U.S. and Europe Must Prevent Iran’s Acquisition of New Enrichment Equipment

Israeli and U.S. strikes in June left Iran with only limited equipment for enriching uranium, according to a September 13 report in Le Monde. Indeed, Tehran is unlikely to be able to restart such efforts anytime soon, the story said, based on a briefing to French officials of Jerusalem’s post-war battle damage assessment.

To resurrect its enrichment program — which would enable Iran to produce new fuel for nuclear weapons — Tehran will likely need to source some equipment from outside the country. Its ability to do this is likely to depend on Western nations’ readiness to restore thorough proliferation safeguards.

Major Bottlenecks in Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Pathway

Israeli and U.S. strikes created major bottlenecks to Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons.

To stymie Iran’s production of enriched uranium fuel, Israel bombed Tehran’s centrifuge manufacturing, assembly, and testing facilities, along with related equipment. Jerusalem and Washington also eliminated Iran’s uranium conversion plant at Esfahan, and severely damaged or destroyed three enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, where some enriched uranium stockpiles may now be entombed. Also at Esfahan, the strikes stymied access to stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in tunnels nearby, and also to a new enrichment plant Iran was constructing there.

Moreover, Israel eliminated, at least temporarily, Iran’s pathway to assembling nuclear weapons — known as weaponization — by destroying an Esfahan lab that Iran could use to create uranium metal for nuclear weapon cores, along with several weaponization facilities containing key equipment and documentation. Jerusalem also assassinated more than a dozen essential nuclear scientists.

All told, and absent unknown capabilities or major foreign assistance, Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons has been set back by at least two years, according to Israeli assessments.

‘Only a Matter of Time’ To Restart Enrichment

Despite these achievements, Iran retains enrichment capabilities it could reactivate over the longer term, Israel reportedly underscored to French officials.

“While the centrifuge manufacturing sites and most of the uranium enrichment facilities were destroyed, particularly at Fordow and Natanz, Iran still possesses this type of equipment,” Israeli officials reportedly said. Tehran has “too few to restart the program in the short term, but it’s only a matter of time.” It is unclear whether the officials were referring specifically to centrifuges or to all relevant enrichment equipment.

Iran is also working to excavate any nuclear assets that might have survived the attacks. It is likely hoping to find enriched uranium stocks, supporting enrichment equipment, and centrifuges. Tehran may also have unknown quantities of centrifuges hidden away to help restore a small enrichment program.

But whatever it cobbles together, Tehran will likely require equipment from abroad.

UN Sanctions and Detection Efforts Can Stem Iran’s Nuclear Trade

The United States, as well as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, are in the process of restoring UN sanctions on Iran, designed in part to curb Tehran’s illicit acquisition of nuclear-related goods and equipment. The sanctions were loosened under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and are set to expire in October 2025. To ensure nuclear trade with Tehran remains banned, the parties should finalize the “snapback” of the UN sanctions by the end of a 30-day window that closes on September 27.

In addition, the United States, Israel, and their partners must work to detect, thwart, and penalize any covert nuclear assistance from Iran’s partners in the Axis of Aggressors: China, Russia, and North Korea. While this trio refrained from defending Tehran against U.S. and Israeli strikes, they may be less averse to quietly helping Iran rebuild its nuclear capabilities, including by turning a blind eye to illicit sales from their own domestic companies.

Finally, Washington and Jerusalem must be prepared to strike Iran again — eliminating any revived Iranian enrichment or weaponization activities — to ensure the regime is kept far from nuclear arms.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.