February 3, 2025 | The National Interest
Assad Is Gone, Syria’s Captagon Trade Isn’t
Despite its statements vowing to clean up the country, Syria’s new government is unlikely to tackle the profitable narcotics trade.
February 3, 2025 | The National Interest
Assad Is Gone, Syria’s Captagon Trade Isn’t
Despite its statements vowing to clean up the country, Syria’s new government is unlikely to tackle the profitable narcotics trade.
Deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle made billions from manufacturing and exporting Captagon, a highly addictive amphetamine. On the same day, Assad fled to Russia, Syria’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa—previously known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—declared an end to the Captagon era. “The Assad regime has turned Syria into a land of corruption and drug trade,” Sharaa said, but now, he pledged, “Syria is being purified.” Yet, in pursuit of stability for post-Assad Syria, Sharaa is already cultivating warm relations with the same kingpins on whom Assad relied to export Captagon.
The Jordanian Armed Forces announced on January 4 that they had killed a number of smugglers attempting to cross into the kingdom from southern Syria. Despite the new Syrian authorities’ seizure of Captagon production facilities and burning of stockpiled pills, the drug trade clearly continues, and Sharaa is not in a position to antagonize the cartel leaders. On December 21, he met with Imad Abu Zureiq, on whom the United States imposed sanctions in 2023 for using his militia to “sell contraband, operate protection rackets, and smuggle drugs in Jordan, while also recruiting directly for [Syrian military intelligence.]”
In a bid to stabilize the country and consolidate his own power, Sharaa has been meeting with leaders from the numerous factions making up the coalition that brought down Assad. Seeing the writing on the wall, Abu Zureiq broke with the regime before it collapsed, but not before getting rid of documents that implicated him in the drug trade and securing the escape of many of the regime officials in the area. Sharaa wants to unify the factions into a single national army, effectively under his command. Perhaps when his power is secure, Sharaa will turn on Abu Zureiq and other kingpins. But their wealth and manpower will make that a daunting task.
Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother and former commander of Syria’s Fourth Armored Division, oversaw the production and trafficking of Captagon for the old regime. The civil war devastated the regime’s finances, but Assad became desperate after the collapse of the Lebanese economy in 2019, creating a crisis that spilled over into Syria. The global trade in Captagon had an estimated annual value of $10 billion, with the Assad family’s cut reaching around $2.4 billion per annum.
Sharaa and his newly appointed minister of defense, Murhaf Abu Qasra, have met with other key figures accused of involvement in the Assad regime narco-enterprise, not just Abu Zureiq. These include Ali al-Miqdad and Moayad al-Aqra, who were initially part of the opposition, like Abu Zureiq, then reconciled with the regime following a Russian-brokered agreement in 2018. Subsequently, they all became affiliated with the regime’s military intelligence directorate under Louay al-Ali, its head in the southern province of Daraa.
Al Ali played a pivotal role in facilitating drug smuggling operations from Syria into Jordan. He allegedly provided logistical support to local smugglers, including weapons and financial resources, in exchange for their cooperation. Many of the armed groups in Daraa that reconciled with the Syrian regime were closely affiliated with al-Ali. While these groups joined the uprising against the regime two days before its collapse, forming the Southern Operations Room, their opportunism suggests that their loyalty to Damascus is tenuous and their financial interests are paramount.
Although Sharaa has already secured control over Damascus and most major cities, the Southern Operations Room has refused to disarm or integrate into a unified military. Its leader is Ahmad al-Awda, another former ally of Louay al-Ali. Al-Awda was once labeled “Russia’s man.” The group’s spokesperson, Nassim Abu Ara, signaled its opposition to accepting Sharaa’s primacy. “We are not convinced by the idea of dissolving the factions. We have weapons, heavy equipment, and full preparations,” he said. Consequently, the southern border with Jordan remains under the control of smuggling groups.
The potential for a clash between Damascus and the southern militias is worrisome, but a rapprochement could be even worse if the traffickers’ reward for joining a unified Syrian army is an unwritten license to continue exporting Captagon. Such an outcome would recreate the Assad regime’s use of the military as a narco-enterprise.
As the United States considers the most effective ways to engage with Syria’s new rulers, a pressing concern should be the integration into the new government of individuals tied to the Assad regime, Russia, and narco-trafficking. On January 6, the Treasury Department suspended sanctions for six months, giving a green light to those who want to do business with the new authorities in Damascus, including individuals currently under sanctions. Yet, if Captagon continues to spill across the border with Jordan or flow out of the country’s seaports, Washington and its allies should wield sanctions and other law enforcement measures to hold Damascus accountable.
Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.