Beyond the Bomb: Is Iran’s Diplomatic Pivot Changing Its Nuclear Calculus?

Iran is facing crunch time on its continued talks with the United States over a potential new deal regarding its nuclear program.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araqchi said on June 4 that if Iran is not allowed to continue to enrich uranium, then it would not agree to a deal with Washington. This statement came after five rounds of indirect talks with the Trump administration. Oman mediates the talks.

Iran’s Agenda

The larger agenda of Iran in the deal talks extends beyond its nuclear program. Iran has been down this path before with the Obama administration. For Tehran, it was always about preserving its larger ambitions in the region and globally. The nuclear program is a prestige issue for Iran, as Araqchi made clear in a social media post on June 4.

However, it’s only part of the Iranian agenda. The larger agenda was laid out in May in Moscow by Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. He spoke about how “new opportunities have arisen for the creation of a new world order.” This isn’t the first time Iran or Russia have talked about a shifting global order.

In October 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, not Masoud Pezeshkian, and also spoke of a “new world order” in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. Russia is the stronger partner in the Iranian-Russia relationship. However, both countries are today only part of a larger puzzle in terms of their drive for this new global order.

For instance, both are now members of BRICS, which brings together several non-Western powers in an economic bloc. In 2022, Russia’s State Duma speaker suggested that Iran could become an observer at the post-Soviet Collective Security Treaty Organization, which brings together Russia and several former Soviet Republics. Iran has also joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was founded by China in 2001 and now has ten member states.

Iran’s global ambitions today are more clear than in the past. It has sought to entrench relations with China and Russia. It has also increased its outreach to Turkey, Pakistan, and India in recent years. As Iran shifted gears towards these countries, it also saw its influence in the Middle East weaken.

For instance, the war launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, led Iran to encourage Hezbollah and other proxies, such as the Houthis, to strike at Israel. In this multi-front war, Israel has gained the upper hand.

Hezbollah was weakened and battered into a ceasefire in November 2024. The Assad regime in Syria, a key ally of Iran, fell on December 8, 2024. The Houthis continue to target Israel, but it appears a deal with the US in early May could pave the way for some de-escalation in the Red Sea.

What matters here is that Iran is no longer on the upswing in terms of regional influence in the Middle East as it was when it signed the original JCPOA Iran deal back in 2015. Today, Iran has amicable ties with Saudi Arabia. It also sees its future in relations with countries in Asia.

This includes conducting outreach to countries with which Iran has historically had colder ties, such as Egypt. Iran’s foreign minister recently flew to Cairo to strengthen those relations. What this means is that Iran is spreading its diplomatic wings outside of its role in backing Shi’ite militia proxies. It’s now involved in larger state-to-state relations.

This practice is prominently featured in Iranian state media, with numerous articles highlighting Iranian diplomatic outreach. For instance, Iran’s president spoke with the sultan of Oman on June 4. Iran’s powerful and influential Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf visited Venezuela on June 3, where he met with Venezuelan Transport Minister Ramon Velasquez. The countries have a joint economic commission, Iranian state media IRNA noted. Qalibaf also visited Cuba as part of his trip to the region and discussed strengthening ties.

The picture that is emerging is clear. Iran may be able to be more flexible on the nuclear file, as it feels it has strengthened its global ties. Although it saw the wings of its proxies clipped in the Middle East, it may feel the era of the proxies is now moving towards a kind of sunset. The proxies will remain important. However, Tehran may now feel it has the luxury and breathing space to invest in bigger plans.

This enables it to connect with markets ranging from Russia to the Persian Gulf and from China to Egypt. Iran has plans for additional north-south economic corridors, for instance, linking the Caucasus to the Gulf, as well as Central Asia to Tehran. Closer cooperation with Pakistan, which is also a friend of Turkey, could lead to ties that link Ankara to Islamabad, as well as Tehran.

In the Middle East, many countries, including traditional Western allies, are hedging their bets on this emerging new world order. What that means is that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and others want to be part of non-Western economic blocs while maintaining their alliances or partnerships with the US and the West.

Iran wants to be well placed to exploit this, with or without a nuclear deal.  

Seth J. Frantzman is the author of After ISIS: America, Iran and the struggle for the Middle East and the forthcoming Drone Wars: Pioneers, killing machines, artificial intelligence and the battle for the future (Bombardier Books, 2021).