Libya’s maritime deal with Turkey turns an energy dispute into a NATO problem

On October 20, Libya’s eastern-based legislature the House of Representatives ratified the 2019 maritime memorandum between Libya and Turkey, reversing years of opposition to Ankara and aligning with the rival western, Tripoli-based Libyan government in a surprising shift.

The memorandum establishes a maritime boundary between Turkey and Libya that infringes upon the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone entitlements of Greece’s islands, particularly Crete. This creates regional uncertainty that Turkey can exploit to its advantage, while raising the cost of Europe’s response and threatening stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Eastern Libya’s alignment with Turkey is the result of increasingly closer military economic cooperation. Ankara has supported Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, and cultivated diplomatic ties with eastern Libya through military training, infrastructure investment, and offshore exploration agreements. As a result, the memorandum creates legal ambiguity that can obstruct developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and heighten security risks.

The risk of miscommunication between neighbors is intensified as actors in the Eastern Mediterranean assert their positions. For Greece and Cyprus, this move comes at the expense of their sovereignty and directly violates international law under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Turkey is not a signatory to. This viewpoint has been reinforced by statements from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa who have condemned the memorandum under international law and reaffirmed European solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.

The ratification came just five days after Greece announced that the developer on the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a €1.9 billion EU-backed electricity project, had applied to resume seabed surveys. The project was supported by the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio the previous week during his visit to Athens, underscoring Washington’s interest in strengthening energy infrastructure.

Leaders from Greece and Cyprus view the GSI as a significant part of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This corridor was introduced at the 2023 G20 summit and aims to connect India and Europe. It would do so by running through the Gulf and Israel, using rail, sea, power, and data networks. Some US lawmakers from both parties have asked Rubio to focus on the cable because they see it as essential to IMEC. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has opposed this route because it bypasses Turkey.

More than ever, Europe must prioritize restructuring its energy relationships, focusing on diversifying supply, reducing energy dependencies, and investing in renewables. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted traditional energy supplies and exposed vulnerabilities in its energy infrastructure. With the threat of a looming energy crisis ahead of winter, Europe has begun to brace itself for high energy costs and potential disruptions. Turkey’s behavior not only infringes upon European sovereignty but also impedes Europe’s energy security.

Energy has long been at the heart of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Discoveries of vast energy reserves in the late 2000s reinforced the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean as an energy corridor, bridging North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Proposed electricity interconnections, including the Great Sea Interconnector and the GREGY, would provide up to five gigawatts of cross-border transmission, in addition to the proposed East-Med pipeline, all of which will be interrupted by the contested maritime area that sits at the intersection of these projects. Moreover, these infrastructure projects depend on access to seabed areas that are complicated by contested maritime jurisdictions. The possibility of naval intervention and interrupted surveys prevents construction and discourages investment, raising the costs of the project.

This is not the first time Turkey has blocked energy developments and asserted its military posture in the region. Turkey has previously deployed seismic research vessels with warships to search for oil and gas deposits, as it did with the ship Oruc Reis in 2020, prompting retaliatory naval drills by Greece and Cyprus. Even without direct military confrontation, responding to Turkish naval activity in disputed maritime areas places additional demands on Greek military readiness and surveillance capabilities. The continued deployment of Greek naval and air assets to defend its internationally recognized territorial waters directs diplomatic, financial, and military resources away from national and NATO security priorities.

The strategic consequences of uncertainty in the region extend far beyond financial costs and risk confrontation between forces. The memorandum’s maritime delimitation complicates the security environment of the Eastern Mediterranean near Crete, home to the Naval Support Activity Souda Bay. The island hosts strategically important American, Greek, and NATO defense infrastructure that support operations in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East as well as a NATO Missile Firing Installation and specialized training grounds. Turkey’s maritime claims increase the likelihood of naval incidents during military exercises for Greece, the United States, and other NATO allies.

Ankara has already begun using the boundary for military purposes. In April, for example, a drone took part in the US-led Flintlock exercise in Libya by flying along the memorandum’s sea borders. France reported in 2020 that Turkish warships illuminated its frigate Courbet with targeting radar. This occurred as the frigate approached a vessel suspected of illegally transporting weapons to Libya. After this incident, Paris temporarily withdrew from NATO’s Sea Guardian mission. Then, in August of that year, Greek and Turkish frigates collided during the Oruc Reis dispute, prompting NATO to establish a deconfliction hotline between the two allied countries.

Commercial interests add another dimension of risk. The Eastern Mediterranean sits at the crossroads of trade, connecting routes from Asia and the Middle East through the Suez Canal to European markets. The memorandum could escalate military tensions in the region and increase uncertainty for commercial operators, creating a chokepoint for Turkey to disrupt trade. Even limited disruptions can impose additional costs to commercial activity that extends beyond regional boundaries.

Why is Ankara increasing its activity now? This ratification results from Turkey’s seven-year effort to gain favor with eastern Libya. By securing approval from the east in addition to Tripoli, Turkey corrects the agreement’s main legal weakness, promotes its “Blue Homeland” doctrine for maritime expansion, and reinforces its right to influence projects like the GSI. It also highlights internal political factors. Erdogan is seeking a fourth term, but many voters disapprove of his economic management. He might view increased tension in the Eastern Mediterranean as a reliable way to build nationalist support and secure foreign concessions. It is worth noting that Erdogan appeared confident after the recent NATO summit in Ankara, encouraged by US President Donald Trump’s positive remarks and seemingly persuaded that the White House will support him no matter what he does. Ankara, in essence, expects no resistance from Washington or Brussels. Without active engagement by both capitals, Turkey’s push for regional dominance could be swift and merciless.

Sinan Ciddi is Turkey program director and senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC; Isabella Bournas is an intern at the organization.