February 6, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post

Iranian media lifts veil on Iran’s kamikaze drone program

The essence of these drones is that the drone itself is a warhead, so it flies into a target like a cruise missile.
February 6, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post

Iranian media lifts veil on Iran’s kamikaze drone program

The essence of these drones is that the drone itself is a warhead, so it flies into a target like a cruise missile.

Iranian pro-government Tasnim News published an important, long article on Tuesday detailing the history and extent of Iran’s kamikaze drone program.

The aircrafts are known as “one-way” attack drones; Iran’s own media notes they are sometimes called “suicide” drones. The essence of them is that the drone itself is a warhead, so it flies into a target like a cruise missile.

Iran has been in the spotlight for exporting these dangerous weapons to Russia, to the Houthis in Yemen, to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to its proxy militias in Iraq and Syria.

The drone program dates back many decades. Iran has often tried to copy US and Israeli models of drones or UAVs. In the past, Iran used these systems for surveillance and has tried to arm them, similar to how the US armed the Predator drone with missiles.

The extent of the program

However, now, Iran has shifted resources to invest in a long line of kamikaze drones, because they are easy to build and export, and can project Iran’s power for thousands of miles around the region. In essence, this is an instant air force. Iran is looking to replicate what the Soviets did with the AK-47 by plowing resources into a weapon system that can be easily exported or replicated abroad.

Tasnim’s article sheds some light on the extent of this program. It reports that Iran’s defense industry has invested in numerous types of drones, ones that can often be hard to spot on radar. The article praises them for their accomplishments, detailing past drone types of this kamikaze model, including the Chamran and Saegh, the Ababil line of drones that were provided in large numbers to the Iranian navy, as well as the Kian, Karar, Arash, Sayad, Miraj, and the new Sina and Bavar. The Sina is an attempt to copy the US’s AeroVironment Switchblade.

Specifically regarding Shahed 136 and 131, the article includes, as a “source” for information on the Shahed, a copy of a Ukrainian report on the drones. The Shahed 136 was first sent to Yemen in 2020 before being exported to Russia for Moscow’s war on Ukraine. Iran’s media was unable to get comments from officials about the export to Russia, so it relied on Ukrainian claims, showcasing the sensitivity of the issue.

Nevertheless, Tasnim is linked to the IRGC, so it can publish this material to brag about the program based on “foreign sources.” In essence, Iran’s media is bragging about the accomplishments of the Iranian drone program by discussing the fact they are being used by Russia by naming the Ukrainians who fell victim to these drones.

Iran’s drone program is complex. It consists of numerous companies and also drones that are provided to the IRGC and the IRGC navy, as well as to the regular army. As such, there is likely internal competition in Iran among the various companies, some of them linked to the IRGC, to develop drones that are successful and which can be exported.

The Shahed 136 has become the face of this program, spreading havoc around the region and in Ukraine in the process. Other Iranian drones have also been exported to proxy groups – Hezbollah and the Houthis. The drones pose a major threat to ships as well as land facilities. An Iranian-backed group in Iraq, for instance, used a drone to kill three American soldiers in Jordan late last month.

Seth Frantzman is the author of Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machine, Artificial Intelligence and the Battle for the Future (Bombardier 2021) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issues:

Hezbollah Iran Iran Global Threat Network Military and Political Power Russia Ukraine