January 15, 2025 | Policy Brief
New U.S. Sanctions on Leadership of Russian Nuclear Corporation Are Positive — But Should Be Just a Start
January 15, 2025 | Policy Brief
New U.S. Sanctions on Leadership of Russian Nuclear Corporation Are Positive — But Should Be Just a Start
The State Department sanctioned senior officials of Rosatom, Russia’s state-run nuclear corporation, on Friday, including its CEO, Alexei Likhachev. These sanctions are long overdue and reflect the Biden administration’s past failure to stem a key revenue source for Russia and its war against Ukraine.
Rosatom’s annual revenue in 2023 amounted to more than $16 billion, up from nearly $12 billion in 2022. The company hopes to top $18 billion when 2024 figures come in. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, Moscow supplies 35 percent of nuclear fuel imported by the United States while Europe relies on a similar amount. Western actions to curtail trade have languished in favor of stable energy markets and due to tight nuclear supplies.
In a State Department press release justifying the new sanctions, the Biden administration explained that Rosatom-related companies are developing weapons systems for the Ukraine war and have provided military equipment for the Russian defense industry. The department also highlighted Rosatom’s role in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex as well as its stationing of employees at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.
The State Department failed to mention that Rosatom also plays a pivotal role in expanding China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. In March 2023, a senior Defense Department official confirmed that Rosatom is providing nuclear fuel to a Chinese nuclear reactor that produces weapons-grade plutonium for China’s nuclear arsenal. The Defense Department warned last month that Beijing will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030 — and at a higher readiness level.
While the new sanctions are welcome, the Biden administration should have sanctioned the organization’s leadership much sooner. The United Kingdom, for example, sanctioned Rosatom’s management board nearly two years ago due to its role in establishing “strategies, policies and objectives” for the company. In December 2023, the authors of this FDD policy brief recommended sanctioning Rosatom’s management board.
The Biden administration finally acted under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, deploying a suite of new penalties against Russia’s energy sector, which it called “the primary source of revenue fueling Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Yet the administration has hesitated to sanction Rosatom as a whole, adding only several subsidiaries and related entities to sanctions lists since Putin’s invasion.
The new sanctions may have a chilling effect on Rosatom’s efforts to continue its dominant role in the global nuclear industry and deter new foreign business with the corporation. Moreover, it may assist the United States and its allies in competing with Russia, which has artificially lower prices given its state-run role.
A second Trump administration must get tougher on Rosatom.
Using E.O. 14024 or by supporting swift congressional legislation, Trump should announce sanctions on Rosatom and all subsidiaries and a responsible wind-down over months to years, depending on the availability of alternative supplies, of U.S. and foreign imports from Rosatom. The new administration should also announce it will enact secondary sanctions against foreign entities and financial institutions that continue to do business with the conglomerate.
The new administration must also continue guiding the expansion of U.S. nuclear production capabilities, which the Biden team has helpfully done, and increase opportunities for American and Western companies to compete for foreign nuclear power reactor contracts.
Three years into the Ukraine war, business as usual cannot continue with Rosatom, nor can it continue with Russia’s energy sector writ large.
Anthony Ruggiero is an adjunct senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and served as the National Security Council’s director for North Korea (2018-2019) and senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense (2019-2021) in the Trump administration. Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of FDD’s Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program. For more analysis from the authors and FDD please subscribe HERE. Follow Anthony and Andrea on X @NatSecAnthony and @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.