‘Sub-National Engagement,’” Jamestown Foundation, October 15, 2019. (https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Dotson_Presentation.pdf?x30101). CPAFFC professes to engage in “non-governmental diplomacy across the world” but is supported and overseen by the Chinese government. “Association Introduction,” The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, accessed October 26, 2021. (https://www.cpaffc.org.cn)
  251. Jichang Lulu, “Repurposing democracy: The European Parliament China friendship cluster,” Sinopsis, November 26, 2019. (https://sinopsis.cz/en/ep)
  252. Ibid.
  253. CPAFFC has been described as an organ of the United Front Work Department. See: Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, “Our twisted sister cities,” The Daily Telegraph (Australia), April 22, 2020. (Accessed via Lexis Nexis)
  254. China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance, Eds. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2019), page 187. (https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/00_diamond-schell-chinas-influence-and-american-interests_REVISED.pdf)
  255. Clive Hamilton, Testimony Before the Australian Parliament, October 12, 2020. (https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/commsen/8d638ff5-2861-4257-bf92-469caf9a203c/&sid=0002)
  256. PRC Embassy in the United States of America, Press Release, “Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Sign the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment of a China-U.S. Governors’ Forum to Promote Sub-National Cooperation,” January 20, 2011. (https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/hjtzxdmgfw_665768/t788646.shtml)
  257. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, “Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment of the U.S.-China Governors Forum to Promote Sub-National Cooperation,” January 19, 2011. (https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/01/155075.htm)
  258. “Kerry, Governors in Beijing to Strengthen U.S.-China Relations,” The U.S.-China Policy Foundation, April 18, 2013. (https://uscpf.org/v3/2013/04/18/5578)
  259. Matt Canham, “Utah to host first U.S.-China Governors Forum,” The Salt Lake Tribune, February 26, 2011. (https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=51319780&itype=CMSID); “Kerry, Governors in Beijing to Strengthen U.S.-China Relations,” The U.S.-China Policy Foundation, April 18, 2013. (https://uscpf.org/v3/2013/04/18/5578)
  260. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Media Note, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track May 3-4, 2012,” May 4, 2012. (https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189287.htm)
  261. “第二届中美省州长论坛在天津举行 [The 2nd China-US Governors’ Forum Was Held in Tianjin],” China News (China), April 2016.
  262. “Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the China-US Governors’ Forum,” China Daily (China), September 24, 2015. (https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/2015-09/24/content_21966923_2.htm)
  263. Huang Zhiling and Zhang Xia, “NPC official calls China, US ‘inseparable,’” China Daily (China), May 23, 2018. (https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/82/194/217/1527058272310.html)
  264. Ambassador Cui Tiankai, PRC Embassy in the United States of America, “崔天凯大使在第五届中美省州长论坛开幕式上的致辞 [Remarks by Ambassador Cui Tiankai at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth China-US Governors’ Forum],” May 24, 2019.
  265. “U.S. Designates Chinese Body a Foreign Mission, Quits Local Cooperation Agreement,” Reuters, October 28, 2020. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-pompeo/u-s-designates-chinese-body-a-foreign-mission-quits-local-cooperation-agreement-idUSKBN27D305)
  266. Liu Danning, “美国加州杰瑞·布朗时期对华外交研究(2011-2018)[Research on the Diplomacy of California during the Jerry Brown Period (2011-2018)],” Jiangsu Provincial Party School of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the CCP, June 2020.
  267. “第五届中美省州长论坛在美国肯塔基州开幕 [The 5th China-U.S. Governors Forum opens in Kentucky, U.S.],” Xinhua News Agency (China), May 23, 2019. A March 2018 article in the Chinese journal Contemporary American Review, titled “China-U.S. Governors’ Forum and Local Cooperation: Theory and Thinking,” was also pointed: “It is necessary to grasp the importance of U.S. states in U.S. domestic politics and enhance the strategic nature of the [governors] forum… We should pay attention to the study of various regions in the United States, understand Sino-U.S. local cooperation better, [and] take innovative measures to effectively deepen China-U.S. provincial-state local cooperation.” Wang Yong, “中美省州长论坛与地方合作:理论与思考 [Governors Forum and Local Cooperation: Theory and Thinking], Contemporary American Review, March 2018.
  268. The China General Chamber of Commerce (CGCC) also works directly with the NGA, including by co-hosting a regular International Cooperation Forum. See: China General Chamber of Commerce, Press Release, “International Cooperation Forum at 2018 NGA Summer Meeting in New Mexico,” July 24, 2018. (https://www.cgccusa.org/en/international-cooperation-forum-at-2018-nga-summer-meeting-in-new-mexico). Inaugurated in 2017 and held during the NGA’s summer meeting, the International Cooperation Forum brings together Chinese CEOs and investors, U.S. governors, and other business executives to, as the CGCC puts it, “discuss international cooperation at the sub-national level.” Then-Utah Governor Gary Herbert and then-Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper spoke at the 2018 event, as did executives from CGCC member companies Bank of China USA and China Investment Corporation. North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum and Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson attended. In his keynote address at the event, Zhang Ping, the consul general from the PRC Consulate General in Los Angeles, urged the attendees to use subnational cooperation to return stability to U.S.-China economic ties: “We need to promote the awareness of the importance of maintaining a sound China-U.S. relationship. China is not a threat, but a partner of cooperation.” The event featured a panel on “Rebuilding a Silk Road to Economic Development,” moderated by Mike Walter of CGTN-America, Qi Bin of China Investment Corporation, and Raymond Qiao of the Bank of China New York. Hickenlooper and Herbert spoke on a separate panel focused on “U.S-China Economic Ties, Growth, Strategies, and Investment Opportunities.”
  269. “U.S.-China Governors’ Collaboration Summit,” China General Chamber of Commerce – USA, accessed October 26, 2021. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20210417061407/https://www.cgccusa.org/en/us-china-governors-collab-summit)
  270. “U.S.-China Governors Forum,” C-SPAN, July 15, 2011. (https://www.c-span.org/video/?300540-2/us-china-governors-forum)
  271. “U.S.-China Governors’ Collaboration Summit,” China General Chamber of Commerce – USA, accessed October 26, 2021. (Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20210417061407/https://www.cgccusa.org/en/us-china-governors-collab-summit)
  272. Xu Jing, Xu Xingtang, and Miao Zhuang, “Feature: Governors compete for investment at China-U.S. Governors Forum,” Xinhua News Agency (China), May 25, 2019. (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/25/c_138088615.htm). The piece also quotes Colorado Lieutenant Governor Dianne Primavera (“Colorado welcomes the opportunity to do business with China”) and then-Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin (“We want you here, we want your investment here”).
  273. “China-U.S. magnesium joint venture launched at Governors Summit in Kentucky,” Xinhua News Agency (China), May 25, 2019. (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/25/c_138087299.htm)
  274. National Governors Association, Press Release, “400 Representatives of U.S., China Attend Collaboration Summit in Kentucky,” May 24, 2019. (https://www.nga.org/news/press-releases/400-representatives-of-u-s-china-attend-collaboration-summit-in-kentucky)
  275. Some three months later, in October 2011, then-Missouri Governor Jay Nixon met with the CHINT Group in Hongzhou as part of a trade delegation to China, during which time he signed a $200 million agreement with Hebei provincial officials. Kelsey Volkmann, “Nixon Signs $200 Million Chinese Trade Deal,” St. Louis Business Journal, October 26, 2011. (https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2011/10/26/nixon-signs-200m-chinese-trade-deal.html)
  276. Tan Yingzi, “Provincial Governors Sign Deals in U.S.,” China Daily (China), July 15, 2011. (https://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2011-07/15/content_12910791.htm); Xie Songxin and Zhang Jianming, “Sub-national forum a hit with provinces, China Daily (China), July 15, 2011. (https://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-07/15/content_12910881.htm)
  277. The GT Solar-Asia Silicon agreement likely referred to GT Solar’s provision of polysilicon production equipment to Asia Silicon.
  278. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Fact Sheet, “Commerce Finds Dumping and Subsidization of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules from the People’s Republic of China,” October 10, 2012. (https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet_prc-solar-cells-ad-cvd-finals-20121010.pdf)
  279. The Governors Forum does not publish official attendance lists. This tally is collected from press and official documentation of the events, covering the five official fora as well as the 2011 and 2012 dialogues. The authors believe that this tally is comprehensive for every iteration of the forum and dialogues except the inaugural one, in February 2011. Held during the NGA meeting, that forum reportedly was attended by approximately 20 U.S. governors. See: Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs Reta Jo Lewis, U.S. Department of State, “Outcome of U.S.-China Governors Forum,” Remarks to the Press, July 19, 2011. (https://2009-2017-fpc.state.gov/168721.htm). Subsequent fora and dialogues featured an average attendance of four U.S. governors or lieutenant governors, with higher attendance at the U.S.-based events than at the China-based ones. Attendance is defined as participation by a state’s governor or lieutenant governor. While not reflected on this map, the Puerto Rico governor participated in February 2011; Guam in October 2011; and the Northern Mariana Islands in October 2011 and February 2012. The U.S. official with the best-known attendance record is Terry Branstad of Iowa, who attended three times as a governor and again in 2018 as U.S. ambassador to China.
  280. The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Press Release, “The Third U.S.-China Subnational Legislatures Cooperation Forum Held in the United States,” November 29, 2018. (https://cpaffc.org.cn/index/news/detail/id/6468/lang/2.html)
  281. You Siyuan, “China, U.S. vow to push cooperation in sub-national legislation,” CGTN (China), November 13, 2019. (https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-11-13/China-U-S-vow-to-push-cooperation-in-sub-national-legislation-LA1eh9yp20/index.html)
  282. “Chinese, U.S. local legislators vow to enhance cooperation,” Xinhua News Agency (China), March 2, 2021. (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/02/c_139778470.htm)
  283. The Chinese provinces represented were Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong, and Yunnan. The U.S. states were Alabama, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, and Tennessee. See: PRC Embassy in the United States of America, Press Release, “Ambassador Cui Tiankai Congratulates on the Opening of the 5th China-U.S. Sub-national Legislatures Cooperation Forum,” March 4, 2021. (http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgxss/t1858421.htm)
  284. “Chinese, U.S. local legislators vow to enhance cooperation,” Xinhua News Agency (China), March 2, 2021. (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/02/c_139778470.htm); You Siyuan, “China, U.S. vow to push cooperation in sub-national legislation,” CGTN (China), November 13, 2019. (https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-11-13/China-U-S-vow-to-push-cooperation-in-sub-national-legislation-LA1eh9yp20/index.html)
  285. “History of Sister Cities International,” Fort Worth Sister Cities International, accessed October 26, 2021. (https://www.fwsistercities.org)
  286. The first U.S. city to pair with a Chinese city was St. Louis, Missouri, which partnered with Nanjing in 1979.
  287. As aggregated from Chinese- and English-language lists, press releases, and media coverage.
  288. Tim Pile, “Sister cities in the West a bulwark for China against worsening US ties,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), December 19, 2018. (https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/travel/article/2178679/sister-cities-west-bulwark-china-against-worsening-us). See also: Hao Xiaosong, “扩容城市’朋友圈’ [Expanding the City’s ‘Friend Circle’],” China Pictorial (China), November 5, 2019.
  289. China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance, Eds. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2019), pages 29–30. (https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/00_diamond-schell-chinas-influence-and-american-interests_REVISED.pdf)
  290. Chicago Sister Cities International, Press Release, “Chicago Builds Ties with China,” June 23, 2014. (http://www.chicagosistercities.com/news/chicago-builds-ties-china)
  291. “State by State: China and Michigan Trade,” China Briefing, June 17, 2015. (https://www.china-briefing.com/news/state-by-state-china-and-michigan-trade)
  292. Zhang Ruinan, “Guangdong ties to Massachusetts bolstered in Boston,” China Daily (China), May 14, 2018. (https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201805/14/WS5af94e6ca3103f6866ee8421.html). Polito also cited Qilu Pharmaceuticals, WuXi AppTec, and the Shanghai (Zhangjiang Boston) Enterprise Park.
  293. Rebecca Fannin, “China’s EV Maker BYD Gets Bad News From DC And Punches Back,” Forbes, December 14, 2019. (https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccafannin/2019/12/14/chinas-ev-maker-byd-gets-bad-news-from-dc-and-punches-back/?sh=1d7971872513)
  294. See the State Department’s tracking of Communist Chinese military companies: U.S. Department of State, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, Fact Sheet, “Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries,” January 14, 2021. (https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist-chinese-military-companies-listed-under-e-o-13959-have-more-than-1100-subsidiaries/index.html)
  295. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, “Designation of the National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification (NACPU) as a Foreign Mission of the PRC,” October 28, 2020. (https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-national-association-for-chinas-peaceful-unification-nacpu-as-a-foreign-mission-of-the-prc/index.html)
  296. For context on connections between Confucius Institutes and the CCP’s United Front Work Department, see: Alex Joske, “The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 9, 2020. (https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you)
  297. For a more in-depth treatment of Confucius Institutes, see the forthcoming analysis by FDD China expert Craig Singleton. See also: Billy Kenber, “China is using UK universities to lobby officials,” The Sunday Times (UK), August 24, 2019. (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-is-using-uk-universities-to-lobby-officials-rbxv5vcbn); Peter Varghese, “Australian universities and China: we need clear-eyed engagement,” The Strategist, August 23, 2019. (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-universities-and-china-we-need-clear-eyed-engagement); U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Fact Sheet, “‘Confucius Institute U.S. Center’ Designation as a Foreign Mission,” August 13, 2020. (https://2017-2021.state.gov/confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/index.html)
  298. “第十届世界华文传媒论坛 [The 10th World Chinese Media Forum],” China News Network (China), October 13, 2019.
  299. “背景资料:世界华文传媒论坛 [Background Information: World Media Summit],” China News (China), August 23, 2007. At the sixth meeting, those present published a “Chongqing Declaration” on overseas Chinese media in the international narrative system. They declared that “the global Chinese media are working together” to build a new international discourse, and that “Chinese-language media across the five continents are not only an indispensable part of local multiculturalism, but also inseparable from the rare development opportunities of Chinese culture.” See: “世界华文传媒论坛发表《重庆宣言》[World Chinese Media Forum Publishes ‘Chongqing Declaration’],” China News Network (China), September 18, 2011.
  300. “世界华文传媒论坛:一路耕耘一路收获 [World Chinese Media Forum: Hard Work All the Way to Harvest],” China News Network (China), October 9, 2019.
  301. This analysis defines “outlets” as U.S.-based media outlets that sent delegates to the World Chinese Media Forum in 2019. It does not include non-U.S.-headquartered outlets that might operate in the United States. State affiliation is determined by the location of the outlet’s stations for radio and television operations, and by outlet headquarters for print and online operations. The one exception is print operations serving the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia area. These operations are coded as present in all three.
  302. That said, these outlets are willing to participate in a conference backed by the United Front, oriented clearly around China’s creation of a global media network, and featuring visits by government officials. This suggests a certain proclivity. That proclivity is also evident in their reporting, which features a heavy bias toward Beijing.
  303. “黄燕媚:文明与毒素的当代碰撞 [Huang Yanmei: Contemporary Collision of Civilization and Toxins],” Chinese Overseas Network (China), September 7, 2019; “Home,” Chinese Overseas Network (China), accessed October 26, 2021; PRC State Council, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, “国务院侨务办公室-侨办介绍 [Introduction to Overseas Chinese Affairs Office],” accessed October 26, 2021. (https://www.gov.cn/fuwu/bumendifangdating/bumendating/qiaoban/index.html)
  304. PRC State Council, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, “国务院侨务办工室2017年度部门预算[2017 Annual Budget of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council],” April 2017, Translated by Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 17, 2020. (https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0192_OCAO_budget_2017_EN.pdf)
  305. Keoni Everington, “CCP Reporter who told Trump he was from Taiwan faces stiff fine,” Taiwan News (Taiwan), April 17, 2020. (https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3917938)
  306. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Reply to Opposition to Petition to Deny,” Filing Before the Federal Communications Commission,” File No. 325-NEW-20180614-00001, September 10, 2019. (https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/106062671205148/19-144%2013.pdf)
  307. “中新社与美国数十家华文媒体深化或建立合作关系 [China News Service Has Deepened or Established Cooperative Relations with Dozens of Chinese-language Media in the United States],” China News (China), October 24, 2006. That concentration of outlets in or near Houston — also reflected in the attendees of the World Chinese Media Forum — is worth emphasizing. In July 2020, the United States announced that it would close the Chinese Consulate in Houston, Texas, based on findings regarding its engagement in espionage and influence activities. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Briefing with Senior U.S. Government Officials on the Closure of the Chinese Consulate in Houston, Texas,” Remarks to the Press, July 24, 2020. (https://2017-2021.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-u-s-government-officials-on-the-closure-of-the-chinese-consulate-in-houston-texas/index.html)
  308. “联邦众议员马克考夫曼先生 访问和嘉勉中美邮报、丹佛孔子课堂 [Representative Mike Coffman Visited and Encouraged China-US Post and Confucius Classroom in Denver],” Chinese-American Post (China), August 21, 2017.
  309. “美中时报与美中投资促进会、美国华人专家会签署战略合作协议 [The America-China Times Signed a Strategic Cooperation Agreement with the U.S.-China Investment Promotion Association and the American Chinese Expert Association],” Sino-US Times (China), November 22, 2018.
  310. “美中投资促进会主席张家豪领投5亿 [America-China Investment Promotion Association Chairman Zhang Jiahao Led the Investment of 500 Million Yuan],” China Network (China), July 5, 2019.
  311. “美中投资促进会 [America-China Investment Promotion Association],” Scicat Encyclopedia, January 5, 2021.
  312. “美中投资促进会主席张家豪领投5亿 [America-China Investment Promotion Association Chairman Zhang Jiahao Led the Investment of 500 Million Yuan],” China Network (China), July 5, 2019; “美中投资促进会一行莅临我集团考察指导 [The America-China Investment Promotion Association Visited Our Group for Inspection and Guidance],” Global Express (China), August 8, 2020; “美中投资促进会常州分会成立 [America-China Investment Promotion Association Changzhou Branch Was Established],” Chinese Overseas Network (China), October 28, 2018.
  313. “美国华人专家会会长:“侨梦苑”是创业沃土 [President of the American Association of Chinese Experts: ‘Qiaomengyuan’ Is a Fertile Ground for Entrepreneurship],” China News Network (China), December 16, 2016.
  314. “中国科学技术协会2019年部门预算 [China Association for Science and Technology 2019 Budget],” The China Association for Science and Technology, April 2019, Translated by Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 27, 2020. (https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-association-for-science-and-technology-2019-budget); “People’s Political Consultative Conference of the People’s Republic of China,” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, accessed October 26, 2021. (http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ppcc.html)
  315. “2015 International Forum for Technology Innovation, Collaboration and Development: The 23rd Annual Conference of CAST-USA,” Chinese Association for Science and Technology, USA, October 2015. (http://castgny.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CAST-Conf-2015-en.pdf)
  316. Chinese Association for Science and Technology, USA, Press Release, “US China Collaboration Forum,” accessed October 26, 2021. (http://castgny.org/en/index.php/us-china-collaboration-forum)
  317. Ryan Fedasiuk and Emily Weinstein, “Overseas Professionals and Technology Transfer to China,” Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology, July 21, 2020. (https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/overseas-professionals-and-technology-transfer-to-china); “Missions,” Chinese Association for Science and Technology, USA, accessed October 26, 2021. (https://webcast621.wixsite.com/castusa/organization)
  318. China Association for Science and Technology, Press Release, “旅美科协一行拜访中国科协国际部 [A delegation from the American Association for Science and Technology Visited the International Department of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology],” June 26, 2018.
  319. PRC Ministry of Science and Technology, Press Release, “科技部部长王志刚会见中国旅美科技协会候任会长焦德泉 [Minister of Science and Technology Wang Zhigang meets with Jiao Dequan, President-Elect of China Association of Science and Technology in the U.S.],” May 23, 2018.
  320. Jia Zhongzheng, “中美经贸关系新变化及中国对策 [New Changes in Sino-US Economic and Trade Relations and China’s Countermeasures],” International Trade (China), 2017.
  321. “Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the China-US Governors’ Forum,” China Daily (China), September 24, 2015. (https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/2015-09/24/content_21966923_2.htm)
  322. The trade data are sourced from the U.S. Census Bureau. Trade with Hong Kong and with the People’s Republic of China are both included.
  323. Li Junqiang and Zang Zhenrui, “基础设施建设是中美合作的关键点 [Infrastructure Construction Is a Key Point of Sino-US Cooperation],” Motherland (China), 2017.
  324. Ibid.
  325. The GDP data are sourced from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The trade data are sourced from the U.S. Census Bureau. Trade with Hong Kong and with the People’s Republic of China are both included.
  326. “通讯:逆风前行——美地方政府积极寻求对华合作 [Correspondence: Going Against the Wind: U.S. Local Governments Actively Seek Cooperation with China],” Xinhua News Agency (China), August 19, 2019.
  327. The headquarters data are sourced from Uniworld Online’s Foreign Company Database.
  328. Ibid.
  329. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Fact Sheet, “‘Confucius Institute U.S. Center’ Designation as a Foreign Mission,” August 13, 2020. (https://www.state.gov/confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission)
  330. Ben Westcott and Jennifer Hansler, “U.S. designates six more Chinese media companies as foreign missions,” CNN Business, October 22, 2020. (https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/22/media/us-china-media-company-pompeo-intl-hnk/index.html)
  331. “U.S. designates Chinese body a foreign mission, quits local cooperation agreement,” Reuters, October 28, 2020. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-pompeo/u-s-designates-chinese-body-a-foreign-mission-quits-local-cooperation-agreement-idUSKBN27D305)
  332. See: Section 605 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1185. (https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/133)
  333. See, for example: David Brunnstrom, “U.S. congressmen reach back into Cold War armory to respond to China,” Reuters, July 28, 2021. (https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-congressmen-reach-back-into-cold-war-armory-respond-china-2021-07-28)
  334. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Section 7613 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,” accessed October 26, 2021. (https://www.transit.dot.gov/funding/procurement/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-section-7613-national-defense)
  335. Membership in the Democratic National Construction Association does not preclude membership in the CCP. For example, Xhu Xiangyuan, one of the experts at Minzhi, is described on the think tank’s website as a member of both the China Democratic National Construction Association and the CCP. The website also says he served as vice chairman of the 9th and 10th Beijing CPPCCs as well as a member of the Standing Committee of the 9th and 10th National People’s Congress.
  336. “陈明键:”全球化大统战”的纵横家 [Chen Mingjian: A strategist of the “Global United Front”],” Overseas Student Association, March 13, 2017.
  337. “海外合作 [Overseas Cooperation],” Tisnghua University, accessed November 2, 2021.

Issues:

China International Organizations